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Abstract 
This thesis examines the nature and extent of initial and 
higher education for officers of the Royal Navy from 1857 
to 1877 - a period that constituted the most vigorous years 
of educational reform in the history of the Service. That 
this activity should arise in a period of general stasis In 
naval affairs, is the central paradox this work seeks to 
explore. 
To this end the system of examination and entry into the 
Service is explained and the origins and development of the 
training ship HMS Britannia are identified. Existing 
assessments of her curriculum and routine are challenged 
and the various attempts to found an alternative shore 
based college are outlined. 
The extent and efficiency of education conducted post-
Britannia in operational warships is also discussed and the 
efficiency of the sea-going Naval Instructor system lS 
questioned. 
In higher education the work of the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth and its successor at Greenwich is considered and 
in particular the process by which this more expenslve, 
overwhelmingly less popular institution was chosen as the 
Navy's new higher education establishment, is analysed and 
explained. 
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Introduction 
In June 1897 the Queen's Diamond Jubilee Review provided 
the greatest display of naval force the world had ever 
seen. At Spithead more than 160 modern warships were 
assembled in a vivid demonstration of the nature and 
quality of British sea power. Only modern vessels were 
deployed and not a single foreign station had been 
weakened to provide a spectacle of almost 30 miles of 
ships-in-line. The number of personnel borne, at 92,322, 
was the highest since the end of the Napoleonic wars and 
the Estimates for 1897, in excess of £22 million, had 
never previously been equalled. Such a lavish 
organisation was fully in accordance with the public mood 
for a country that dressed its children in sailor suits 
and created a whole body of 'genre' art, around images of 
the Royal Navy. 'All classes', Marder has suggested, 'had 
or thought they had something to gain from the growth of 
1 the Navy'. 
Yet the most striking aspect of this demonstration of 
naval power and public enthusiasm often taken to be 
synonomous with the Victorian era, was that it was in 
sharp contrast to the bulk of the nineteenth century naval 
exper1ence. Just a decade before the Diamond Jubilee 
Review for example, the ships taking part in a similar 
evolution were described by one Admiral as 'a motley 
collection of ancient constructions' and by another as 
2 
'mere ullage'. Their unsatisfactory state was emphasised 
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by a series of accidents and collisions that indicated 
equally poor levels of training and efficiency of those 
who operated them. This was undoubtedly a more typical 
picture of the Royal Navy in the Victorian era. In 
contrast to the glittering display and public enthusiasm 
of the last decade, for the bulk of the nineteenth century 
the Service was a relatively small, overworked, 
chronically ill-manned institution struggling to come to 
terms with a plethora of policy objectives and 
technological innovation. 
This thesis examines the years 1857 to 1877, a period 
when the fortunes of the Royal Navy were arguably at their 
lowest. In the introduction the background and nature of 
the Service at this time, particularly in terms of 
politics, finance, administration and personnel will be 
summarised so that educational developments within the 
organisation may be properly understood. A sound grasp of 
the wider naval context is particularly important, for 
these years have been seen as 'the dark ages of the 
3 Victorian navy' and an era where the Service was content 
to see itself as 'apart from all ordinary knowledge 
involving a mass of technicalities and contradictions not 
4 to be unravelled by inexperienced persons'. The second 
part of the introduction surveys the extent and nature of 
previous comment on the period. In particular, it 
examines existing accounts of the development of naval 
education, so that a datum for the purposes of contrast 
and comparison on the subject may be established. 
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Finance and Politics 
Any attempt to scrutinise the activities of the mid-
Victorian Royal Navy must commence with some appreciation 
of its financial context and in particular the fluctuation 
of the yearly sums voted in the Estimates. In general 
terms spending falls into three principal and distinct 
periods. For about 25 years after Victoria's acceSSlon 
there was a gradual approximately three fold increase in 
naval spending, which supported a doubling of the numbers 
of seamen and boys voted. This situation was maintained 
for several years after the Russian wars, principally ln 
response to French ironclad construction. From 1862 
expenditure began to fall and although there were 
fluctuations over the following 25 years, the 1862 figure 
was not matched again until 1885. Thus for over two 
decades the Estimates were relatively static. The third 
distinct phase in naval spending is apparent with the 
advent of rumours of a Franco-German alliance and an 
increase in foreign ship building programmes synthesised 
in the 'naval scare' of 1884. In the next 15 years both 
the Estimates and the number of personnel in the Service 
doubled, as the international naval rivalry which was to 
characterise the late Victorian era took a grip on the 
politics and public interest of the country. 
The years of this study coincide largely with 
frugality and general stasis in naval spending. The 
exception was the period of four years from 1857, which 
through a combination of invasion fever and concern about 
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new construction in the French navy saw the Estimates rlse 
from almost £10 million to well over £12 million in 1861. 
However, this figure represented the zenith of naval 
spending and was not matched again for more than 20 years. 
Year by year attempts were made to limit the budget and by 
1869 it had fallen below £10 million for the first time ln 
a decade. Although it rose slightly after 1870, it only 
once exceeded £12 million up to 1885 and financial 
retrenchment remained the primary aim. (See Table A). 
Thus despite the numerous international calls on British 
naval assets and the need to fund a technological 
revolution in ship design, this was an era when the 
Service, year by year, represented less of a burden upon 
the national economy. It is doubtful, suggests Bartlett, 
whether at any other time Britain was able to purchase 
. h . 5 securlty at so c eap a prlce. 
Politically the early years of the period were dominated 
by Liberal government. The exception was the brief 
interlude from February 1858 until July of the following 
year, when the Conservatives under Lord Derby, with Sir 
John Pakington as First Lord, formed the administration. 
Their policy favoured an overall strengthening of Navy in 
response to a French challenge, particularly in ironclad 
construction. Thus in February 1859 Pakington asked for 
an increase of about £1 million over the previous years 
spending, noting that 'whatever may be the cost we have no 
option in the discharge of our duty but to commence the 
construction of ironclad ships,.6 
The programme was duly initiated in April, amid growlng 
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fears of an invasion threat and public concern about 
Britain's wartime capability. 
To some extent these were factors that could be 
exploited by the succeeding Liberal government under 
Palmerston, with the Duke of Somerset as First Lord, which 
came to power in July 1859. Yet any naval expansion they 
proposed, while finding support from the Crown, the 
Conservatives and a large section of the electorate, often 
foundered within their own party. Even the Cabinet 
contained men of every shade of Liberal opinion from Whig 
aristocrat to Cobdenite radical and while The Times 
suggested that 'There never was a more powerful 
t ' 7 cas ... , the result was that every budget brought a 
fight over naval expenditure. Despite a deep rooted 
desire from Gladstone and the Treasury to achieve 
economies in the Service budget, fear of the French and 
the considerable range of foreign policy objectives that 
required naval support, made economies difficult to 
achieve up to 1862. After this the Estimates declined 
yearly to the end of the Ministry, although the tension 
over spending remained - Gladstone recording in his diary 
Id d ' . ,8 in 1865, 'Estimates always sett e at agger s pOlnt . 
The arrival of the Derby administration with Disraeli as 
Chancellor in June 1866 thus brought little change in 
attitude towards the purposes and costs of the Navy. 
Although the 1867 and 1868 estimates represented a slight 
increase at £11.4 and £11.7 million respectively, Disraeli 
who was increasingly taking the work load of the ailing 
Derby, stoutly resisted the latest Admiralty demands for 
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more ironclads which had been prompted by alleged 
increases in the French and Russian ship building 
programmes. His view was much in accord with the Liberal 
argument that if more capital ships were required, they 
must be purchased by cutting expenditure on distant 
stations. 
The fall of Disraeli in 1868 and the subsequent 
election of the Liberals allowed Gladstone's persistent 
attacks upon naval expenditure to come to fruition under a 
controversial new First Lord, H C E Childers. Although he 
only held office for a little over two years, his single-
minded drive further to reduce naval spending demonstrated 
'a degree of ruthlessness in favour of economy which was 
to dismay even some of the advocates of retrenchment,.9 
Childers introduced a scheme to combat fluctuations 
ln dockyard labour, and the Royal yards at Woolwich and 
Deptford which had been under threat for some years, were 
finally closed. Savings were made in the Admiralty 
workforce, and an improving international situation 
lightened the burden of the ironclad construction 
programme. The principal reductions were achieved by cuts 
and re-distribution amongst the overseas squadrons, where 
a considerable proportion of money and manpower was 
invested. While this could not be achieved immediately, 
the momentum to reduce squadron strength ln the Pacific 
and in South America by one half, and in China and the 
West Indies by one third was established, although 
inaccurate targetting meant that the opportunity both to 
reduce expenditure and improve efficiency was lost. By 
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the time Childers left office in March 1871 the Estimates 
were below £10 million and the number of seamen and boys 
voted was in dramatic decline. 
George Goschen who succeeded Childers has been seen 
as the necessary skilful and tolerant administrator 
required to modify the excesses of his predecessor. Yet 
while he undoubtedly cut a more statesmanlike figure, 
attempting to provide coordination and encouraging 
discussion among Board members, in terms of naval economy 
he had very little room to manoeuvre. The degree of 
parsimony achieved by Childers left few areas untouched 
and Goschen was often forced to advise that further 
reductions were impossible. Thus despite Gladstone's 
desire for a pre-election financial triumph, the naval 
estimates could no longer provide the required flexibility 
and stayed almost static until the end of the Liberal 
government in February 1874. 
The next six years of Conservative rule witnessed no 
fundamental change in naval policy and expenditure and 
although the Estimates very gradually increased over the 
period, it was not indicative of any difference 1n 
philosophy. While attempts were made from within the 
Admiralty to emphasise the French threat of a 'guerre de 
course' and to encourage a rapid frigate/gunboat building 
programme to protect trade, such arguments went unheeded. 
The principal problem for the advocates of naval expansion 
was that for Liberal and Conservative alike it was 
difficult to take the foreign threat seriously, or at 
least seriously enough to countenance any naval expansion. 
13 
\ 
As Rodger has suggested, the politicians of the 18705 
were neith~r stupid or unpatriotic men but they 
did not think in terms of a real threat from 
foreign enemies. For men of their outlook it was 
natural and proper to treat naval affairs almost 
entirely from a financial standpoint. lO 
The result was that throughout Disraeli's term of office 
and for several years into the succeeding Liberal 
government, the money and personnel voted each year 
remained relatively unchanged. 
It will be noted that, throughout the two decades 
covered in this thesis, naval economy was one of the 
principal means of achieving cuts in public expenditure. 
In this respect it is difficult to identify any 
significant difference in party political approach to the 
process of reducing the Service as a burden upon the 
national economy. That successive governments were able 
to conduct themselves in this manner was largely due to a 
generalised public apathy towards naval affairs. Although 
the majority agreed that a strong navy was important, 
while Britain remained nominally the major sea power, this 
acted as a disincentive to popular enquiry into naval 
matters. For almost the whole of the period politicians 
could rely upon a general public disinterest, outside the 
naval ports, on naval matters, and thus political 
contention remained subordinate to the common drive to 
reduce expenditure. 
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Administration 
While at the start of the period there was some 
justification 1n Sir John Pakington's complaint that 'any 
man who wants to write a pamphlet or make a speech cannot 
do better than attack the AdmiraltY',ll a comment echoed 
by his successor as First Lord that 'the human memory 
cannot recall a period when the department of the Admiralty 
was not the subject of accusation and complaint' ,12 it 1S 
clear that by 1857 the institution was in dire need of 
reform. The principal problem identified in the climate of 
financial stringency was that the Admiralty was a large 
expensive department with a degree of autonomy that 
rendered it difficult for the Treasury, or even Parliament, 
to control. More seriously there were structural and 
organisational weaknesses which made it impossible to 
assign responsibility to individual Board members, while 
simultaneously saturating them with administrative detail. 
The necessity for Admiralty reform was recognised, and 
a Select Committee of former First Lords was asked to 
consider the question during the Palmerston administration, 
1859-65. However, in the wake of the disasters of the 
Crimean War, the War Office offered a more urgent target 
and the Admiralty, while it remained tolerably efficient, 
was allowed to proceed unhampered. For the first ten years 
of this study the institution was parochial to the extent 
that the Secretary to the Board was said to open and 
13 
read all mail personally. There were virtually no 
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naval staff with the exception of the Naval Lords 
themselves and all matters requiring professional 
judgement, no matter how trivial, were considered at the 
highest level. The result was that, by 1868, the influence 
of the senior political appointee, the First Lord, had 
become diminished, and determination of general policy had 
been sacrificed in favour of the detail of administration. 
Thus the first decade of this study witnessed First 
Lords in Wood, Pakington, Somerset and Corry who were 
diligent, earnest and not lacking in spirit, yet whose 
achievements were modest. While the brunt of any public 
indignation might fallon the occupants of office, the 
fault in Admiralty administration lay deeper - the 
combination of financial stringency and administrative 
unwieldiness often defeating efforts to secure measures 
that had First Lords' personal support. It was indicative 
of this that Somerset, First Lord from 1859 to 1865, the 
senior political member and a man of some spirit, spoke 
resignedly of seeking to persuade his colleagues with 'such 
influence as I may possess,.14 
As in the area of naval expenditure it was the opening 
years of the Gladstone administration, 1868-74, with 
Childers as First Lord, that saw radical reorganisation 
in Admiralty affairs. Within a month of taking office he 
had altered the composition of the Board, which from 
January 1869 was to consist of four civilian and three 
nominally naval posts. The civilians comprised three 
members of Parliament holding posts as First Lord, Civil 
Lord and Parliamentary Secretary - the fourth being 
16 
the Secretary to the Admiralty Board. The naval posts were 
reduced to three; the First Naval Lord, the Controller of 
the Navy and the Junior Naval Lord. This restructuring, 
which made each Naval Lord executive head of a branch and 
required him to report directly and separately to the First 
Lord, was intended to establish clearly defined 
responsibilities. While to some extent this was achieved, 
the balance of power was tilted in favour of the 
politicians and gave a high degree of autonomy to the First 
Lord in particular. This was exploited by Childers who 
decreed that all members should consult with him 
individually, but that all other communication should be 
conducted in writing. 
The result was the virtual dismantling of the Navy's 
principal executive body and although nominal 
responsibilities were assigned to the Naval Lords, there 
was little group discussion. From the 1869 reorganisation 
it was the First Lord who not only decided on important 
matters, but who set the agenda for such decisions. As 
Rodger has noted, henceforth the First Lord 'was neither 
obliged in theory nor accustomed in practice to encourage 
any private discussion among members of the Board,.lS This 
body which met more than 200 times in 1866 was by 1870 
reduced to holding brief weekly meetings for the purposes 
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of formal approval. In this manner important orders 
retained an appearance of collective responsibility, 
although in fact all consensus had disappeared. 
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While there was no doubt that some form of radical 
reorganisation of the Admiralty was required, the Childers' 
measures simply substituted a new set of difficulties. 
Lacking the opportunity for consensus the Naval Lords now 
operated largely in ignorance of the First Lord's 
decisions, and the requirement to communicate solely ln 
writing slowed procedure and created administrative 
confusion. The new system which had meant to increase 
personal responsibility instead reduced all decisions, no 
matter how important, to administrative detail. Ironically 
it was the question of personal responsibility that led to 
Childers' downfall as he attempted to exonerate himself 
from the loss of the experimental turret ship, HMS Captain 
- a vessel whose stability had been seriously questioned, 
yet whose maiden voyage he had personally sanctioned. He 
resigned from office in March 1871. 
The 1869 reorganisation effectively established the 
working nature of the Admiralty Board until the end of the 
period. Childers' measures were made more workable by his 
successor, G J Goschen, an expert administrator who 
reinstated frequent Board meetings and perhaps most notably 
appointed a First Lord who had previously served a Tory 
administration - thus recognising the position as a 
professional rather than a party appointment. Yet the 
basic flaws in reorganisation remained and could do so 
unaddressed, while naval affairs remained on the periphery 
of political life. 
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The relevance of Admiralty affairs to this study is two 
fold. Firstly, at no time in the period can the Admiralty 
be accurately portrayed as a central authority providing 
firm direction and control of naval affairs. In the field 
of education and training for example, while the Junior 
Naval Lord, and after the Goschen re-alignment of 1872, a 
combination of Junior and Second Sea Lord, had 
responsibility for this area of activity,17 there is 
little evidence of a cohesive policy towards the subject, 
and innovation appears to be the result of individual and 
unrelated initiatives. The Childers' reorganisation, which 
reduced Board meetings to a formality while maintaining a 
visage of joint responsibility, allowed individuals to 
exerClse an influence out of all proportion to their formal 
position withiri the organisation and thus policy origins 
are easily obscured behind the bland phrase 'by Command of 
their Lordships'. 
The second point of relevance is to note the shift in 
the balance of power at Board level towards the political 
element and in particular the First Lord - a phenomenon 
that makes the Childers administration a watershed in the 
years covered by this study. In 1859 the Duke of Somerset 
as First Lord could not conceive of a situation where he 
would overrule the naval members of the Board, yet ten 
years later important decisions had become the sole 
perogative of the senior politicians, with the naval staff 
reduced to assistant status. While internally this power 
shift was significant, it should not be identified with an 
increase in wider political power. At Cabinet level naval 
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affairs continued to be of little significance and their 
consideration was virtually synonymous with reduction in 
public expenditure. Thus although the 1870s saw capable 
and conscientious First Lords in George Ward Hunt and W H 
Smith who possessed considerable degrees of autonomy and 
were not averse to reform, they carried little political 
weight. Within the all pervading climate of financial 
stringency even these skilful administrators could seldom 
satisfy the demands of their naval counterparts. 
Personnel - Ratings 
While the economic and political background of the 
period was one of financial stringency and political 
domination, the view that the Admiralty was totally 
restrained by these influences and thus, denying themselves 
the opportunity for reform 'they resolutely shut their eyes 
d .. ,18. . . to any an every new 1nvent1on 1S qU1te 1naccurate. In 
certain areas of naval activity the years 1857 to 1877 were 
characterised by innovation and reform, much of which arose 
directly from the processes of retrenchment already 
discussed. This may be acutely observed in the 
traditionally vexatious area of personnel, where conditions 
of life and work underwent a transformation that 
fundamentally changed the lot of the British sailor. 
Despite the plentiful number of small ships and the 
widely-dispersed nature of their operations, the actual 
requirement for lower-deck personnel during the period was 
relatively low. The 1860 figure of 84,100, total numbers 
20 
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voted, was not matched for a further 34 years and from 1870 
the complement never exceeded 61,000 (See Table B). Yet 
although this requirement was modest and the pool of 
experienced men substantial, a chaotic manpower situation 
on the lower deck persisted for some years. While boys 
were provided by the flagship and marines retained In 
barracks, there was no effective standing body of seamen 
and the central core of the ship's fighting strength 
continued to be recruited in an 'ad hoc' manner. This 
required the Captain and officers of a newly-commissioned 
ship to find their own crew, usually by advertisement in 
the major seaports. Gradually, depending on the popularity 
of the commanding officer, name of the ship and 
destination, sufficient volunteers were found and the ship 
sailed. At the start of the period the remnants of this 
chaotic system were still extant, with HMS Renown and 
HMS Marlborough commissioned in 1857 and 1858, delayed for 
172 days and 129 days respectively, for lack of crew. 19 
The problem was gradually resolved during the period. 
An important step had been taken in 1853 when a committee 
appointed by the first Derby administration had laid the 
foundations of a sailor's career structure by recommending 
that all boy entrants should be engaged for ten years 
'continuous and general service'. Seamen gunners, on 
account of the specialist training invested in them, were 
already required to enlist for five years, and the Royal 
Commission on Manning reporting in 1859 supported the 
concept of a body of trained seamen to be retained and 
drafted as required. By 1865 nine tenths of the personnel 
22 
were serving on continuous engagements, and by the 1870s 
only a handful were retained on the old terms. 20 
The advent of a career structure provided the impetus 
to improvements in discipline, pay and conditions that 
transformed lower-deck life. If the sailor was asked to 
reject the old hire and discharge system in favour of a 
long-term commitment to the Service, then shipboard 
conditions of drudgery and danger that differed little from 
the days of the Napoleonic wars had to be improved. 
Equally importantly the changing demands of the 
technological and mechanical revolution within the Service 
meant that the Admiralty were now looking not only for a 
longer commitment but also for a higher calibre recruit, 
and hence living and working in warships had to be made 
more amenable. 
The improvement 1n the sailor's lot had important 
implications for the quality and organisation of the 
officer corps. If higher calibre personnel were being 
attracted to the Service, then the quality of their leaders 
was inevitably subjected to scrutiny. In this regard the 
investment in boys' training as a means of relieving the 
manning problem was a vital one, for the quality of the 
products of the training brigs was self-evident. The 1859 
Royal Commission on Manning noted that such boys 
'inevitably constitute from their superior education and 
training the most valuable part of the crews of HM 
Ships,2l. One serving Captain was more forthright, 
noting that when a boy 'just drafted from the training 
ship and Naval Cadets fresh from shore met on the 
23 
quarterdeck or in a boat, the former was more capable of 
taking the command,.22 
Personnel - Officers 
In fact the overall state of the officer corps in 1857 
was almost as chaotic as that of the lower deck, although 
for quite different reasons. While, generally, there were 
insufficient men willing to serve on the lower deck, the 
number of commissioned officers was excessive, with the 
'active and employed' element representing a very small 
percentage of the total officer corps. The problem had its 
orlglns ln the drastic reduction in naval operations in the 
wake of the Napoleonic wars that left large numbers of 
officers unemployed. In three decades of peace the limits 
of individual service -the method of entry and exit from 
the Navy had not been satisfactorily defined. By 1857 the 
result was that officer entry in terms of both standard and 
numbers required was still relatively random and, despite 
considerable efforts by the Admiralty in the previous 
decade, the concept of a scheme of retirement was only 
slowly to emerge. 
The period was notable for dramatic improvements ln 
determining these limits of service, and while the 
heirarchical class orientated basis of the Wardroom 
remained relatively unchanged, it was during these years 
that the profession of naval officer became 'for the first 
time an ordered stream lined, state regulated affair,.23 
The institution of a training ship for officers was 
synonomous with the regulation, of entry, for with the issue 
of Admiralty Circular 288 on 23 February 1857 every 
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nominated candidate who succeeded in passing the 
examination at the Royal Naval College Portsmouth would 'at 
once be appointed to a Training Ship at Portsmouth or 
Devonport for a period of not less than three months for 
the purpose of instruction,.24 This brought to an end the 
chaotic system of allowing individual Captains to enter 
Cadets into their own ship, thus effectively choosing the 
next generation of officers on a highly subjective basis, 
with little Admiralty control. While the system of 
nomination was to remain a bastion of privilege and 
contention, and while there were isolated cases of Cadets 
avoiding the training ship or joining the Service over 
25 
age, the period witnessed the triumph of bureaucratic 
control ln determining the number and quality of entrants. 
The size of the officer intake in the years of this 
study varied considerably, and may be seen as falling into 
two distinct periods. From the advent of the training ship 
system until the late 1860s the number was governed largely 
by promotions or vacancies in the higher ranks. As the 
Mates/Sub Lieutenants list was considered too small and the 
number of Lieutenants acknowledged as 'being inadequate 
to the needs of the Service, ,26 the Cadet entry in the 
early part of the period was both large and subject to 
considerable fluctuation. The 1859 figure of 236, for 
example, was double that of two years previously and 
considerably ln excess of the 153 average of the 
1860s. 27 From 1870 with the advent of limited competition 
which decreed that 148 nominated candidates would 
28 
compete for the 74 places available annually, 
25 
the situation became more stable. Although absolute 
nomination was reintroduced in 1875, the number of 
candidates remained at between 70 and 80 per year until the 
end of the period, with the Admiralty finally establishing 
regularity and order into the recruitment of its young 
officers. 
The creation of an orderly exit from the Service was 
also achieved during these years. In the wake of the 
massive expansion of the officer class provoked by the 
Napoleonic wars there were still large numbers of elderly 
and inefficient officers serving in the early years covered 
by this study. Although serving, they were very seldom 
employed - in January 1865 only 19.6% of all Flag Officers 
29 
were in this category - but they did effectively clog the 
Navy List and deny their juniors realistic chances of 
promotion. The problems of entry and exit were thus closely 
linked, for by 1870 these poor prospects and the subsequent 
lack of incentive had produced a shortage of junior and mid 
seniority officers as the system of advancement was 
effectively choked. 
The detailed means by which retirement was achieved are 
not strictly relevant to this thesis, although it may be 
noted that only when the retirement problem was solved, was 
the size of the entry satisfactorily regulated and the 
education process stabilised. This was established in 1870 
when the Childers administration introduced a statutory 
retirement age and realistic pension for each rank. As with 
all the Childers reforms this produced a stream of protest 
but its value was undeniable, for it meant that for the 
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first time there was true bureaucratic control over the Slze 
of the officer corps. From about 1870 the Royal Navy was 
able to educate a predictable number of Cadets and to offer 
the most able and intelligent early promotion based on 
merit. In this sense it was an essential prerequisite for 
entry into the machine age. 
The large number of elderly unemployed officers 
existing on half pay, yet theoretically liable for 
aprci~~mentl has tended to distort assessments of the 
overall calibre of the officer class of the period and ln 
particular to denigrate its receptivity to technological 
change. While the Russian wars had enabled incompetent 
senior officers to return to sea after absurd lengths of 
service on half pay, and while such men had been largely 
responsible for the Navy's mediocre performance, they were 
far from typical of the officer corps. Despite modern 
assessments that the officer cadre was 'nostalgic in its 
regard for sail' and that it took 'a long time to digest 
vast technological changes,30 it will be argued that at 
junior and mid-seniority level the opposite was the case and 
that a high priority was placed on the advancement of 
science and technology within the Service. 
The period of this study witnessed more changes ln the 
design and construction of warships than at any time in the 
previous four centuries. In 1857 the First Lord of the 
Admiralty still considered that armoured ships had not been 
subjected to conclusive examination under fire and 
. . .. 1 d 31 consequently had little lnterest ln sea-golng lronc a s. 
As late as 1859, with the government in a quandry about 
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French competition and the effectiveness of the ironclad, 
for a brief period the work on wooden walled line of battle 
ships was actually speeded up. Yet by the end of the period 
HMS Inflexible had been launched. Displacing almost 12,000 
tons, she carried 4 x 16" guns and had thicker armour plate 
than any ship before or since. Her underwater armoured deck 
was to develop as a standard feature of all navies and she 
was rightly regarded as a milestone in the history of 
. . h 1 h' 32 Brltls nava arc ltecture. To come to terms with such 
advances, many of which were achieved within the span of an 
individual career, required acumen and foresight. As the 
Official Historian noted, while in 1857 the good executive 
officer differed little from his counterpart in 1805, by the 
end of the period he had to be 'not only a seaman and 
gunner, but also something of an engineer, something of a 
physicist, something of a chemist and much more,.33 
Yet the challenges of the era were not solely 
technological for there was an important and extensive 
dimension of naval activity far removed from technical 
innovation and encompassing a considerable manpower 
requirement. The defence of trade in distant waters was an 
important area of British naval operations throughout the 
period, with distant commands established in North America, 
the Pacific, East Indies, China, Cape of Good Hope and from 
1859, Australia. Rarely were these stations awarded more 
than one capital ship34 and 'the small wars and those too 
soon forgotten police duties which confer so many benefits 
h .,35 upon t e Emplre were largely fought by small ships 
commanded by relatively junior officers, who were required 
28 
to demonstrate considerable degrees of resourcefulness and 
independence when far removed from senior authority. It has 
been noted that for the Royal Navy, although the Victorian 
era was in some sense one of general peace, it was anything 
but generally peaceful. 36 The service records of its junior 
and mid seniority officers confirm the extensive catalogue 
of active service in remote areas under great hardship, that 
underpinned the concept of 'Pax Britannica'. 
Thus while there were undoubtedly reactionary serving 
and retired senior officers with ample time to expound 
eccentric views in an extensive service press, they were not 
typical of the officer corps. Their junior and mid-
seniority counterparts, many of whom would attain high rank 
in the l870s and l880s, faced a remarkable range of military 
and technological challenges that confound modern 
assessments that for 20 years after the Crimean war 'the 
torpor of the long Victorian afternoon descended upon the 
Navy37 and that prior to 1884 'naval life had indeed become 
one long holiday,.38 
The naval background to the years 1857-77 is a complex 
and contradictory one. There is no doubt that the period 
stands in marked contrast to the energy and activity of the 
last decade of the century and that the overall climate was 
dominated by a systematic reduction of naval expenditure 
that extended to almost every area of Service life. It 1S 
also true that while the Slze and shape of the navy was 
sporadically a matter of concern, the political debate on 
Service matters was both limited and lacking in the genuine 
fervour of the years after 1884. The combination of public 
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indifference and a cross-party consensus on the need for 
financial retrenchment, ensured little delineation in party 
political approaches to naval problems. Against this arid 
political and financial background the administrative 
structure of the Admiralty which was supposed to provide the 
central command and control of Navy remained, despite the 
reformer's zeal, chronically ill organised. 
However, to dismiss these years simply as a barren 
period between the Crimean War and the period of the late 
Victorian naval competition, is to 19nore a number of 
significant organisational and structural changes with long 
term implications for the Service. It may be argued that 
advances achieved in these years were an essential 
foundation for the much-feted late Victorian and Edwardian 
navy. It is hard to see, for example, how such a complex 
technically-orientated organisation could have operated 
without the social transformation of the lower deck and the 
subsequent manpower stability achieved by 1870. This in 
turn stimulated an improvement in the quality and competence 
of naval leadership that was essential if the new technology 
was to be mastered and if new strategic thinking concerning 
its use, was to be developed. In this regard the two 
decades from 1857 despite a number of unredeeming features, 
witnessed a growing sense of order in naval affairs, much of 
it achieved and in place by the end of the period. 
Yet there is a sense in which the Service was subject 
to more profound change ln these years - a sense in which 
the nature and subtlety of its administrative process 
shifted markedly. In this respect despite the comparative 
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lack of political dichotemy ln the period, the Liberal 
administration 1868 to 1874 and in particular the 
administration of H C E Childers as First Lord stands as a 
watershed. While it is correctly argued that his reforms 
only succeeded in exchanging one form of chaos for another, 
the resultant shift in the balance of power on the Admiralty 
Board was of major significance. Prior to 1869 the Service 
consensus invariably held sway, and while this situation 
which was the product of consultation and cooperation 
guarded against intemperate planning, it did little to 
encourage the decisive action and personal responsibility 
required to manage the new technological challenges. The 
reorganisation which concentrated power in the political 
domain, while perhaps unsatisfactory ln Childers' individual 
case, in fact provided what has been characterised as 'the 
initial impetus needed to dislodge an intensely conservative 
, , , f 't 't ' of monoll' thl' c l' rnmobl'll' ty' .39 lnstltutlon rom 1 s POSl lon 
In this sense the Royal Navy, while it had to wait a further 
15 years to see a transformation ln its fortunes, had 
entered a new era in 1870. 
This subtle shift has largely been ignored by naval 
historians who, in correctly identifying a lack of public 
interest in the Service, naval spending in decline and a 
lack of major operational interest, particularly fleet 
action, have tended to pass quickly from the Crimean War to 
the origins of naval rivalry in the mid 1880s. In this 
manner many of the foundations of the 'new' navy have been 
overlooked or ignored. Nowhere is this better observed than 
in the field of naval officer's education and training, for 
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the two decades from 1857 saw almost every aspect subject to 
a process of scrutiny, innovation and reform. This 
included, for the first time, a single uniform method of 
entry and education for young officers via the training ship 
system, the awarding of commissioned officer status to Naval 
Instructors, the foundation of a naval university, the 
appointment of the first Director of Education and the 
establishment of a series of major and subsidiary committees 
to examine and report on the state of basic and higher 
education with the Service. While some of these innovations 
were shortlived and others so unsuccessful that one 
commentator was forced to conclude that 'the mountain has 
been in labour so often - so many mice have been born,,40 
the years 1857-77 constitute the most vigorous years of 
educational innovation and reform in the long history of the 
Royal Navy. The fact that this activity coincided with a 
period when the Navy's fortunes were at such a low ebb, 1S 
the central paradox that this thesis seeks to explore. 
General Historiography 
To begin to explain the problem it is essential to 
examine the historiography of the Royal Navy in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, and in particular to analyse 
the very limited amount of comment that exists on the 
development of officer education during the period. The 
prospect is far from satisfactory for the researcher 
attempting to gain a comprehensive picture of the years 1857 
to 1877, for there is no modern general history of the Royal 
Navy devoted to the second half of the nineteenth century, 
and the established histories are acknowledged as being both 
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unbalanced and deficient. There has been a marked tendency 
to ignore the social history of the Navy in favour of 
specialist studies principally concerned with the 
technological revolution that swept through the Service from 
about 1860. There are also several studies detailing the 
naval activity associated with the years of 'Pax Britannica' 
and with the Crimean War. 
Perhaps the earliest example of the imbalance in 
hi3tcrical coverage is to be found in Clowes' standard seven 
volume history of the Royal Navy published in 1903 41 which, 
in dealing with the years 1857 to 1900, concentrates almost 
entirely upon operational matters. Despite the fact that 
the period contained no major war involving general fleet 
action, some 470 pages are devoted to the military history 
of the Service and only 84 to organisation, administration 
and personnel. The result 1S that the important changes 
that took place in conditions of service and particularly 1n 
naval education and training, are reduced to a mere 
catalogue of detail, devoid of qualitative analysis or 
comment. 
This imbalance in favour of the operational history of 
the period is itself comparatively rare and has largely been 
eclipsed by a concentration on technological change which 
has stimulated numerous accounts in the field of warship 
design. This is scarcely surprising, for the advent of new 
ship construction, the development of torpedoes and advances 
in gunnery, propulsion and protection were all major 
characteristics of the era. Yet strangely the parallel 
revolution required in the education, training and 
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reorganisation of personnel required to grapple with the new 
technology has received almost no study. While there is a 
monograph detailing reform in ratings'conditions 42 and some 
work has been completed on the social life of the lower deck 
d . th' . d f .. 43 44 urlng lS perlo 0 transltlon, , corresponding 
developments in the officer structure and, in particular, 
improvements ln officer education, have received almost no 
critical attention. 
Against the backcloth of a general deficiency in the 
social history of the nineteenth-century Navy, there are 
grounds for seeing the years addressed in this study as 
being particularly poorly served. Beyond major technical 
• 
studies by Brown 45 and Parkes 46 the period has attracted 
very little critical attention of any kind, and has been 
described as 'a lacuna in the social history of the Royal 
47 Navy'. The relatively small size of the force and a 
quality of strategic thinking which has been characterised 
as not so much misguided as non-existent,48 have apparently 
made the period unattractive to the researcher. 
Existing general studies of the nineteenth-century Navy 
tend to finish with the advent of the Crimean War or 
commence towards the latter part of the period. The 
49 detailed and authoritative work by Bartlett for example, 
which is essentially a study of naval policy but includes a 
good social perspective, concludes in 1853. More commonly, 
published work on the victorian navy tends to commence at 
the end of the period as the rapid increase in public 
interest in naval affairs at the start of the l880s produced 
a rapid expansion of source material. The definitive work 
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on the late Victorian navy by Marder50 starts with the 
apparent threats to British naval supremacy from Russia and 
France in 1884, and the important study of the development 
of strategic thought by Shurman51 takes its effective 
starting point in the mid 1880s. 
The view that 1884 constituted a sort of annus 
mirabilis has imposed an unfortunate characteristic on the 
historiography of the previous 30 years. In establishing 
the 1880s as a decade characterised by a dramatic increase 
in public interest in naval matters, there has been a 
tendency to portray the previous three decades as a datum 
against which this progress is measured and thus to 
overstate the degree of stasis ln naval affairs. Thus the 
reform that did take place during the period - important 
advances in naval discipline which saw five new acts in the 
1860s for example, or the educational innovations that this 
thesis seeks to explore, have either been ignored or more 
commonly sublimated to generalisations stressing the 
reactionary nature of the age. The image of 'ultra 
conservatism' applied to succeSSlve Admiralty Boards, which 
'nostalgically wedded to the Nelson tradition and the heroic 
days of sailing navies were hopelessly lost amid the 
technical clamour for advance,52 is common and usually 
employed not to explain the nature of the age, but rather 
to emphasise the revolutionary changes in the era that 
followed. The adoption of stock images of conservatism 
in the mid-Victorian navy has had a number of attractions 
being both simple, convenient and, as Rodger has suggested, 
offering advantages to the biographical historian whose hero 
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may appear as 'the progressive David slaying the Goliath of 
reaction,.53 
Nowhere has the view that the mid-Victorian navy was 
dominated by 'the dead hand of ultra conservatism nurtured 
on the long tradition of naval success,54 been more 
prevalent than in comment on the officer structure. It has 
been common to portray the senior officers of the period as 
old, reactionary and unable to corne to terms with the 
scientific realities of the day - 'Trafalgar Admirals ln the 
1870s,55 as one commentator has described them. It is 
undeniable that, in the absence of an effective system of 
retirement, some elderly officers continued to serve in 
positions of importance - in 1854 the Commander in Chief ln 
the Baltic was 68 and his equivalent at Plymouth was 81! 
It was also true that there were many thousands of 
unemployed officers on half pay who advocated in public, 
outmoded and reactionary views. However, this thesis will 
argue that these men and their views were far from typical 
and that many senior officers in the period 1857 to 1877, 
particularly ones advocating improvements in education and 
training, were progressive, enlightened men very much in 
accord with the spirit of the age. 
The one commentator who has made a particular study of 
. . . 56 personnel is Lewis, in his work The Navy ln Transltlon 
which discusses the social changes in the Service over a 50 
year period from the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars. 
This is an important book for it is the only one that 
deliberately sets out to subjugate the mechanical and 
technological changes, and the developments in naval policy, 
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to a consideration of personnel. For this reason, although 
the study concludes in 1864 and although its comment on 
education and training post 1857 is limited, it is the 
foremost general history apertaining to this study. Lewis 
portrays the development of naval education in the years 
prior to the start of the period in terms of a steady 
general improvement in both quality and provision, with old 
systems being replaced by improved methods of training and 
instruction demanded by the new technology of the age. He 
sees for example, the 1837 abolition of new entry training 
at the Royal Naval College, Portsmouth, as initiating 'a 
scheme of unified entry' 57 with education at sea being 
'placed in the hands of the new Naval Instructors,.58 This 
view will be challenged in Chapter One of this thesis - the 
scheme of unified entry will be shown to be chaotic and the 
provlslon of Naval Instructors proved to be both uneven and 
inadequate. Indeed it will be argued that the establishment 
of the training ship HMS Britannia was in reaction to a lack 
of uniformity, direction and control resulting from the 1837 
system of conducting officer education at sea. 
Although Lewis acknowledges the advent of the Britannia 
system as an 'epoch making' move, he restricts himself 
primarily to factual detail of the conditions of 
implementation and devotes less than two pages to a 
consideration of the new mode of training. Yet despite this 
limited coverage, he concludes that while the ship 
undoubtedly represented an important improvement in the 
control and standard of officer entry, by 1858 it already 
represented an anachronism with 'many factors inherited 
37 
directly from the old war days,.59 Lewis envisages a 
reactionary Admiralty under pressure on matters of 
conditions and discipline gradually being forced to make 
improvements 'through parental, press and parliamentary 
protests,.60 This study will demonstrate, however, that far 
from a reluctant Admiralty gradually responding to external 
pressure, it was from within the Navy that the demand to 
improve conditions of education and training for naval 
cadets may primarily be observed. 
Lewis is the only major published commentator to 
attempt a consideration of the general nature of officer 
entry and education and unfortunately his work finishes in 
1864. Further consideration seldom stretches beyond the 
training ship, yet given this lack of serious analysis, it 
is surprising the extent to which the idea of an Admiralty 
nostalgically wedded to the sailing ship era, failing to 
reflect the emerging technology or its training, has held 
sway. Although evidence is seldom cited, this line of 
argument is frequently adopted when HMS Britannia is 
discussed. Bonnett for example sees the ship as a quite 
deliberate attempt to recreate the conditions of the 
Napoleonic wars, stating that 'in appearance and product the 
Britannia was inseparable from the past. She was painted to 
look like the Victory and she was geared to produce officers 
d k f h · ,61 fit for the quarter ec 0 t e Vlctory. 
Even in biographies of senior naval officers of the 
early twentieth century, the vast majority of whom were the 
products of the training ship, there seems to be a marked 
reluctance to examine this formative period in their 
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careers, beyond the view that the Britannia failed to 
reflect the training needs of the day. Thus Temple 
Patterson, in his work on Jellicoe, notes that in the 
Britannia of 1872, 'her curriculum was behind the times,62 
while Roskill, writing on Beatty who was a cadet in 1884, 
describes the system of training as 'extra ordinarily ill 
, d,63 1 h concelve a tough neither offers evidence to support 
these Vlews. A similar superficiality may be noted in a 
SLUUY of the historical development of leadership in the 
Royal Navy by Horsfield who, despite the fact that almost 
every naval officer over a 50 year period was a product of 
HMS Britannia, confines his discussion of the system to 
noting 'the rigours and inadequacies of the training 
h ' , 64 s lp . 
HMS Britannia is briefly considered in the early 
chapters of works by Davies and Grove 65 and by Hughes. 66 
Their principal concern however, is the history of the Royal 
Naval College established at Dartmouth in 1905, and they 
depend for the early history of the ship on the only book 
67 length study published in 1904 by Statham. This is a 
detailed study clearly based on official records, although 
it is completely unreferenced and heavily infused with 
anecdote and reminiscence. Statham was a Cadet in the ship 
in 1862 and is thus an important, if rather uncritical 
source. However, his narrative gives the impression that he 
was an eye witness to a much larger period than could 
possibly have been the case. This makes some of the 
recollections suspect, particularly as Statham appears to 
have been the sole source for detail repeated by others. 
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These include Pack68 who cites Statham as an eye witness to 
the move of the Britannia from Portsmouth to Portland 1n 
February 1862 and again as a commentator on events on board 
in August 1866, by which time Staham had left, the Captain 
had changed and the ship had moved to Dartmouth. 
Nevertheless despite its age, Statham's work remains the 
most carefully researched and detailed account of the 
training ship era. 
Initial education ln the Royal Navy during the years 
1857-77 has received very little study beyond the Statham 
work, a brief consideration of the early years by Lewis and 
var10us fragments in biographies of naval leaders. College 
histories from 1905 mention the subject briefly and there is 
a similar tangential approach evident in monographs on the 
development of particular Service ranks. These include 
Walker's book on the history of the Midshipman 69 and works 
by Penn on the evolution of the Engineer70 and the 
. d h' 71 t . 1 Th t' 11 M1 s 1pman respec 1ve y. ese are essen 1a y non-
analytical but are characterised by a tone of mild yet 
unsubstantiated criticism, questioning the relevance of the 
Britannia system to the realities of the day. Yet if this 
coverage of initial education is unsatisfactory, the subject 
of higher education for officers, ie. that which took place 
after the Britannia both in operational warships and at the 
Royal Naval Colleges of Portsmouth and Greenwich, is 
arguably more so. 
In the area of higher education there 1S no published 
book length study. Coverage is restricted to journal 
articles and a short section of a book dealing with the 
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local history of Greenwich by Dawson. 72 The relevance of 
this work is limited and amounts to only nine pages dealing 
with the foundation and early years of the Royal Naval 
College. Although quite a vivid picture of college life 1n 
the late-Victorian era is achieved, via use of contemporary 
quotations, it is completely unreferenced and contains 
several errors. 
The remaining coverage of higher education 1S contained 
1n two articles in the Journal of the Institute for Nautical 
Research (Mariners Mirror). The first is a 12 page article 
by Callender73 published in 1939 tracing the development of 
the subject from 1839 to 1873. While this constitutes a 
useful survey, it is essentially anodyne in nature ignoring 
or unaware of the political dimension in the considerable 
debate about the location of the Navy's new university. The 
1968 article by Lloyd 74 covers much the same ground, 
although it contains both factual and interpretive errors 
which include misunderstanding the position of the Director 
of Education for the Admiralty and misinterpreting, as does 
Dawson, both the role and findings of the Tarleton Committee 
of 1872. 
One of the most interesting accounts of naval education 
1n the l870s comes from an unusual source. In 1878 
Professor James Soley of the United States Naval Academy was 
directed by his government to write a study of educational 
practice in the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany and 
Italy. Soley carried out a study tour of Europe for this 
purpose and his Report on Foreign Systems of Naval Education 
published in 1880 was a full-length study of practice in the 
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leading European naVles. The British section included an 
account of the work of HMS Britannia, education conducted 
operational warships by Naval Instructors, the Royal Naval 
College Greenwich and the specialist training schools for 
torpedo and gunnery practice. It was a largely factual 
account of each phase of the educational programme and was 
related ln great detail. Soley, while suitably deferential 
to the upholders of 'Pax Britannica', was little impressed 
with the British system and his overall conclusion was that 
'the high scientific and professional attainments of many 
English naval officers are not in consequence, but in spite 
of, their early education,.75 
Chronologically this book lies just outside the period 
of this thesis and is essentially a 'snap shot' of 
educational practice in the year 1879 - two years beyond the 
limit of this work. Nevertheless much of the procedure 
observed in the Soley work remained identical to earlier 
years and his report, which a contemporary critic noted 
contained 'more accurate and detailed information as well as 
more intelligence criticism than has hitherto been rendered 
in any way available,76, has considerable value. This was 
enchanced by the independent nature of the commentator who 
was acknowledged to be a 'singularly capable and well 
informed foreigner free from the trammel of old custom and 
'd' ,77 national preJu lce. 
Work by F B Sullivan 
The only work to deal with the complete scope of naval 
education in the years covered by this study is an 
unpublished 1974 doctoral thesis undertaken at the 
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University of Reading School of Education by F B Sullivan. 
The 'Origins and Development of Education ln the Royal 
78 
Navy' examines educational provision for both officers and 
ratings from 1702 to 1902 and the author claims that 
'persistent research has enabled a detailed account to be 
written of the totality of naval education during the 
. d' 79 perlo . The work is divided into four main sections 
covering the 200 year period and further sub divided into 14 
chapters. Educational provision pertaining to the years of 
this study lS examined in Chapters 12 and 13 which amount to 
a total of 85 pages. However, as the coverage frequently 
includes reference to ratings' education and as the latter 
chapter extends to 1903, the specialist analysis of officer 
education between 1857 and 1877 amounts to less than 50 
pages. 
There can be little doubt that in the early chapters of 
this work, which consider educational provision in the 
eighteenth-century Royal Navy, a valuable and original 
contribution to knowledge has been achieved. Two areas of 
activity are considered, namely the shoreside education 
provided by the Naval Academy since 1733 and the 
instruction in operational warships undertaken by Naval 
Schoolmasters throughout the eighteenth century. In the 
latter area it had previously been assumed that these men 
were seldom employed and little was known of their 
80 
appointment and qualification procedure. By examination 
of both Admiralty and Trinity House records, Sullivan has 
shown that Naval Schoolmasters were present in much greater 
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numbers than previously thought and that over one thousand 
warrants were issued between 1712 and 1815. He has also 
shown that Naval Schoolmasters were operating on board ships 
much earlier than previously believed. Similarly the thesis 
contains a valuable consideration of the foundation of the 
Naval Academy at Portsmouth. Details of this institution 
had been obscure and Sullivan's consideration of the 
original curriculum, staffing and organisation, together 
with discussion of the progress of the institution 
throughout the eighteenth century constitutes the most 
comprehensive account of the establishment prior to its 
reorganisation as the Royal Naval College in 1806. 
However, the advent of the nineteenth century, as the 
scope of naval education was extended, and as the source 
materials became more numerous and detailed, clearly reveals 
the shortcomings of the study and particularly the over 
ambitious aim of attempting to analyse in detail both 
officers' and ratings' education, at sea and on shore, over 
a 200 year period. These defects fall into three principal 
areas. 
The first is that faced with such an extensive remit 
over an extended period, the subject area becomes too great 
and the author is forced into unsatisfactory levels of 
analysis which can only account for developments in 
superficial terms. Thus, for example, the fortunes of the 
Naval Instructor branch from 1837 are related in terms of a 
gradual improvement 'as -the number of Naval Instructors 
steadily increased and the Admiralty aim of attracting 
better candidates was gradually achieved,.81 Conversely the 
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evolution of the training ship system from 1857 until the 
end of the century is interpreted in terms of a gradual, 
progressive disenchantment causing 'increasing 
dissatisfaction with it as time went on,82. It will be 
argued in this work that in neither of these cases and 
numerous others, do Sullivan's generalised conclusions 
ln 
adequately reflect the subtlety and detail of historical 
events that are both complex and capable of varying 
This shortcoming which applies particularly to the 
nineteenth-century section of Sullivan's work is most 
acutely observed in the coverage of the important reforming 
committees set up .to look at naval education in the 1870s. 
Here the author appears to take no cognisance of the 
political background against which the Royal Navy of the 
period operated. He does not recognise, for example, any 
political dimension in Admiralty decision making or 
acknowledge any of the exigencies of party politics or self 
interest within an organisation whose workings at this time 
have been said to resemble 'less the smooth running of a 
well oiled machine than the byzantine intrigues surrounding 
an absolute monarch,.83 The Admiralty is thus portrayed as 
a sort of autonomous body producing its own initiatives, 
appointing committees and initiating policy changes for 
reasons which are never analysed, and assumed to be self 
generating. 
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The result is that explanation of Admiralty policy 
throughout the thesis never moves beyond the naive and 
simplistic. For example, although Sullivan is aware 
that in ]870 the first Committee on the Higher Education 
of Naval Officers was appointed, he is unable to explain 
the cause of its inception beyond 'it was not until 1870 
that the Admiralty stirred itself and appointed a 
Committee,.84 Similarly he does not seek to explain why 
two and a half years should elapse between the 
submission of the report and the implementation of its 
recommendations beyond 'the Admiralty did not allow 
itself to be hurried,.85 Likewise he 1S unwilling to 
identify the reasons behind the decision to review the 
86 efficiency of the Royal Naval College in 1877, beyond 
the fact that 'the College had been established for four 
87 years'. There is a persistent lack of curiosity about 
what motivated the Admiralty to behave as they did. By 
Chapter 13 this results in Sullivan envisaging a period 
of lethargy and decay in naval affairs arguing that for 
20 years after 1857 - 'the torpor of the long Victorian 
88 
afternoon descended upon the Navy', yet arguing in the 
previous chapter that this same period was characterised 
by 'a period of intensive self analysis by the Admiralty 
89 1n the education sphere' • His failure to account for 
or even acknowledge this paradox is one of the major 
shortcomings of the work. 
The second problematic area is also derived from 
the breadth of the remit and results in the author 
reducing the sort of educational activity he is prepared 
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to consider in the thesis. He is thus forced to adopt 
parameters which prohibit a comprehensive understanding 
of the totality of naval education in the period. For 
example, any consideration of the gunnery school at HMS 
Excellent is excluded, on the grounds that it was 
'technical training which was given to specialist 
pe 1 h d ·, 90 rsonne suc as gunners an englneers . While 
clearly some distinction has to be drawn between 
education and training, this thesis will suggest that it 
cannot be a rigid one. In this particular instance HMS 
Excellent and the Royal Naval College Portsmouth were 
inextricably linked, for after 1839 the Captain of the 
Gunnery School was also the Superintendent of the 
College and the justification for re-6pening the latter 
had been based on the requirement for an academic 
element in gunnery training. Thus higher education ln 
the Royal Navy far from being 'distinct and not to be 
confused with the technical training,9l first found 
definition within subjects such as gunnery and naval 
architecture. 
The exclusive parameters of the Sullivan work also 
dictate that only 'education provided within the Royal 
92 Navy for serving personnel' are considered. While 
this appears logical even a brief survey of the two 
decades from 1857 reveal the extent to which external 
institutions reflected and impinged upon educational 
activity within the Service. This ranged from, at a 
basic level, the heavy reliance by officer candidates on 
private educational establishments undertaking 
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'cramming' for the entry examination and the academic 
course in the Britannia, to the influence of bodies such 
as the Royal United Service Institution founded in 1832 
which has been seen as a substitute for a war college 
and a sort of university of the services. 93 It will be 
argued that such peripheral educational activity was an 
important facet of officer education in the Royal Navy 
and some consideration of it is essential if an accurate 
overall picture is to be gained. 
The third area of concern is based on the quality 
and use of source material. There is no doubt that 
Sullivan has done valuable work in his scrutiny of more 
than 20 volumes of Admiralty Records which detail all 
the commissions and warrants issued in relation to naval 
appointments between 1712 and 1824. 94 Similarly his 
examination of eighteenth-century Trinity House By-
Minutes has enabled a body of source material to be 
assembled such that 'a considerable void in the early 
history of the naval school master is filled,.95 
However, in his coverage of nineteenth-century 
education, the situation is less satisfactory. 
In the latter stages of the Sullivan work there 1S 
a strong dependence on secondary sources. When this 
material is scrutinised it becomes apparent that the 
bulk of it constitutes a series of sub references from a 
single source. Chapter 12 for example, which deals with 
the training ship era from 1857 to the end of the 
century, cites 129 references of which more than 100 
will be shown to be derived from or relate to, one 
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particular study, Statham's The Story of the 
Britannia. 96 The reliance upon this one book for such 
an important period of educational development lS 
clearly unacceptable if a total picture of the quality 
and extent of naval education is to be achieved. 
Additionally, while Statham's work is the most detailed 
account of the training ship era, its limitations make 
it sporadically unreliable as a standard work. 
There are further shortcomings in the use of source 
material which lead to errors and omissions in 
Sullivan's treatment of the second half of the 
nineteenth-century. These arise from instances where 
the primary source has clearly not been consulted and 
the information and comment from the secondary source 
have merely been repeated. There are a number of 
examples of this in the latter part of the thesis 
including comment on the Tarleton Committee 1872 97 and 
the Wellesley Committee of 1876,98 both significant 
forces in the evolution of naval education, neither of 
which has been consulted in original form. The result 
is a failure to understand or account for highly 
significant changes in the naval education process 
during these years. 
It will be argued in this thesis that the Sullivan 
work, while offering an important dontribution to the 
understanding of educational provision up to 1806, lS 
deficient in its nineteenth-century coverage. His 
attempt to account for the complete range of naval 
activity over a 200 year period is too ambitious for a 
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thorough understanding to be gained, particularly in the 
second half of the nineteenth century when educational 
innovation and reform was at its greatest. The nature 
and content of the Sullivan remit has resulted ln a 
less-than-rigorous use of source material, the pursuit 
of unrealistic parameters that preclude a full under-
standing of educational activity, and the adoption of 
levels of analysis which seldom investigate historical 
detail or account for motivation on anything beyond a 
banal level. 
The historiography of naval education in the 20 
years after 1857 presents an uninspiring picture. There 
is a general deficiency in naval social history in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and in particular 
a neglect of the two decades following the Crimean War. 
Against this unsatisfactory background it is difficult 
to identify any cogent account of the development of 
naval education and training. Despite the fact that 
these years saw the foundation of the modern naval 
education system they have been the object of only 
fragmentary and unsatisfactory analysis. This has two 
principal characteristics: 
First. It is evident that in the existing work 
only a limited amount of research has been conducted. 
While the number of journal articles and books that 
comment on naval education is small, the sources from 
which these details are derived are particularly 
restricted and sometimes unreliable. This has resulted 
in errors of fact and interpretation which have been 
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repeated to the extent that they have assumed a general 
validity. 
Second. The historiography is notable for a 
complete lack of enquiry into the origins of educational 
activity from 1857 beyond a vague association between 
educational advance and the pace of technological 
change. At no stage do any of the commentators ask why 
such changes should have taken place and nowhere is the 
pclitical and administrative dimension behind innovation 
and reform acknowledged or investigated. 
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Chapter One 
The Origins of Officer Education and the 
Foundation and Early Development of the 
Training Ship, HMS Britannia to 1862 
57 
Abstract 
This chapter outlines the nature and development of the 
bipartite system of naval education from its origins to the 
demise of the Royal Naval College in 1837. The reasons for 
closure are discussed, and educational activity in the Service 
in the years immediately preceding this study is subjected to 
detailed analysis, with existing assessments of the quality 
and extent of educational provision challenged. 
The origins of the training ship concept are identified 
as being both earlier and more pastoral in nature than 
previously believed, and the adoption of the system for 
officers is shown to be the culmination of a serles of 
bureaucratic measures designed both to control entry and 
education more closely, and to counteract high discharge rates 
amongst officers under training. 
The early years of the officer training ship are 
considered and a description of her routine is outlined. 
Contemporary assessments of her efficiency are examined and 
new evidence is offered to suggest that the Britannia was the 
subject of criticism and debate from her earliest days. 
Throughout this chapter it is argued that previous 
research, both published and unpublished, is unsatisfactory 
and that the replication of omission and error characterise 
much existing comment. 
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Officer Education up to 1857 
In 1857 there were already established traditions in 
initial officer education in the Royal Navy dating from the 
late seventeenth-century when education, or more accurately 
the process of examination, was first established as a 
bureaucratic device to control the number of officers In a 
particular rank. Pepys had introduced a series of 
preconditions for candidates for the post of Lieutenant In 
1678 which produced immediate results: 
Thank God we have not half the throng of those of the 
bastard breed pressing for employment which we heretofore 
used to be troubled with, they being conscious of their 
inability to pass this examination. l 
From this time candidates for promotion were to serve three 
years at sea, spend at least a year as a Midshipman, produce a 
certificate of sobriety, diligence and obedience and pass an 
examination In navigation and seamanship at the Navy Office. 
These reforms were primarily administrative devices for 
controlling progress through the naval service previously 
achieved by birth, position and influence. Nevertheless, the 
requirement for examination implied a need for instruction, 
and it was in the last quarter of the seventeenth-century that 
the first unofficial efforts in naval education are to be 
found. 
Some official recognition of this appeared in an 
Admiralty Order in Council of 1702 which authorised a payment 
of £20, subsequently known as Queen Anne's Bounty, which was 
added to a Midshipman's pay and given to anyone willing to 
undertake the duties of a schoolmaster. Poor pay and poorer 
conditions ensured that the calibre of potential schoolmasters 
remained low. In fact, the concept of education as either 
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valuable or indeed necessary to entry and successful 
advancement through the Service was completely alien to the 
eighteenth-century navy. From the earliest times officers had 
entered the Service by a process of arrangement whereby 
parents would approach the Captain of a ship and ask for his 
patronage for their son - which, if he could see advantages ln 
it for himself he would grant and the boy would be taken to 
sea. These young men, known as Captain's Servants and after 
1794 'Volunteers First Class', could be rated as the Captain 
chose and proceeded to become Midshipmen with the eventual alm 
of sitting the examination for Lieutenant. Despite this 
latter hurdle, the amount of interest which had secured their 
entry and which they could continue to command, remained the 
key factor in their future promotion stakes. 
The problem for the Admiralty was that for several 
hundred years it had very little control or endorsement over 
new entrants into the Service. The abuse for example of 
entering non-existent people into the Ship's Book was common, 
and children's names often appeared on ships' muster lists. 
Even when the people did exist there were difficulties in 
identification, for it was a Captain's prerogative to rate his 
young officers as he thought convenient. Thus a future 
Admiral might appear as an Able Seaman - as Horatio Nelson did 
in HMS Seahorse in 1774.2 It was partly to combat this sort 
of chaos that examination, and by implication the process of 
education, was introduced into the seagoing ships of the Royal 
Navy. The use of education as an instrument of beaurocratic 
control is a persistent theme in the history of the Service. 
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This, then, was the state of shipborne education 
throughout the eighteenth century. It was characterised by 
relatively small numbers of ships' schoolmasters occupying a 
low status in the ship's heirarchy, poorly paid and living ln 
primitive conditions. They were conducting basic education ln 
mathematics, navigation and seamanship, sometimes with crew 
members, but usually with young officers. The relevance of 
this education was strictly limited and had little or no 
effect on the career progress of the officers involved, while 
the existence of 'interest' remained the primary factor ln 
advancement. The Admiralty saw some advantages in educational 
provision but more particularly in examination - for this was 
the bureaucratic device that allowed them to gain some limited 
control of numbers and ranks. It also went some way to 
checking the excess of the patronage system. 
In parallel with this chaotic system of shipborne 
education the Admiralty operated a more formal entry and 
education Vla the Royal Naval Academy Portsmouth which had 
been founded in 1729 'for the better education of forty young 
gentlemen to be trained up for Your Majesty's service at 
sea,.3 The Academy attempted to impose certain minimum 
standards upon entry and the pupils 'young gentlemen, sons of 
noblemen and gentlemen' were to be aged between eleven and 15 
years of age and were required to produce a certificate 
stating their competence in Latin. The syllabus was a 
comprehensive one and included practical elements to be 
conducted in the Royal Dockyard as well as the study of 
'Writing, Arithmetic and Drawing, as well as Dancing and 
Fencing,.4 
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The Academy opened ln the summer of 1733 but despite the 
wide-ranging curriculum and the impeccable credentials of the 
pupils, the progress of the institution was not a happy one. 
It had a capacity for 40 pupils but seldom seems to have been 
full and perhaps for this reason the background of entry was 
widened in 1773 to include 'the sons of commissioned Officers 
of His Majesty's Fleet who would be entertained in the Academy 
as part of the forty scholars to be educated there.'S This 
appears to have made little difference to the institution's 
popularity and there was a welter of contemporary criticism of 
general standards culminating in the First Lord of the 
Admiralty's view, expressed in 1801, that 'the Royal Academy 
at Portsmouth (which) is a sink of vice and abomination should 
be abolished,.6 
While there can be little doubt that the Academy failed 
to provide satisfactory levels of education it was almost 
certainly more effective than the alternative shipborne 
education provided by a low calibre, poorly paid schoolmaster 
in the harsh conditions of an operational warship. Lewis 
suggests that the Academy 'though it may have been far from 
good by modern standards can hardly have been worse than that 
accorded to the ordinary run of officers which was often 
'I' 7 nl • Yet this chaotic system of shipborne education with 
all its drawbacks commanded vigorous support throughout the 
eighteenth century and into the mechanised age, to the extent 
that one commentator has suggested that the training ship 
innovations of the 18S0s were quite deliberately anachronistic 
, 8 ln nature. 
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Much of the support for shipborne as opposed to college 
entry and education, was simply the product of self-interest 
on the part of senior officers who could duly dispense 
patronage. Yet there were positive skeins of thought which 
actually supported the idea of thrusting eleven and twelve 
year old boys of impeccable family background into the harsh 
conditions of an operational warship. Byam Martin, in 
dismissing the standards at the Academy, praised the virtues 
9 
of a well regulated man 0' war' as the best place for 
education to be conducted. There was much support for this 
view. Barrow, in an essay on education in 1804, wrote 'Were 
it not for the dormitory at Westminster and the quarterdeck 
of a man 0' war we should soon have a nation of 
macaronies,.lO The Duke of Clarence (later William IV) 
declared in 1827 that 'There 1S no place superior to the 
quarterdeck of a British man 0' war for the education of a 
11 gentleman'. 
Despite this vigorous support for education at sea and 
despite the poor reputation that the Academy had established, 
the Admiralty did not abandon the concept of shore-based 
education. In 1806 the old institution was enlarged, over-
hauled and renamed the Royal Naval College. A distinguished 
mathematician, James Inman, was appointed Professor and he 
quickly established a reputation for excellence with a 
comprehensive syllabus that stressed the importance of 
science to the seaman's art. The number of places for 
scholars was increased from 40 to 70, and students were 
divided into half yearly classes depending upon ability. 
Alterations and enlargements to the College took two years to 
complete and the institution opened its doors to the first 
pupils in February 1808. 
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The relative support for shores ide or shipborne 
education of naval cadets is a recurring theme in naval 
education from the earliest years and throughout the period 
of this study. It has been suggested that the Admiralty 
decision to pursue shoreside education was 
part of a controversy that was to continue for almost a 
century and a quarter, namely that of whether such 
education and training could be carried out more 
effectively in a shore-based institution or at sea on 
board a man 0' war',12 
but in fact there seems to be little evidence of a genuine 
educational dilemma here. For despite the progress and 
improvement ln the Royal Naval College it still only catered 
for a fraction of the officer entry. It has been shown that 
only 2.7 per cent of the officer entry during the period 
1806-1814 who survived until 1845, joined the Royal Navy 
through the College and the figure only rose to around 11 per 
cent ln the decade after 1815. 13 
A more plausible explanation for persevering with the 
College system was to link it to the theme of education as 
the bureaucratic and administrative device already discussed. 
In the chaotic manpower situation heightened by the effect of 
the Napoleonic wars it was the only way that the Admiralty 
could gain control over its officer entry. The College had 
become a device to combat the power of 'nomination' and 
against this the Admiralty had to fight for, as Lewis has 
suggested, 'it would never get a properly organised, properly 
balanced officer structure until it had won this particular 
battle,.14 
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One result of this internal struggle was that senlor 
officers who felt their interest threatened by the College 
agitated for and obtained a series of improvements for ship's 
schoolmasters which were implemented between 1806 and 1837. 
Sullivan has suggested that these incentives ln pay and 
conditions were successful and that 'a large number of ships 
enjoyed the services of a schoolmaster during the eighteenth 
d 1 . t th t" 15 an ear y nlne een cen urles . Within the context of the 
bipartite naval education system this is an important claim 
and one that must be considered if an accurate assessment of 
educational provision in the first half of the nineteenth 
century is to be gained. 
An examination of Admiralty records is of some limited 
help. It is possible to trace numbers of schoolmasters 
servlng in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
through miscellaneous lists and registers at the Public 
Record Office. Admiralty Papers 6/427 and 6/185 contain 
folios with individual warrants appointing schoolmasters 
to ships throughout the eighteenth century and up to 1824. 
Sullivan has shown that in the 18 years prior to this date 
206 warrants were issued and concluded that 'naval 
schoolmasters were~far more numerous during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries than previously had been 
believed,.16 However, this figure is misleading for as a 
warrant was issued each time a schoolmaster was appointed to 
a warship, it was possible for one individual to receive a 
number of warrants. This was in fact the case, for in the 
years 1806-1824 12 schoolmasters accounted for 75 of the 
warrants issued. Further analysis shows that of the 98 
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schoolmasters appointed during the period, 64 were appointed 
only once and 12 received but two warrants. When these men 
are discounted, we may see that over an 18 year period only 
22 schoolmasters served regularly in a fleet, which could 
comprise as many as 100 ships of 1st to 6th rate in anyone 
year. 
From June 1837 with the appointment of Schoolmasters to 
be 'Warrant Officers of Wardroom Rank' their numbers were 
recorded in the Navy List. This leaves a period from 1824 
(when ADM 6/185 completes) to 1837 (when the Navy List entry 
begins) when the number of schoolmasters 1S difficult to 
estimate. Sullivan, although his period of interest extends 
to the end of the nineteenth century, does not address 
himself to numbers between 1824 and 1837 and no register of 
schoolmasters for the period exists. Numbers were certainly 
declining around 1820, for an Order in Council of 28th 
February 1822 stated that 'only one person has passed at 
Trinity House,18 in the three years previously. In 1824 only 
. d 19 two warrants were 1ssue . 
In the absence of Admiralty records of the numbers of 
schoolmasters serving in the 13 years between 1824 and 1837, 
a number of alternative sources including the Nautical 
Magazine, first published in 1832, were consulted. The 
evidence here is quite clear. In 1832 only three 
schoolmasters were appointed to ships of the Fleet, in 1833 
only one, and in the years up to 1837 the number never 
exceeded eight. 20 During this time a number of large ships, 
which by scheme of complement would have carried between six 
and eight officers under training, were without 
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schoolmasters. In 1833 these included the 110 gun flagship 
San Josef, the Caledonian (120) and the Edinburgh (74) while 
other substantial ships included the Endymion (50), Blanche 
(46) and Forte (44). By tracing all schoolmaster 
appointments made in the years to 1837 it is apparent that 
not only were these ships without schoolmasters initially, 
but that they remained without them up to and beyond 1837. 
Given the completely inadequate system of education 
at sea and the advances that the Royal Naval College had 
made via a talented staff and a slowly increasing 
proportion of the officer entry, the decision to 
disestablish the College in 1837 was a significant one. 
It was closed without ceremony in March of that year and 
for the next two decades all new entrants proceeded 
directly to operational warships, where they were subject 
to a system of education that was inadequate in both scope 
and provision. The essential point to grasp about the 
demise of the College was not, as Sullivan has 
21 
suggested, that the seaborne schoolmaster scheme offered 
a viable alternative but rather that the closure formed 
part of a wider pattern of anti-educational measures 
detectable ln the Royal Navy of the 1830s. These included 
an attempt to disband the newly-founded gunnery school in 
1832 and a similar but successful campaign that resulted 
in the demise of the School of Architecture in Portsmouth 
Dockyard in the same year. Both these institutions which 
formed the embryonic stage of future higher education in 
the Royal Navy were closely connected with the College. 
The degree of opposition within the Navy to the Royal 
Naval College from its foundation ln 1806 had always been 
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considerable. Much of this was in accordance with the 
traditional struggle between the Admiralty and its senior 
officers, concerning the power of nomination and the 
increasing proportion of entry that the College was 
taking. In the two decades after the Napoleonic wars 
this traditional friction was increased as the officer 
corps became subject to a process of class consolidation 
designed to block the advances made by officers of more 
humble stock during the war years. So advanced had this 
process become that for the only time in the history of 
the Service consideration was given to the purchase of 
commissions as a means of reducing and refining the 
ff ' l' 22 o lcer 1st. 
This sort of measure was ln direct conflict with the 
bureaucratic control of entry that the College represented 
and the result was a strong vein of prejudice towards the 
College and its products, by senior officers. This 
reached a point in the 1830s where some Captains would not 
accept college-trained officers into their ships.23 The 
constant refining of the officer structure during this 
period became distilled into a preoccupation with status 
and in particular a fixation on the part of existing 
senior serving officers about what constituted a 
gentleman. To this end many officers believed that a 
warship was the best place for the robust physical and 
social conditions long favoured as part of the gentleman's 
experience. Not only was the quality of entry more 
closely controlled but the essential moulding of character 
was in the hands not of a civilian professor, but of the 
Captain and his officers. Thus education at sea was 
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it was more effective but because it allowed senior 
officers closely to control the quality of young gentlemen 
joining the Fleet, and it provided the rigorous physical 
and social experience that was seen as essential in the 
officer's background and experience. 
An additional dimension in the decision to dispense 
with the College was the existence in the Royal Navy of 
this period of a widespread antipathy towards scientific 
method and study. Much of this problem was related to the 
quality of senior officers, ie those making decisions 
about training, and their ability to corne to terms with 
the scientific realities of the day. Promotion to Flag 
Rank was still conducted by strict rules of seniority with 
many men responsible for advising the government still 
serving at the age of 80 or more. There is evidence that 
many of these men were unable to grasp the scientific and 
24 technical changes taking place around them. This may be 
vividly observed in the attacks on the gunnery school and 
h · b h . 1 . d 25 the School of Arc 1tecture, ut t ere 1S a so eV1 ence 
that the Royal Naval College which practised the study of 
science and was included in the naval estimates under 
funds allocated to the scientific branch, was the target 
for senior officers determined to redress the balance of 
naval training towards a more practical format. 
When these factors are considered in association with 
the views of naval administrations of the 1830s committed 
to drastic cuts in virtually all areas ,of naval activity, 
the reasons for the demise of the College became clear. 
26 It was closed, not as Sullivan has suggested because the 
alternative schoolmaster system was a success and compared 
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favourably with College training, for this is demonstrably 
untrue. Shipborne education was pursued not because it 
was successful or educationally superior but because it 
was less expensive, less scientific and less democratic. 
Thus by the closure of the College and the renewal of 
faith In the schoolmaster system, the Navy denied itself 
the opportunity to instruct its young officers in the 
increasing technology of the age. By 1840 with over 70 
stearn ships in the Navy List, all entry into the Service 
was by training in sailing ships, where a practical course 
in sail-based seamanship was followed. While it is true 
that the College syllabus may not have accurately 
reflected the scientific advances of the day, training In 
seagoing ships was even more remote. Such a move may have 
strengthened the class structure and ensured that the 
necessary gentlemanly qualities were instilled, but its 
segregation and contempt for technical and scientific 
advances were to have a profound effect on the future 
efficiency of the Service. 
For the next 20 years naval education was conducted 
solely at sea. In the wake of the College closure the 
Admiralty set out to recruit highly qualified, university 
trained teachers to replace the old schoolmasters. These 
men were given increased pay and improved conditions and 
were to have the title 'Naval Instructors'. For 
Sullivan the year 1837 is one of major reorganisation and 
he sees the following 20 years characterised by the 
foundation of a large and well qualified group of Naval 
Instructors whose existence he claims was 'symptomatic of 
a growing realisation on the Admiralty's part of the 
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importance of naval education, which realisation had been 
brought about by the pace of technological advance,.27 
Yet an analysis of the Admiralty alternative to 
College education shows that while it may have been the 
intention to introduce an improved system this was never a 
reality. An examination of Navy Lists 1837-1840 shows 
that the provision of Naval Instructors, far from being 
effective, was in fact almost non-existent. In September 
1837 1 f . 28 b on your men were servlng and y September 1838, 
some 18 months after the scheme had been announced, the 
numbers had risen to SlX of whom only two were 
29 graduates. With some 34 ships in commission which would 
carry young officers by scheme of complement in that 
30. . 11 b . 1 d d d h t h t . . t year, lt Wl e eaSl y e uce tat e vas maJorl y 
received no instruction at all. The inadequacy of the 
system was confirmed in a House of Lords debate on 12 
February 1839 when the Earl of Hardwicke complained to the 
First Lord that since the inception of the new scheme the 
Navy had been 'aboslutely for two years without 
d ., 31 e ucatlon . 
After 1840 Sullivan suggests there was a dramatic 
increase in 'a body of graduate teachers named the 
Instructor Branch,32 and that the Admiralty had been 
prompted to 'examine naval education which had assumed a 
greater importance than ever before,.33 Yet close 
analysis shows that while there was an increase, graduates 
seldom accounted for more than a quarter of the numbers 
serving in anyone year between 1840 and 1856 (see 
opposite). Furthermore the increase is la~gely explained 
not by men of high attainment entering the Service to 
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teach, but by Chaplains already serving taking on the 
additional role of Instructor. An 1842 Order In Council had 
permitted Chaplains to receive three quarters of an 
Instructor's pay in addition to their own, plus £5 per annum 
for each pupil taught. 34 The increase in those performing 
the dual role was dramatic - of 56 Naval Instructors serving 
In 1846 only 11 were Chaplains; ten years later the total of 
96 Instructors included 47 Chaplains. Thus while numbers did 
increase it must be emphasised that even by 1856 the 
Instructors were not a body of graduate teachers but rather a 
group of non-graduates supplemented by Chaplains. 
Contemporary comment supported the view that the ship-
borne education system was inadequate in both scope and 
provision. Evidence to the Shadwell Committee of 1870 from a 
number of witnesses confirmed the situation in the years 
leading to 1857 as one of haphazard approaches to manning, 
insufficient Naval Instructors and insufficient time allowed 
for on-board study. Thomas J Main offering evidence to the 
Committee claimed 'it was impossible to supply and keep 
supplied all ships with Naval Instructors,.35 Captain J G 
Goodenough in a report to the Admiralty in 1868 claimed that 
'the opportunities for education on board well regulated 
ships receded instead of advancing during the last twenty 
years,.36 Corbett, reviewing the progress of nineteenth-
century naval education at the turn of the century, described 
the post college system as 'a disastrous attempt to teach 
cadets afloat' and stated that after 1837 'for twenty years 
the hopeless system continued, till in the normal wayan ill 
waged war gave the shock that with us the necessary 
dIn ,' t' f' 37 preliminary to a lnlstra lve re orm . 
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These observations, combined with a rigorous examination 
of the number and nature of Naval Instructor appointments, 
suggest that Sullivan's view that in 1837 'the whole basis 
upon which education was provided was overhauled and put on a 
much sounder footing,38 is based on insufficient analysis. 
Far from being better organised, the closure of the College 
and failure to recruit sufficient numbers of Naval 
Instructors meant that educational provision had fallen to 
its lowest point Slnce the foundation of the old Naval 
Academy in 1729. This was the situation ln the year this 
study commences and it was as a reaction to the inefficiency 
and disorganisation of officer education over the two decades 
since the College closure, that the system was overhauled. 
The Advent of the Training Ship Concept 
Despite the fact that for more than two centuries 
training of both officers and ratings had taken place almost 
exclusively in operational ships, the origins of 
commissioning a vessel purely for the purpose, have received 
little attention from previous commentators. Although 
Sullivan claims to have produced a detailed account of the 
d · h . d 39 h . totality of naval education urlng t e perlo e lS 
curiously vague about the origins of the central educational 
institution of the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century - the 
training ship. He offers only the broad generalisation that 
the foundation was prompted by 'the inadequacy of training at 
sea, by pressure of international events, and by the pace of 
technological change',40 although no attempt is made to 
justify or account further for any of these statements. 
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While Sullivan's exact argument is consequently unclear 
this thesis will demonstrate that the advent of new 
technology had little relationship or relevance to the 
origins of the training ship and that the early educational 
and professional courses followed therein were characterised 
rather by a deeply traditional approach. Similarly if 'the 
pressure of international events' refers to the Russian Wars 
1854-56 it will be shown that while some impetus to examlne 
training more thoroughly may have been derived from the 
conflict, the notion of ships specifically devoted to 
training was in existence and working a number of years 
previously. Sullivan's third explanation for the initiation 
of the training ship 'the inadequacy of training in 
operational warships' is undoubtedly correct, although it is 
a direct contradiction of his previous argument that the post 
1837 Naval Instructor system was both successful and heralded 
a new era 'symptomatic of a growing realisation on the 
Admiralty's part of the importance of naval education,.41 It 
has been demonstrated in this chapter that this was not the 
case. 
Other commentators are equally vague. Statham 
attributes the foundation of the training ship system to Sir 
James Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty 1853-1855, who he 
says conceived of a plan to establish 'a training ship for 
young seamen in order to provide a better class of man to 
fill the vacancies In the Fleet. ,42 This argument is 
supported by Lewis who claims that Graham's experience In 
raising manpower for the Fleet during the Crimean crisis was 
instrumental in initiating the training ship Illustrious,43 
an argument repeated by penn 44 and by Pack. 45 
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There can be little argument about Graham's contribution 
ln actually commissioning the ship or in investing in boys' 
training as a long term solution to the Navy's manning 
problem. Nor can there be any doubt about the exacerbating 
effect of the Russian Wars which had reduced the First Lord, 
in the absence of sufficient trained manpower, to advising 
his Flag Officers to attempt to recruit sailors for the 
campaign in Norway and Sweden. 46 Nevertheless there is 
evidence that the idea of a ship devoted exclusively to 
training was both older and derived from a slightly 
difference impetus. Admiralty records show that as early as 
December 1847 brigs attached to flagships were being employed 
specifically for boys' training. In that year the SlX gun 
brig Rolla was allocated for service at Portsmouth as 'an 
exercise vessel for Boys of the Ordinary', her instructional 
staff being drawn from HMS Victory. In April 1848 the 
Nautilus was detailed for the same service at Devonport, her 
staff being borne in HMS Impregnable. In 1850 the Wizard was 
attached ln the same way to HMS Ajax at Cork. 47 
The introduction of such vessels was prompted partly by 
the drive to attract young men into the Service and thus 
combat the chaos of the existing manning system by providing 
systematic training from an early age. To this end the 
training or 'school' brigs carried out coastal cruises for 
recruiting purposes. There was also, however, a separate 
pastoral justification which stands as an early indication of 
the social transformation of the lower deck that the 
Admiralty was to superintend over three decades from the 
l850s. Interest in the establishment of the school brigs was 
an acknowledgement that the educational and training needs of 
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boys were distinct and specialised and that it was necessary 
to create an environment, removed from the pernicious 
influence of the flagship, where education and training might 
be satisfactorily conducted. 
This view was formally recognised by the Committee for 
Manning the Navy appointed on 6 July 1852 under the 
chairmanship of Sir William Parker. The group which 
consisted solely of professional naval officers - Parker, 
Rear Admiral Arthur Fanshaw, Captain Hon Richard S Dundas, 
Captain Peter Richards and Captain John Shepherd, was 
directed to consider 'the most efficient Means of attaining 
and retaining Seamen for manning the Fleet,.48 However, few 
restrictions were placed upon their enquiry, the Board noting 
that 'My Lords do not deem it necessary to bind 
the Committee by any specific Instructions in the 
. . b . ,49 d th Consideratlon of so lmportant a su ]ect, an e 
Committee made a wide range of recommendations on adjacent 
matters ranging from the arrangements for Prize Money 
to the encouragement of Sailors' Savings Banks. 
Dealing with the entry and education of boys, the 
Committee acknowledged the contribution of the school 
brigs, not solely because of their recruiting value, but 
also because 
boys should not unnecessarily be exposed at their 
very early age to the influence of bad example, 
we think their education might be more 
beneficially and uninterruptedly pursued if 
they were removed altogether from the flagships.50 
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Recommendations were made for the training and instruction 
of a selected number of boys in the various trades 
practised on board Her Majesty's Ships and in paragraph 19, 
the commissioning of separate ships for the purposes of 
education and training was specifically recommended. 
separate ships should be appropriated exclusively 
as School Ships selecting for that purpose ships 
of not less than two decks which are not likely to 
be required for early service; a systematic course 
of education and quiet process of training should 
be enjoined due regard being had to the youth of 
the boys.51 
The report was submitted on 14 February 1853 almost 
coinciding with Sir James Graham's appointment as First 
Lord in the Earl of Aberdeen's government. Eleven months 
later in January 1854 the two deck 72 gun HMS Illustrious 
was commissioned for the purposes of harbour training for 
young seaman entrants. It will thus be noted that while 
these youngsters were nicknamed 'Jemmy Graham's novices' 
and while the First Lord was an enthusiastic advocate for 
the training ship system, credit for the initial concept 
should be given to the Parker Committee. Over the next ten 
years a further five ships at Devonport, Southampton, 
Chatham and Portsmouth were commissioned, as successive 
governments invested heavily in boys' training. 
The imagination and vision of the Admiralty in this 
matter was the impetus for a wider industrial and 
reformatory ship movement in British seaports in the 50 
years from 1856. Old hulks, frequently obsolete warships 
donated or loaned by the Admiralty, were established for 
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the education of homeless and destitute boys, as an 
extension of the Ragged School Movement. The motivation 
appears to have been two fold - partly to provide a pool of 
labour for the merchant and fishing fleets, but also as a 
means of controlling the rate of juvenile crime. The 
movement grew quickly, with ships established at Liverpool 
(1856), London (1859), Cardiff (1866) and Hull (1868) and 
later at Bangor, Bristol, Dundee and the Garelock. 52 Under 
the provision of the Industrial Schools Act of 1866, boys 
were taught reading, writing, cyphering, practical 
geography and navigation. Industrial training included 
'all necessary preparation for nautical duties, sailmaking 
d " 't '1' d h k' ,53 an repalrlng, carpenterlng, al orlng an s oe rna lng. 
While these ships were charitable ventures outside the 
Admiralty domain, they were frequently commanded and 
inspected on behalf of the government by naval officers, 
emulated Royal Naval ship routine, and were an important 
source of semi trained manpower for the merchant and 
military services. 
A Training Ship for Officers 
As the reputation of the Navy's ratings training ships 
for high standards of discipline and organisation became 
established, successive administrations were encouraged to 
increase both the number and proportion of boys entering 
the Service. In the ten years prior to the commissioning 
of HMS Illustrious the figure had averaged a vote of 2000 
54 boys per annum. In the decade after the Crimean War, 
with the training ship system operating, the number of boys 
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voted only dropped below 6000 on one occasion and by 1864 
the vote accounted for about one fifth of lower deck 
numbers compared to one twentieth a decade previously55. 
While the Admiralty did have some difficulty initially in 
filling the vacancies they created, the investment in boys' 
training as a means of stabilising manning was clear. 
In contrast, the ad hoc system of training young 
officers was failing to produce either the numbers or the 
quality required to pass the Lieutenant's examination and 
thence proceed on to the trained strength of the Navy List. 
A contemporary estimate suggested that of 367 Naval Cadets 
admitted between 1852 and 1855 only 170 eventually passed 
for Lieutenant. 56 Of 155 Cadets entered in 1854 more than 
57 
one third failed to pass and a later survey suggested 
that this figure was generally valid for a ten year period 
from this date. 58 In contrast to the methodical structured 
pattern of ratings training established by the training 
ships, the inadequate number of Naval Instructors 
attempting to teach young officers in the demanding 
surroundings of operational warships, were failing to 
produce trained junior officers in sufficient numbers. 
There is also evidence that not only were officer 
numbers unsatisfactory but that the quality was poor. 
Testimony to the Tarleton Committee of 1872 portrayed a 
picture of young officers in the 1850s spending inordinate 
lengths of time as Midshipmen, either lacking the ability 
or the inclination to pass for Lieutenant. A letter to the 
committee of 19 March 1872 cited the cases of officers who 
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were still Midshipmen at ages ranging from 22 to 26 years 
old and suggested that 
it is not unreasonable to suppose that such 
officers are of no use to the Service even if they 
eventually pass, and if they are entering 
without intention of passing they are probably 
setting a bad example to younger officers 59 
Captain Robert Harris, first commanding officer of the 
training ships, noted the shortcomings of the old system, 
suggesting that not only was the officer loss rate 
considerable but that 
many of those who remained were crammed for the 
examination and reached the Lieutenant's List with 
an amount of knowledge which much increased the 
responsibility of the Captains with whom they 
served. 60 
The decision to emulate the pattern of boys training 
by commissioning a training ship specifically for officer 
cadets has popularly been attributed to the efforts of 
Harris. He was undoubtedly an important influence on the 
development of naval education and his pamphlet, An 
Historical Sketch of the General Means Adopted for the 
Education of Naval Officers, published in 1863, was one of 
the earliest and most comprehensive studies of the subject. 
Harris entered the Navy directly to sea in HMS Euryalus as 
a 13 year old in 1822. He qualified as a gunnery 
lieutenant in HMS Excellent and, on promotion to Commander, 
volunteered to study on half pay at the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth, in its early days as a higher education 
establishment. He was appointed to command the boy 
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seaman's training ship in 1854 and two years later, at his 
own request, his son was entered in the ship as a Cadet to 
be trained with the seaman ratings. Statham suggests that 
it was this experiment that convinced the Admiralty that 
the scheme should be extended to all officer entrants 6l -
the decision being taken within six weeks of Cadet Harris 
completing training in January 1857. As with the majority 
of comment on the early years of the training ship, other 
. 1 d' . 62 k 63 d 64 sources lnc u lng Lewls, Pac an Penn repeat this 
version of events. 
While it cannot be denied that the training of Cadet 
Harris may have influenced Admiralty thinking, it is 
important to point out that by 1857 the Board had been 
attempting to exercise an increased degree of bureaucratic 
control over the system of officer entry for some years. 
At first these regulations were unevenly applied or 
ignored. Much of the memoir and autobiography of the 
period cites entrance and examination procedure that was 
absurd. Captain J E Hunter joining in 1848 was merely 
required to write out the Lord.'s Prayer and asked if he 
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could drink a glass of sherry , and Admiral Sir John 
Fisher met a similar entrance procedure in 1854. 66 Moresby 
cites examination success for a Lieutenant in the l840s on 
the basis of knowing which end of a cigar to place in his 
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mouth and there are numerous examples ln the l840s and 
50s of farcical entrance and exam procedures. 
Despite these abuses, year by year the Admiralty 
extended the regulations as it sought to wrest the 
control of entry from individual senior officers and 
incorporate it into the bureaucratic structure of the 
Navy. This process had started in 1838 when regulations 
established in the wake of the College closure dictated 
that 
Naval cadets must not be under 12 years of age, 
they must be in good health, fit for service and 
able to write English from dictation and must be 
acquainted with the first 4 rules of Arithmetic, 
Reduction and the Rule of Three. 68 
In 1849 the words 'nor above 14' were added69 and in 1851 
the regulations were enhanced with no candidate allowed a 
second examination and all examinations to take place at 
70 the Royal Naval College Portsmouth. The 1855 
regulations raised the age on entry to between 14 and 15 
years and prescribed an examination ln 
Writing English correctly from dictation: 
Arithmetic Vulgar and Decimal fractions: First 
Book of Euclid Algebra including simple 
equations: General knowledge of Geography: Latin 
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or French or modern language. 
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Thus by time these regulations took effect on 23 January 
1856 the degree of stringency in entry requirements had 
greatly increased. 
The culmination of these efforts was reached early 
ln 1856 when a working party was appointed to consider 
the question of examination and instruction of Naval 
Cadets and Midshipmen. It was headed by Commodore F T 
Pelham, then serving as Captain of the Fleet in the 
Portsmouth flagship HMS Duke of Wellington, and the other 
naval representatives were Chaplain and Naval Instructor 
J A Burrough and Naval Instructor Kempster M Knapp. The 
three civilian participants, who were all closely 
involved in educational activity relating to the Service, 
comprised the Revd Thomas J Main, Professor at the Royal 
Naval College Portsmouth since 1839, the Revd George 
Fisher, Principal of the Royal Hospital Schools adjacent 
to the naval pensioners' establishment at Greenwich and 
the Revd Dr Chambers, Headmaster of the Royal Naval 
School New Cross, founded in 1833 for the education of 
the sons of less affluent Naval and Marine officers. 
Details of the Committee and its deliberations 
are sparse and it seems to have been ignored by most 
published sources. Its status may more accurately be 
described as working party or consultative group, for its 
findings were not presented to Parliament as a Command 
Paper and it appears to have published no report beyond 
the Admiralty Circular Number 288 of 23 February 1857 
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which outlined the new regulations for entry and 
examination. Nevertheless this Circular was the most 
comprehensive document governing the entry, education and 
training of young officers produced to date and outlined 
not only the syllabus for cadets in the training ship but 
also educational practices to be adopted for midshipmen 
serving in the Fleet prior to passing for Lieutenant. 
Comprehensive professional requirements in seamanship, 
navigation and gunnery were dictated and examiners were 
warned 'to be most strict in their investigation of the 
qualifications of officers,72 
The section of Circular 288 relevant to the 
Training Ship consisted of some ten paragraphs. 
Candidates were to be aged between 13 and 15 and 'free 
from impediment of speech, defect of vision, rupture or 
h . l' ff" ,73 N . t d d . d t t P YSlca lne lClency. omlna e can 1 a es were 0 
present themselves for quarterly examinations to be held 
at the Royal Naval College Portsmouth, where those aged 
13 were required: 
1. To write English correctly, from dictation 
in a legible hand. 
2. To read, translate and parse an easy passage 
from a Latin or French author with the aid 
of a dictionary. 
3. The leading facts of Scripture History. 
4. Modern Geography, in so far as it relates to 
a knowledge of the principal countries, 
capitals, mountains and rivers and be able 
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to point out a place on a map when the 
latitude and longitude are given. 
5. Arithmetic including Proportion and a fair 
knowledge of Vulgar and Decimal Fractions. 
6. Algebra, including Fractions. 
7. The First Book of Euclid, to proposition 
XXXII inclusive. 
Those over the age of 14 were, in addition to the above, 
to demonstrate the ability to use 'Globes and glve 
definitions of Latitude, Longitude, Azimuth, Amplitude 
and the other circles of the Sphere' A practical 
knowledge of Plane Trigonometry, Vulgar and Decimal 
Fractions and Algebra was also required. 74 
After serving the minimum three months aboard 
the Training Ship any Cadet who felt competent could opt 
to be examined, with discharge from the Service the 
penalty for failure. In practice this meant that most 
Cadets spent between SlX and twelve months on board 
before completing a leaving examination which comprised 
all the entry subjects excepting Latin and in addition 
included: 
In Arithmetic - Insolution and Extraction of the 
Square Root 
In Algebra - Simple Equations 
The Elements of Geometry as contained in the 
textbook for the use of Greenwich School, by John 
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Murray 1854. 
Plane Trigonometry and the solution of practical 
and useful problems. 
Spherical Trigonometry, the mode of solving 
Triangles and its application to simple 
Astronomical problems. 
In Navigation - A 'Days Work' to find the Latitude 
by meridian altitudes and Longitude by Chronometer 
Nautical Instruments - To explain and use the 
Sextant, Azimuth Compass, Artificial Horizon and 
Theodolite 
Some knowledge of the mode of Surveying and the 
construction of charts. 
French, as far as 50 lessons of Ollendorfs method 
of learning French and the reading and translating 
of an easy passage from a French author without 
th . d f d' t' 75 e al 0 a lC lonary. 
Running parallel with academic studies was a 
comprehensive course in seamanship which included 
practical boatwork, rigging, sail handling and methods of 
mooring. Specimen lectures were also given on practical 
astronomy and nautical instruments. 
Circular Number 288 came into force in May 1857 
and thus applied to the next quarterly entry of cadets in 
August of that year. HMS Illustrious which had been in 
commission for boys' training at Portsmouth since January 
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1854 was selected for the purpose and under the existing 
commanding officer, Robert Harris, was moored off Haslar 
Creek to receive the first batch of 23 cadets in August 
1857. From this date, for the first time in British 
naval history, young officers were subject to a common, 
unified system of entrance examination and initial 
training. 
Harris was assisted by three staff officers -
Lieutenants George S Paterson, Marcus Lowther (for 
Sealark brig) and F T Thompson (for Bullfinch tender) and 
an academic staff of Chaplain and Naval Instructors W R 
Jolley and R M Inskip, and Naval Instructor K M Knapp 
who had helped to devise the syllabus as a member of the 
Pelham Committee. As the quarterly batches of students 
overlapped and the numbers increased, the staff was 
supplemented by Lieutenant George S Nares (January 1858) 
and Naval Instructor J G D Barton (July 1858). The 
proximity of the ship to Portsmouth dockyard ensured a 
supply of visiting instructors, including W D Hay the 
Dockyard Chemist and expert on hull growth and corrosion 
and Thomas Brown, Chief Engineer in HMS Excellent who 
was appointed to give lectures on the steam engine. 
Physical training and swimming were taught by a Mr Tuohy, 
Admiralty Professor of General Exercise and Gymnastics, 
who ran a semi-official establishment for the purpose at 
76 Gosport. 
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Although Statham suggests that despite 'a great dearth 
of actual record during these times, there is abundant 
evidence of an implicit nature that the new experiment was 
. 77 turnlng out to be a complete success', there were clearly 
some teething problems. Harris' own memoir, while noting 
that 'the Midshipmen who entered just before the new system 
commenced have painfully felt in many instances, the 
disadvantages under which they laboured',78 acknowledged 
difficulties in the new training venture. These centred 
around the extensive nature of the syllabus, which Harris 
considered too advanced for the length of study available,79 
and the fact that Cadets of different ages were not 
remaining the same time under instruction which 'rendered 
the arrangement of classes very difficult and interfered 
. h h d f . ., 80 Wlt t e stea y progress 0 lnstructlon. 
The result was a redrafting of the 1857 regulations, 
subsequently published as Admiralty Circular No 393 of 23 
October 1859,81 which came into force on 1 April 1860. From 
this date Cadets who were to be entered between 12 and 14 
years old were all to have twelve months instruction in the 
harbour training ship. On completion it was envisaged that 
three further months would be spent in a sea going training 
ship for the purposes of practical instruction, on 
completion of which, subject to satisfactory conduct, 
youngsters would be appointed to the Fleet with the rate of 
Midshipman. The Eurydice was commissioned for this purpose 
although both Statham and Harris suggest that she was never 
actively employed, the latter attributing this to the 
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prevailing financial stringency in naval matters. 82 A 
subsequent Order in Council of 20 November 1861 dropped the 
requirement to spend time in a sea going training ship and 
also redefined the relationship between the ranks of Cadet 
and Midshipman. From this time all Cadets gaining a first 
class pass were immediately promoted Midshipman, while 
holders of second and third class passes had to serve a 
further six and twelve months respectively before being 
rated up. 
An increase in the number of officers under training by 
1859 prompted the introduction of a larger and more 
commodious vessel and on January 1st of that year, the 120 
gun three decker HMS Britannia was commissioned to replace 
the Illustrious. She displaced 2616 tons and although 
launched in 1820 had seen recent service in the Crimean War, 
on the completion of which she had been laid up. She was 
moored in the berth of her predecessor and under the same 
commanding officer had a complement of 236 Cadets in 1859 83 
- the largest number of officers under training for a 
decade. This ship, the fourth of the name, was employed in 
the training role until July 1869 when at Dartmouth she was 
replaced by the even larger 131 gun Prince of Wales which 
was renamed to become the fifth Britannia. 
Life ln the Early Training Ship 
Details of the early days of the Illustrious and 
Britannia at Portsmouth are sparse. It is known that the 
number of Cadets aboard fluctuated from 105 in 1857 to 140 
in the following year with the highpoint of 236 in 1859 and 
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HMS BRITANNIA 1st RATE LINE Of BATTLESHIP, 120 GUNS 
LAID DOWN PLYMOUTH 1813, LAUNCHED 1820, 2616 TONS 
CADET TRAINING SHIP PORTSMOUTH/PORTLAND/DARTMOUTH 1859-1869 
~ 
~ 
1. """ ._- 50 ft __ ._ ... __ ~ APPLIES TO • .. - .. ••..• --- • • - I 
THE PROfiLE Of THE SHIP ONLY 
2. AS A TRAINING SHIP BRITANNIA WOULD 
HAVE fLOATED PROUD Of HER LOADLINE, 
HENCE THE RELATIONSHIP Of THE 
ACCOMMODATION TO THE WATERLINE 
IS NOTIONAL. 
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then a decline to 179 and 174 in 1860 and 1861 
respectively.84 Among them was HRH Prince Alfred (entered 
31 August 1858) second son of Queen Victoria who was a 
student in both ships although he lived ashore throughout 
his training and attended for daily instruction only. 
Another distinguished student was C W D Beresford, later 
Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, who joined Britannia in 
December 1859 and remained until the end of March 1861. His 
memoirs give only a vague impression of life on board 
although he confirms that the sea training ship Eurydice was 
employed for instructional purposes moored alongside the 
t .. h' 85 ra1n1ng s 1p. 
The principal published witness to life aboard 1S the 
historian of the ship, E P Statham, who was a Cadet 
1861/1862. Considering the degree of detail devoted to the 
later years of the ship, he is strangely reticent about the 
period he should have been able to relate in the most 
detail. He claims 'there is no record available' of the 
number of Cadets entered in 1860 and 1861 (it was 179 and 
174 respectively)86 and is generally vague about the exact 
nature and conduct of training. He does provide a brief 
description of the physical layout of the Britannia which he 
describes as 'new and roomy, well suited to the purpose 
according to the ideas of the time,.87 Britannia was a 
'three decker', a term implying three gun decks, with an 
orlop deck, or cockpit beneath and a weather deck above, 
making a total of five in all. A diagram detailing the 
layout derived from Statham's description appears opposite. 
Fortunately evidence to the Rice Committee of 1874 by 
92 
Lieutenant W F S Mann RN provides a previously unconsidered 
portrait of the detailed routine in the Britannia at 
Portsmouth between 1859 and early 1862. He entered the ship 
as a 13 year old product of the Royal Naval School, New 
Cross and due to illness spent an extended period of 15 
months in the ship. He explained to the Committee that 
Cadets of the time were divided into two watches spending 
alternate days, with the exception of Sunday, studying 
academic subjects and practical seamanship. On 'study days' 
Euclid and arithmetic were pursued in the mornings followed 
by dictation from half past one until four o'clock, with 
five minute breaks during which time cadets could run about 
the upper deck. The non-academic days were characterised by 
sailing, deckwork and working aloft. In the winter, drill 
sessions in an adjacent blockhouse were substituted for mast 
work. There appeared to be ample time for relaxation with 
Mann noting that 'Always about 4 or half past we went on 
shore or away pulling in boats and so on,.88 
Statham's description of the sleeping arrangements was 
supported, with the witness affirming that the Cadets slept 
in the lowest deck in the ship, in hammocks narrowly spaced 
approximately 16 - 18" apart, although he confirmed that 
ventilation on this deck was more than satisfactory, due to 
h ·, . d 89 the cutting of additional scuttles in the s 1p s Sl e. 
There was apparently very little bullying, although all new 
entrants underwent an initiation ceremony similar to the 
traditional 'crossing the line', which involved climbing the 
90 
mast and receiving a mouthful of grease. Mann denied the 
existence of a fagging system and claimed that 'at the time 
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I joined there was a lot of capital fellows who kept things 
of that sort down with a high hand,91. Three classes of 
punishment were described - Class A consisting of loss of 
privileges, Class B - 'hand spike drill for half an hour 
and to stand in the middle deck for half an hour with leave 
and pudding stopped,92 and Class C which involved 
confinement to the lower deck for a specified period. 
The portrait of life aboard the early Britannia seems 
inncc~~us enough - certainly when compared to a comparable 
shore side public school of the period. Mann dismissed the 
suggestion that the amount of study overtaxed Cadets, 
noting that the system was less severe than at present. 
There was no evidence of any official form of corporal 
punishment ('handspike drill' merely consisting of 
exercises with wooden bars, akin to Indian clubs). While 
accommodation conditions were basic, Lewis' portrayal of 
'the still airless orlop deck,93 is clearly wrong and fails 
to take account of the enlarged scuttles which Mann claimed 
provided too much, rather than too little, ventilation 
. 11 . . t 94 especla y ln Wln ere 
By examining other evidence given to the Rice 
Committee it is also possible to make an assessment of the 
efficiency of the Britannia up to and including 1862. One 
of the witnesses called was Vice Admiral Alfred Phillips 
Ryder, a leading advocate of improvement in the naval 
education system and a prominent member of the Royal united 
Services Institution, where he both chaired seminars and 
read papers on the subject in the 1870s. He had entered 
the Service ln 1833, passed for Lieutenant six years later, 
and studied at the Royal Naval College Portsmouth where he 
94 
was considered to be one of the outstanding officers of his 
generation. 95 Ryder 1S a particularly valuable figure in 
tracing the development of educational provision in the 
Service, for as a Captain he had served as Private 
Secretary to Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset, First Lord 
of the Admiralty 1859-1866. Much of the evidence he 
offered to both the Shadwell Committee on Higher Education 
of 1870 and the Rice Committee on Cadet's Education 1874 is 
thus based not only on a lifetime interest in the subject 
but also on first hand experience of policy within the 
Admiralty in these years. 
Ryder offered a detailed comparative analysis of the 
Britannia and the system that preceded it, based upon 
'wastage' - 1e the number of Cadets and Midshipmen who 
failed to pass for Lieutenant due to voluntary release or 
discharge for misconduct. First he noted the disastrous 
effect on retention rates of the closure of the Royal Naval 
College Portsmouth observing; 
that the number of collegians who were discharged 
from the serV1ce for misconduct in each year was much 
smaller than the number of non collegians so 
discharged ... that the number of non collegians who 
voluntary abandoned the service as a profession was 
also relatively more numerous than the collegians who 
did so .•. 
that the number of midshipmen discharged owing to 
misconduct and by request increased rapidly after the 
Royal Naval College was abolished ... 96 
This supported statistical analysis of the period cited in 
this chapter by Harris97 and the evidence offered to the 
95 
Tarleton Committee, both of which complained of low 
standards and high wastage rates in the interregnum 
The improvement in retention coincidental with the 
introduction of the training ship is then outlined, with 
Ryder noting that in the ten years prior to 1857, of 1131 
Cadets entered, 177 had left by request, 160 had been 
discharged for misconduct making a loss rate of 337 or 
about one third. A post Britannia survey from 1857 to 1862 
incl, indicated that of the 874 midshipmen who had entered 
and proceeded to the Fleet, 23 had resigned and only 11 had 
been discharged for misconduct, approximating to one 
twenty-sixth of the entry. While Ryder acknowledged that 
for statistical reliability terms of years of equal length 
must be applied, he argued that the figures showed that 'in 
spite of the great difficulty attending the experiment, the 
Britannia boys have corne triumphantly out of the trial,98 
There was indeed considerable favourable comment about 
the new system. Ryder cited an 1863 Admiralty return 
concerning the standards of 593 Midshipmen and Cadets 
currently serving in the Fleet which he said indicated that 
'the Britannia does her work right well and infinitely 
better than the system which for 20 years 1836-1856 took 
boys from any place of education and sent them at once into 
a sea gOlng ship,.99 Statham quotes from the letters of a 
number of sea going commanders and flag officers who he 
says were 'unanimous in their praise of the qualifications 
and conduct of youngsters sent to sea in the early days of 
. d h B . t ., 100 the Illustrlous an t e rl annla . There is also 
evidence that the ship rapidly became the focus of public 
and service press attention - the Army and Navy Gazette 
96 
suggesting that Britannia 'from a very small and In reality 
insignificant beginning, has assumed a character of 
t " 1" 101 na lona lmportance' . 
While there can be little doubt that the increase in 
efficiency prompted by the new system was appreciated and 
welcomed, particularly when compared with the disastrous, 
wasteful system it replaced, there is also evidence that 
the Britannia was not the universally admired institution 
that Statham portrays. In fact despite much favourable 
comment the ship was also the subject of considerable 
criticism and debate from its earliest days. In view of 
Statham's anodyne treatment of the early period and in the 
light of Sullivan's claim that the ship was subject only to 
'gradual discontent as time went on,102 it is important to 
establish the nature and content of this previously 
unconsidered debate. 
Contemporary Criticism of the System 
Contemporary criticism of the Britannia may be 
considered at a number of distinct and separate levels. 
The first was concerned with the minutiae of the training 
ship - detailed discussion and argument about matters such 
as location, the nature of the syllabus, and the inevitable 
time honoured arguments about 'declining standards'. This 
was the very stuff of the correspondence columns of an 
extensive Service press from the outset. This included at 
varlous times during the period the Army and Navy Gazette 
and the Broad Arrow published weekly, the monthly United 
Service Magazine, and the Naval Chronicle and Sailors Horne 
Journal (later the Naval History of our Times) also 
97 
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published monthly which claimed to detail 'every Admiralty 
Circular Issued, Every Naval Despatch Gazetted, the Doings 
of Every Naval Station at Home and Abroad, Every 
Statistical Return Published in connection with the 
Navy,.103 A survey of these publications indicates a 
continual preoccupation with the policy, standards and 
organisation of the training ship. 
Much of this was ephemeral in nature and evidence as 
Rodger has suggested that 'legions of unemployed officers 
on half pay, out of touch with the Service and out of 
sympathy with the times had ample leisure to put forward 
th ' ft t . d 1 . . . ,104 elr 0 en reac lonary an unrea lStlC Vlews . As 
early as November 1860 less than two years after the 
Britannia commissioned, a correspondent to the Army and 
Navy Gazette complained that 'standards have generally 
deteriorated over the last year' and that Cadets 'would 
have been better if they had never seen the Britannia,.105 
Typically a subsequent edition published a rejoinderl06 
and in this manner similar discussion rumbled along over 
the years. No matter was too trivial for consideration 
with subjects ranging from the smoking habits of 
trainees,107 the brand of hand soap most suitable for young 
108 . b' 1 . th' f d' officers and the deslra 1 lty or 0 erwlse 0 sen lng 
Cadets to the Arctic as part of their initial education. 109 
Yet in the midst of the ephemeral and the eccentric, 
the Service press also produced serious and constructive 
consideration of the nature and quality of officer 
training. The Army and Navy Gazette was particularly 
notable in this respect devoting four leading articles to 
the subject in 1862, which reflected areas of contention in 
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the Britannia debate that would be rehearsed continually over 
the following five decades. These included the inadequacy of 
the academic courses in which lack of external validation 
made the staff 'auditors of their own accounts,llO, the 
health and physical condition of Naval Cadets and the 
desirability of establishing a naval college ashore. 
It is instructive to note that, contrary to the Sullivan 
view of an increasing dissatisfaction with the training ship 
ln later years, this debate was evident in the earliest days 
of the Britannia. In November 1862, with the ship only four 
years old, the editor of the Army and Navy Gazette noted: 
that the close schoolrooms and the suffocating 
sleeping spaces on board our model training ship, are 
quite sufficient to sew diseases which will, if not 
immediately injurious, ultimately sap the lives of the 
unlucky boys who are unconsciously inhaling a 
III pOlsonous atmosphere 
The corollary of this argument was that the ship should 
be replaced by a naval college, with the paper noting that 
the First Lord now had 'an excellent opportunity of presslng 
upon his colleagues the value of a naval college to be 
, ' t 1 l't' 112 erected ln some convenlen oca 1 y . 
The question of whether training should best be 
conducted in the Britannia or in a purpose built college was 
also considered by the Naval Chronicle which initially 
favoured support for the ship. It noted in October 1861 
that: 
the Naval Cadet should be educated afloat because: 
1. Any advantages which may attach to shore education 
the Naval Cadet has availed himself of prior to his 
100 
nomination. 
2. The very fact that the Naval Cadet is living and 
sleeping in a ship surrounded by salt water is itself 
a coadjustor of no small amount. 113 
Again in January 1863 the paper considering the subject of a 
naval college noted, without citing evidence, that 'in the 
opinion of very many of our ablest and most distinguished 
Admirals there lS no need for anything of the kind,114 and 
concluded that if 'it be resolved to form a college, then it 
should be optional for the nominee to join or receive his 
education elsewhere,.115 While this comment is unofficial 
and the policy somewhat inconsistent - the same paper noting 
of the Britannia in 1870 that 'the sooner she is sold even at 
. f' h b ,116.. 1 . d f d b a sacrl lce t e etter lt lS C ear eVl ence 0 a e ate 
via both the correspondence and editorial columns of the 
Service press about the efficiency of naval training from the 
earliest days. 
There is also evidence that a body of oplnlon favouring 
a college alternative existed outside of the editorial 
columns of the papers. The debate for example found 
recognition in the report of the Select Committee on 
Promotion and Retirement in the Royal Navy which was 
appointed in March 1863. Its primary purpose was to 
recommend steps to bring order to the chaotic career 
structure of the officer corps and thus the bulk of its 
deliberations are not relevant to this work. However, 
despite a disclaimer that the subject of education and 
. d . t . t 117 h . . training was OutSl e 1 s reml, t e Commlttee ln 
considering the question of advancement, were forced to 
assess the qualifications and training of those on the first 
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rung of the promotion ladder. The report thus provides a 
useful insight, particularly into the thinking of senior 
naval officer witnesses about how naval education should best 
be conducted. Its findings have not been considered by any 
previous study. 
Under the chairmanship of the Rt Hon Spencer Walpole the 
Committee heard evidence from 20 naval officers of Commanders 
rank and above who were presented with a serles of 
propc~itions, including number eight - 'That a naval college 
be established with ships attached and that no Cadets be sent 
to sea under the age of sixteen,.118 Unfortunately the 
responses from witnesses tended to be rather abrupt with 
little elaboration on the views expressed, however despite a 
considerable range of opinion regarding entry age and a 
general consensus that Britannnia was doing valuable work the 
evidence was overwhelming. All witnesses, with the exception 
of Admiral Sir Rodney Mundy, were in favour of replacing the 
ship by a naval college. 
The most important figure to testify was the - then 
First Lord of the Admiralty, the Duke of Somerset, who was 
interviewed at length. While he was happy with the sub 14 
year old entry, he too was a supporter of a shore based 
college, noting that 
if you had a college on shore it would give you ln my 
opinion many advantages with reference to their 
education and perhaps more opportunities for giving 
them a scientific education than there can be on board 
a ship. It is of great importance that they should 
have an opportunity of obtaining a scientific 
. 119 
educatlon. 
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With a keen appreciation of the financial stringency 
of the times he felt that such an institution might be made 
self supporting and that while young officers would form the 
core of the student body, civilians might also be admitted on 
f . b . 120 a ee paylng aSls. 
As it pertained to the progress of the young naval 
officer from his entry as a Cadet to his commission as a Sub 
Lieutenant, the Committee expressed general satisfaction with 
the state of officer education noting that 'nominations are 
fairly made, the education is good but perhaps confined too 
h t th h 1 d t 1 . 1 h' , 121 muc 0 e sc 00 an 00 ltt e to seamans lp . On the 
question of building a naval college it noted that 'there are 
matters upon which much interesting evidence has been given, 
but it is rather for the Admiralty than this Committee to 
122 decide upon them. Despite this self effacement, its final 
list of recommendations included 
as regards the advancement and promotion generally of 
Naval Cadets and Commissioned Officers, your Committee 
recommend -
1. That the expediency of establishing a naval 
college with training brigs and small steamers 
attached to it, should be considered by the Admiralty. 
2. That the college shall be made, as far as 
f . 123 practicable, sel supportlng 
Although no college was built there is evidence that the 
First Lord examined the possibility ln some detail at this 
time. His then Private Secretary, Captain (later Vice 
Admiral) A P Ryder told the 1874 Committee on the Education 
of Naval Cadets that in 1863, at the First Lord's 
instigation, he had carried out a survey of the views of 
ships' captains presently serving or who had served in the 
103 
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previous six months. This amounted to some 54 senior 
officers who were asked firstly whether they were in favour 
of a naval educational establishment or whether boys should 
be sent direct to sea, and secondly if such an establishment 
should be ashore or afloat. The response was overwhelming, 
with Ryder reporting to the First Lord that 
A College on shore with training vessels attached to it 
is the proposal then that by an immense majority finds 
favour with naval officers of experience who have 
thought on the subject. I have no hesitation therefore 
in claiming that by evidence of the facts and by the 
evidence of the almost unanimous opinion of naval 
officers then afloat who had formed an opinion, we 
ought to have a naval educational establishment and 
that it ought to be on shore. 124 
In consequence Ryder claimed that 'the Duke of Somerset's 
mind was I believe very much made up on the point in favour 
of having a college on shore,125 and that the proposal 
proceeded as far as a survey of Southern England, with '38 
sites reported upon, a plan of each site made and the places 
marked upon the Admiralty chart,.126 
Why such plans were not advanced is unclear, although 
Ryder noted that the coastguard survey of potential sites was 
later mislaid and never subsequently found. 127 Clearly it 
would have been difficult in a period of particular financial 
stringency to gain approval both to disestablish Britannia 
and build a new naval college. The Navy of the period was a 
prime target for economies in public expenditure and the 1861 
128 Estimates were not matched for a further 17 years. So 
stringent were cost controls that Somerset, far from being 
able to build a new college, was unable to support a small 
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sea training vessel attached to Britannia, noting in 1863 
that 'the fitting out of a ship for that purpose would cause 
great expense and consequently I gave up,.129 
Nevertheless it is clear from the content of the 
contemporary Service press, from the evidence of senior 
officers to the Select Committee on Promotion and Retirement, 
from the 1863 survey of senior sea going officers and from 
the extensive site investigation quoted in Ryder's evidence 
to the Rice Committee, that the prospect of a shore based 
college was both popular in the Service and under active 
consideration in the Admiralty, even in the earliest days of 
the training ship. That this should be so represents a 
marked contrast in the thinking of senior officers compared 
with their counterparts of 30 years previously. It has been 
shown that contempt for scientific method and a strong 
prejudice against college training - to the extent that some 
commanding officers refused to accept college trained boys in 
their ships - were significant factors in the closure of both 
the School of Architecture and the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth. 130 The evidence is that three decades later, 
with the Navy's technological revolution gaining pace, many 
senior officers acknowledged and welcomed the prospect of a 
shore based college and that in the Duke of Somerset's 
administration 1859-65, there was also a degree of political 
support for such an institution. 
It will thus be apparent that while the introduction of 
the Britannia system undoubtedly resulted in higher retention 
rates amongst young officers, and that their seniors, noting 
improvements in the calibre of Midshipmen and Cadets, 
welcomed the advance it represented over the previous system, 
it was neither free from-criticism nor did it preclude a 
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vigorous debate about the efficacy of a naval college. 
Indeed there is considerable evidence that such an 
institution was actively supported not only in civilian 
Select Committee and the Service press, but also amongst the 
officer corps. The failure to establish and identify this in 
previous accounts is an important omission in the evolution 
of naval education and one that assumes some significance 
when subsequent changes of conservatism in the officer cadre 
are examined. 
Later Assessments of the Training Ship System 
It will be apparent that the origins, evolution and 
early development of the training ship system up to 1862 have 
not previously been exposed to rigorous analysis. That this 
should be so is surprising for it has been shown that the 
establishment of the system was in many ways logical, 
sequential and in general accordance with wider aspects of 
Admiralty policy. There are two important prerequisites for 
understanding the conditions of foundation. The first 1S 
accurately to identify the disastrous state of officer 
education in the wake of the closure of the Royal Naval 
College Portsmouth in 1837. The succeeding 20 year period 
witnessed a failure to recruit a corps of Naval Instructors 
of suitable status and size to staff the alternative system 
of educating young officers solely at sea. This resulted in 
Cadets and Midshipmen of such inferior quality, and with a 
disastrous retention rate, that the Lieutenants list of 
trained men was always inadequate. Only when this situation 
is properly understood can the various Admiralty measures 
aimed at improving officer quality in the l840s and 50s V1a 
increasingly stringent entry requirements be placed 1n 
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perspective. Circular 288 of 1857 which directed officer 
training to the first uniform system of entry via the 
Illustrious and eventually the Britannia was the final 
extension of this process. 
The second strand of the argument is to recognise that 
in the midst of the chaos in officer training the recruitment 
of boys was proceeding in a methodical, organised manner. 
This was primarily part of a long term process to combat 
fluctuation in manning, but it also arose from a recognition 
within the Admiralty that some form of specialised 
environment was required for young men to be educated and 
trained. It is important to note that this justification 1S 
evident well before pressure placed on manning by the Crimean 
War and that it found expression not through public or 
parliamentary criticism, but via a committee of senior naval 
officers. The adoption of the training ship concept for 
young officers was thus a natural extension of a policy that 
had been operating successfully for a number of years prior 
to 1857. 
It is clear that neither of these central arguments has 
been investigated in sufficient depth in previous work. The 
account of the foundation of the training ship by its 
principal commentator Statham, does not give sufficient 
consideration to the years leading to the establishment of 
the system. The result is that he is forced to explain its 
inception solely in terms of the personalities involved. 
Thus the decision to commission a ratings training ship 1S 
attributed simply to the personal vision of the First Lord of 
the day, Sir James Graham. A similar process may be observed 
in the adoption of the ratings training ship for the use of 
young officers, where Statham sees the example of Cadet 
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Harris serving In the Illustrious as persuading the Admiralty 
to revise its training policy. It has been demonstrated that 
while the influence of these two personalities cannot be 
discounted, there was a substantial and complex series of 
events underpinning both decisions. 
While the Statham work is essentially anodyne, infused 
with deference to his alma mater, and light on substantiable 
reference, it does appear to have been used by almost all 
modern commentators as a template, not merely for the history 
of the Britannia but as a source for wider and more 
generalised comment on the subject of officer entry, 
education and training in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. 
Thus Statham's designation of Sir James Graham is 
dutifully repeated by almost all other commentators including 
Penn, Lewis, Pack and Sullivan with the result that the 
existence of the small sea going training ship ('school 
brigs') since 1847 is unrecognised, the pastoral dimension In 
the training ship concept is missed, and the work of the 
Parker Committee who made the actual recommendation is 
ignored. The attractive notion of the experience of Cadet 
Harris persuading the Admiralty to review its policy lS 
similarly replicated by all published commentators, thus 
ignoring the substantial effort on the part of the Admiralty 
to regulate the system of officer entry over the previous 20 
years, and the work of the Pelham Committee whose 
recommendation, encompassed in Circular 288, actually 
initiated the system. 
While Sullivan has considered the state of naval 
education prior to the inception of the training ship system 
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it is an inadequate examination based upon insufficient 
analysis. His argument that a rapid increase in the number 
of Naval Instructors after 1840 amounted to 'the 
establishment of a genuinely professional corps of naval 
ed t ,131 fl' . uca ors , or examp e 1S 1ncorrect. The increase is 
explained rather by the number of Chaplains already 
applying to receive the extra pay allocated for the 
Instructor's role. Nor can it be agreed that by 1856 'a body 
of graduate teachers named the Instructor branch,132 had been 
formed, for it has been shown that in that year of the 96 
members serving less than one third were graduates. In fact 
the majority of the Instructor branch were not 'graduate 
teachers' but rather a group of non-graduates supplemented by 
serving Chaplains who were prepared to teach in addition to 
their normal duties. 
Although Sullivan 1S considering the extent of 
educational provision, he makes no attempt to reconcile the 
number of Instructors with the billets available. He thus 
fails to appreciate that despite a nominal increase in 
staff there was always a serious disparity, with many 
ships spending extended periods without the services of a 
Naval Instructor. Statistical analysis, supported by much 
contemporary criticism, confirms the inadequacy of a 
system that produced inferior young officers, taking 
inordinate lengths of time to pass for Lieutenant. 
Similarly during the 20 year period between the college 
closure and the commissioning of the first officer training 
ship the Service was forced to sustain wastage rates 1n 
officer training unmatched at any other time in the 
century. Thus Sullivan's claim that in 1837 'the whole 
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basis upon which naval education was provided was overhauled 
and put on a sounder footing',133 is without foundation and 
is based on little more than observing a nominal increase in 
the number of Naval Instructors appearing in the Navy List. 
Having arrived at this incorrect conclusion, Sullivan ln 
consequence is unable to account in detail for the major 
overhaul to the system in 1857. Although he devotes a 
substantial portion of his thesis to the history of the 
training ships the reasons for their foundation are merely 
summarised as being derived from 'the pressure of 
134 international events' and 'the pace of technological 
135 
change'. Neither justification is explained or 
articulated either here or at any subsequent stage of the 
thesis. While he does acknowledge 'the inadequacy of 
instruction at sea,136 as a factor, this also remains 
undeveloped - presumably as further investigation would 
dismember his argument that education had been placed on a 
sounder footing when the decision to conduct it solely at 
sea, was taken in 1837. 
The inadequate coverage of the origins of the training 
ship is extended into its early history, where the limited 
comment on Illustrious and Britannia up to 1862 is agaln 
typified by a reliance on Statham. Unfortunately despite 
having personal experience of the system, this account of the 
early years is particularly sparse. The most serious 
omission is the failure to acknowledge the extent of 
contemporary criticism of Britannia or the debate about its 
replacement by a naval college. While Statham is cogniscant 
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of the 1863 First Lord's survey which found a deal of support 
for a shore based institution137 he does not place it in the 
wider context of Service press criticism, the 1863 Select 
Committee recommendation, or the extensive site 
investigation. Statham is content to dismiss the survey 
findings on the grounds that there was 'an abundance of 
contrary evidence' and that senior officers who were unhappy 
with the products of the Britannia 'must surely have been 
exceptionally unfortunate in the youngsters sent to them,.138 
In this bland unsubstantiated dismissal he is closely 
followed by Sullivan. By the time his account reaches 1862 
he reveals an unwillingness to include any real historical 
detail beyond that already narrated by Statham - to the 
extent that there is a high degree of coincidence in the 
selection of material in the two accounts. A detailed 
examination of all Sullivan's references pertaining to the 
Training Ship from the date of its inception to the 1904 
publication of Statham's work reveals this to be the case. 
Details appear at Annex A, where it will be noted that of the 
115 references that relate to the era 1854 to 1904 no less 
than 73 are based upon Statham or sources directly cited in 
his work. As the remaining 42 are in turn derived from only 
two further secondary sources, it will easily be deduced that 
Sullivan's references for the period 1854 - 1904 stern from 
just three secondary works. This clearly implies a paucity 
of original research in a major sector of naval education 
over a 50 year period, and seriously questions the 
independence and value of Sullivan's comment in this area. 
The dependence upon Statham has already been noted in 
III 
work of others. It lS however particularly significant ln 
the Sullivan thesis for while other commentators are 
characterised by a limited remit or only aim to examine 
education as a fragment of wider naval social history, 
Sullivan's claim that 'persistent research has enabled a 
detailed account to be written of the totality of naval 
d t ' ,139. e uca lon lS a considerable one. The combination of this 
extensive remit, with an inadequate research base in a 
specific area, over an extended period, means that initial 
misconceptions are applied to a wider field of naval 
education with a consequent distorting effect. 
That previous coverage of the origins and initial years 
of the officers training ship should be characterised by lack 
of analysis and repetition without verification lS 
surprising, for the early evolution was much in accordance 
with the climate of the times. Once the impetus behind the 
foundation is adequately understood the standardised offi~er 
entry via the training ship was both logical, necessary and 
the parallel to practice firmly established in boys training. 
When the system was shown to produce an improved calibre of 
officer with a better retention rate it was pursued - not out 
of some vague nostalgia for the days of sail but because the 
old ship represented a cost effective environment for 
training, at a time of acute financial stringency. 
It is important to note that from its inception, the 
efficiency of the training ship was a matter of extensive 
debate. While in some ways the concept of a static harbour 
training ship united those who favoured education at sea and 
those who supported a dedicated educational institution, it 
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did not quash continuing discussion. It is particularly 
important in the light of formal proposals a decade later to 
found a naval college, to note that such suggestions were ln 
evidence from the earliest years. Further it will be 
observed that far from the Service reacting to pressure from 
external sources, the initial impetus to improve and regulate 
training came, via the Parker Committee, from within the 
Navy. Similarly, once the training ship had been 
corrmissioned there was still a continuing debate amongst 
senior officers about the respective worth of training at sea 
or on shore. 
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Annex A 
to Chapter One 
Source Derivation - Chapter 12 - Sullivan Thesis 
Statham Dependence 1854 - 1904 
Stat am x 23 
Admiralty Circular 288 x 3 
Rice Re"""'-""'- Statham ----------+-------Hansard 
x 7 
Luard Report 
x 28 
Admiralty Circular of 
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Chapter Two 
The Origin and Development of Continuing and 
Higher Education ln the Royal Navy 
to 1869 
121 
Abstract 
While the concept of a formal higher education system 
in the Royal Navy did not emerge until the recommendations 
of the 1870 Shadwell Committee and the establishment of 
the Royal Naval College, Greenwich three years later, 
there was considerable educational activity ln the Service 
beyond that conducted in the training ship. 
Chapter Two examines the years 1857 to 1869 under two 
principal headings: 
Continuing Education - the extent and efficiency of the 
education provided in sea going ships which every officer 
undertook for a period of at least four years, on 
discharge from the training ship until sitting the 
Lieutenant's examination. 
Higher Education - the activities of the Royal Naval 
College, Portsmouth which after closure as an initial 
training establishment in 1837 was refounded two years 
later, to provide theoretical education in support of the 
Navy's professional training, and to offer experienced 
officers opportunities to pursue further study. 
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Continuing Education at Sea 
Under regulations promulgated 1n Circular 288 of 23 
February 1857, which came into force in May of the 
following year, on successful completion of time 1n the 
training ship Naval Cadets, by this time aged 14 or 15, 
were discharged for further education and training to the 
Fleet. As no officer could present himself for the 
Lieutenant's examination until the age of 19 this implied 
four or five years further study in the difficult and 
demanding surroundings of an operational warship where, 
according to availability and scheme of complement, there 
might or might not be a Naval Instructor borne. It 1S 
important to note that despite the advent of the training 
ship system and the uniformity and order it placed on 
entry and initial training, the vast majority of education 
prior to the Lieutenant's examination, continued to be 
conducted at sea. Even after 1859 when training ship time 
was extended to twelve months l and an attempt was made to 
commission a dedicated sea training ship, the young 
officer still spent at least four years at sea gaining the 
professional skills and scientific knowledge necessary to 
pass the final examination. 
The operational fleet that the young Cadet joined on 
completion of his time in the training ship was remarkably 
varied in geographical location, type of ship and duties 
undertaken. Naval Cadets and Midshipmen were most liable, 
by scheme of complement, to serve in larger ships where 
there was an increased likelihood of the services of a 
Naval Instructor. While a capital ship, usually an 
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elderly wooden walled line of battleship converted to 
screw propulsion, would serve as a flagship on each 
foreign station, as a general rule big ships were based 
closer to horne. The larger and more modern the vessel, 
the more likely she was, in the 1860s, to be deployed ln 
response to perceived threats from France and Russia, ln 
the Channel and Mediterranean Fleets. This was where the 
majority of young officers continued at least part of 
their shipboard education. 
Such an appointment did not guarantee any commonality 
of experience. A draft to a capital ship in the Channel 
Fleet in 1863 for example would almost certainly imply 
service in an 'ironclad' - revolutionary new warships 
capable of 14 knots under stearn power and protected by 
four and a half inch wrought iron, bolted to 18" thick 
teak. A comparable post in the Mediterranean in the same 
year would mean service in one of eight, screw converted, 
wooden walled men 0' war - the earliest dating from 1827 -
that by this stage had become vulnerable targets with 
limited useful employment. The last of these on this 
station HMS Victoria a 102 gun three decker, served as a 
, 
flagship until 1867, her retention perhaps based on the 
one virtue of the three decker by this stage, namely the 
excellent accommodation provided for the Commander in 
Chief and his staff. 2 
As a Naval Cadet, Lord Charles Beresford was 
appointed to such a ship on completion of initial training 
in March 1861. HMS Marlborough was a wooden walled 
battleship carrying 121 guns which had been fitted with a 
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single screw engine ln 1853. Despite this innovation she 
was firmly part of the 'old Navy' with a complement of 
950, frequently overcrowded and with an overlong sick list 
due to poor habitability.3 She was fitted with a 24" hemp 
cable 'the same class of cable as that which was used ln 
Nelson's time,4 and the use of the engine was not 
encouraged - the young Beresford noting that 'steam was 
never used except under dire necessity,.5 In the 
Marlborough the standard and times of sail drill and 
incidental evolutions were paramount - even at the expense 
of injury and death. In less than two years aboard, 
Beresford saw a number of men fall to their deaths from 
the yards, including his fellow officer under training, 
'd h' 6 Ml s lpman Inman. 
In contrast, Midshipman Henry Murray joined HMS 
Warrior on commissioning in the Channel Fleet also in 
1861. As a fighting ship she outperformed anything then 
afloat and with her superior speed, protection and long 
range guns could have destroyed any other warship in short 
order. 7 She also represented a major contrast ln general 
habitability and, while it has been noted that she was the 
inspiration rather than the realisation of advances in the 
seaman's environment,8 she did represent a step change. 
Innovations like the pioneering system of ventilation 
which drew air into the ship and then forced it through a 
system of trunking to the lower decks, or the provision 
of a drying room which encouraged sailors to keep their 
kit and themselves clean, were important advances. The 
existence of steam launches provided both convenience and 
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an important training facility for young officers and, as 
Lambert has pointed out, the routine of frequent boat drill 
allowed officers and men to achieve a degree of familiarity 
with each other that was vital if they were to act together 
effectively in wartime. 9 
The fighting efficiency and the environmental advances 
represented by the new construction must not be over 
exaggerated. Yet the fact that, even as late as 1870, it 
was possible for a young officer learning his profession to 
be serving in ships as different as the wooden walled 
Rodney laid down in 1827, or the new Audacious which had 10 
x 9 inch guns and 8 inch armour plate, does serve to 
demonstrate the varying nature of the young officers 
experlence, at this critical point in the technological 
evolution of the Service. 
For Naval Cadets posted to distant waters the naval 
experience was even more diverse for, despite the fact that 
the 12 years from 1857 were characterised by a generally 
successful endeavour by both political parties to reduce 
the naval budget, the extent and variety of British naval 
operations was considerable. In 1859 for example more than 
150 ships were deployed in non-European waters and were 
called upon to meet such a range of demands that the First 
Lord complained 
The undeniable fact is that we are doing or 
endeavouring to do more than our force is 
sufficient for. It is fortunate that the world 
is not larger, for there is no other limit to 
the service of the fleets. lO 
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The China and Far East station, even after the ending In 
1860 of the second China war, was a major employer of ship 
and manpower absorbing over 40 vessels and in excess of 
6000 men until 1869. The Civil War diverted ships and men 
on the North American station, and trade protection and 
anti slavery patrols ensured that the West Africa squadron 
remained active, with at least 15 ships and almost 2000 men 
involved throughout the period. 
With the exception of the flagships, most of the craft 
involved on distant stations were relatively small, shallow 
draft gunboats and gun vessels designed to penetrate 
previously unnavigable rlvers, creeks and inshore reefs. 
As small ships they were frequently under junior command 
with complements of officers and ratings seldom exceeding 
100. While most young officers were appointed to larger 
ships, extensive periods were spent by Naval Cadets and 
Midshipmen on loan to smaller craft or ashore with 
expeditionary brigades. Such activities frequently 
involved a baptism of fire for young officers with a serles 
of engagements in the l860s including the Second China War, 
the Indian Mutiny, the Ti Ping Rebellion, the New Zealand 
War 1860-64 and operations against the coast of Japan which 
gave a lie to the idea of life in the Victorian navy as one 
long holiday. 
Admiral Sir John Fisher, a future First Sea Lord, was 
one who first saw active service as a Midshipman at the 
Peilo forts in 1859. This disastrous affair which saw a 
total of 89 killed including Midshipman T H Herbert, and 
345 wounded including Midshipman A J Powlett and G Arrnytage 
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left a deep impression on the young Fisher, who saw a man 
with his eye and part of his face burnt away as the British 
attack failed. ll Yet such horrors were not untypical. 
Nine Midshipmen and Naval Cadets served with the Naval 
Brigade at Lucknow in 1857, of which the Commanding Officer 
wrote 
Since the battle was fought, with the exception of 
one day's rest for the footsore men who have marched 
seventy two miles ln three days besides fighting a 
severe engagement we have had daily marches ... 12 
In this action Midshipman M A Daniel was killed and Naval 
Cadet Lascelles, then aged 15, performed distinguished 
service. Throughout the Official History of the various 
colonial campaigns of the 1850s and 60s, the names of 
Midshipmen and Naval Cadets feature prominently. 
Thus many Midshipmen arriving home, post fleet time, 
to prepare for the Lieutenant's examination were seniors of 
considerable active service. While they had seen no 
general fleet action their experiences as members of a 
world-wide maritime police force had exposed them to death 
and injury from both disease and the enemy. Indeed it has 
been estimated that even in the second half of the 
nineteenth century the Royal Navy sustained a higher 'all 
causes' death rate than during the First World war. 13 Even 
where sea time had been spent in European waters or where 
the climate in a foreign flagship had been more temperate, 
the Midshipman's experience was remarkably diverse and the 
conditions under which they acquired their professional 
expertise were often radically different. From the 
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Mediterranean to the China Fleet, 1n wooden walled men 0' 
war or armour plated battleships, from active service 1n 
pursuit of pirates to high spirits in the gunrooms of the 
Channel squadron, Naval Cadets and Midshipmen were required 
to continue their education until, via the shoreside 
Lieutenant's examination they joined the trained strength 
of the Service. 
Some recognition of this difficulty and diversity 
appeared in Circular 288, where 15 of the 23 paragraphs 
applied to the conduct of training and education post 
training ship, and where considerable emphasis was placed 
on correct procedure and close supervision. The 
regulations included instructions to Commanding Officers 
who were required 'to take care that a convenient place 1S 
d h f . d f . t .,14 d set apart an proper ours are 1xe or 1ns ruct10n an 
to ensure that 'a Monthly Examination Day is to be 
established,.15 Additionally they were required to allow 
Naval Instructors 'reasonable access to the charts and 
chronometers for the purposes of instructing officers in 
their 16 use' . For their part, in addition to studies, the 
young officers were required 'to keep a book in which the 
ship's reckoning is to be worked and noted and when they 
are at sea, this book is to be sent in every day to the 
C .,17 apta1n. 
Under Circular 288 the period of sea borne education 
was divided into three phases, the first of which required 
a minimum time in the Service as a Cadet of 18 months and 
the successful completion of the examination specified in 
paragraph (x) of the Circular. This demanded a knowledge 
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of elementary seamanship - steering and managing a boat 
under oars and sail, knotting and splicing, rigging and the 
use of a lead line. A general appreciation of naval 
gunnery was also required. For subjects within the Naval 
Instructor's remit, the Cadet was to show that he had 
maintained his knowledge of all he had learnt in the 
training ship, that he was competent in both coastal and 
astro-navigation and that he could produce the usual 
certificates of good conduct. Having satisfied these 
requirements he could then be promoted Midshipman. 
The second hurdle occurred after 18 months in this 
rank when it was necessary to pass a more advanced 
'intermediate' examination, which was again a blend of 
practical seamanship, navigation, chart work and nautical 
surveying. By this time the young officer was expected to 
show proficiency ln French and, if he had served in a steam 
vessel, required to demonstrate 'an acquaintance with 
different parts and workings of 'the Steam Engine,.18 
Success in this examination was a pre-requisite for a 
further minimum two years service and then, only if he was 
19 or older, could he present himself for the Lieutenant's 
examination held jointly at the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth and on board the gunnery training ship HMS 
Excellent. 
It will be noted that compared to even a few years 
previously there was now, in theory, a well regulated 
pattern of educational progress for the young officer to 
follow. The degree of supervision and control stipulated 
in the Circular was also increased. The two examinations 
130 
conducted at sea for example were to be supervised by 
the officer in command, not below the rank of 
Commander and the next Senior Officer in the Ship and 
the Examination in Navigation in the presence of a 
Captain or Commander, by two Naval Instructors when 
it may be practicable, or by a Naval Instructor and a 
Master, or where there is no Naval Instructor or by 
two Masters. 19 
Furthermore the candidate was to be the subject of 
continual monitoring with the directive that 'a report of 
the progress he has made in each of the above subjects lS 
to be made to the Secretary of the Admiralty in the Half-
20 yearly return'. Supervising officers were cautioned 
to be 'most strict in their investigation of the 
qualifications of Officers,.2l 
An attempt to extend the degree of supervision and 
control appeared in Admiralty Circular 393 of 23rd 
November 1859 which directed that in future the period ln 
the training ship would be made equal for all - namely 12 
months exclusive of vacations. This Circular also 
announced that 'on leaving the Harbour training ship it is 
intended that the Cadet shall pass three months ln a 
. h' f . l' t t . ,22 Seagoing trainlng s lp or practlca lns ruc lon . It 
has been established that, while the ship designated for 
sea training, HMS Eurydice, was moored alongside the 
harbour training ship and some static instruction took 
place aboard, she was not employed at sea due to financial 
stringency.23 Nevertheless the extension of training time 
to 12 months and an attempt to provide a specialist 
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environment aboard a designated sea going ship, clearly 
demonstrated an increased sense of purpose and direction 
towards young officers' education and training. 
Apart from minor modifications to the regulations for 
entry and initial examination of Naval Cadets in February 
24 1865, the general pattern of education at sea remained 
almost unchanged until the end of the decade. In 1868 the 
longstanding attempt to commission a sea-training ship was 
achieved, with HMS Bristol a steam screw frigate 
designated for the purpose ln the February of that year. 
It will be noted that by 1859 a quite distinct 
pattern of training had emerged for the young officer. 
After successful completion of 12 months study in the 
harbour training ship his time ln the fleet was 
characterised by two further hurdles - the examination 
necessary to enable him to be rated Midshipman, and a 
further intermediate assessment after 18 months, which 
noted his progress towards the shores ide Lieutenant's 
examination. It has also been shown that the conditions 
under which such study was undertaken were both difficult 
and demanding and at this particular point in the 
evolution of the Service, subject to considerable varlance 
according to class of ship, geographical location and 
duties undertaken. 
The Provision of Naval Instructors 
While the 1857 and 1859 regulations responded to 
these difficulties by stipulating close supervision and 
monitoring of young officers by naval staff, perhaps the 
most important factor in the process was the extent and 
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quality of Naval Instructors serving the fleet of the 
period. It has been shown 25 that in the two decades prlor 
to 1857 provision was inadequate with many ships in 
commission without Naval Instructors and a subsequent 
neglect of the education of young officers. While the 
introduction of the harbour training ship was in part a 
reaction to this situation and one that undoubtedly put 
the initial entry and education of Naval Cadets on a much 
sounder footing, the bulk of the educational process prior 
to the Lieutenant's examination remained in the hands of 
the Naval Instructor, serving at sea. A detailed 
consideration of the Naval Instructor branch up to 1870 lS 
thus a vital component in any assessment of the officer 
education process in these years. 
The regulations and duties applying to the Naval 
Instructor in 1857 had been established in general terms 
13 years previously in Queens Regulations and Admiralty 
Instructions, but in the year this study commences the 
most recent detailed amendments were derived from an 
Admiralty minute of 10th September 1849. To enter the 
Service as a Naval Instructor candidates had to be aged 
between 20 and 35 years, be able to produce testimonials 
of good character and show themselves competent in an 
examination held jointly at the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth and in the gunnery training ship HMS Excellent. 
This comprised 
1st. The usual College passing examination in 
Navigation. - 2nd. The application of the 
theory of Projectiles to Gunnery 
3rd. Observations with the Sextant. The use of 
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the Azimuth Compass and Chronometer etc. 
Perfect proficiency will be expected in 
b . 26 o serv1.ng: ... 
Although a knowledge of French, other modern languages and 
drawing was not compulsory, it was considered 'very 
desirable that Naval Instructors should be able to give 
instruction in these branches of Education,27 and 
preference was to be given to candidates with these 
attainments. 
Once qualified and aboard his ship, the Naval 
Instructor's duties were 
to execute punctually and zealously all directions he 
may receive from the Captain or other superior 
officer, relative to the education of the subordinate 
Officers or others placed under tuition. He is to 
exert his best efforts to instruct and advance the 
several pupils placed with him in the several 
branches of sciences stated in Art 29 Sec 1 Chap 11 
page 27 of these regulations. He is also to 
superintend the conduct and behaviour of his pupils 
while under his instruction and he 1.S to be careful 
to check and remove any improper conduct or 
experiences of any of them and if not amended, he 1.S 
to report the same to the Captain or Commanding 
Officer. 28 
In terms of the syllabus the Instructor was only 
required to teach the subjects that he had passed in his 
entrance examination for the Service, namely: 
1st. Common Arithmetic, including Vulgar and Decimal 
Fractions. 
2nd. The first six and the eleventh books of Euclid. 
3rd. Algebra, progressing to the highest order of 
Equations and its application to the solution 
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of Geometrical Problems. 
4th. Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, theoretical 
and practical. 
5th Nautical Astronomy, particularly the principles 
on which the various rules for finding the 
Latitude and Longitude are founded. 
6th. Mechanics 
7th Hydrostatics 
8th A competent knowledge of the Classics. 29 
However, it will be noted that the nature of the syllabus 
for Cadets and Midshipmen in seagoing warships outlined in 
Circular 288 of 1857 was more extensive than this remit. 
While some assistance, particularly in navigation, might 
be expected from the ship's officers, Naval Instructors 
were clearly required to work at a more advanced level 
than that implied in the 1844 regulations. 
Pay had last been subject to major review ln August 
1840 when an Order in Council had noted 'difficulty ln 
providing Your Majesty's Ships with competent 
Instructors,30 at the rates of pay established two years 
previously. As a result under these regulations pay was 
increased with Naval Instructors receiving between 7.0s 
and lOs per day according to their length of service. The 
long established bounty which stood at £30 per annum was 
discontinued for the Naval Instructor, but the Chaplain 
could continue to draw the sum if he undertook the Naval 
Instructors role in addition to his other duties. This 
was in turn abolished in 1842 31 and his new remuneration 
was to be, in addition to the Chaplain's pay, a sum of £5 
per annum per pupil, plus three quarters of the 
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Instructor's pay. Apart from minor improvements to the 
half pay rates of Naval Instructors made in January 
32 l85~, these were the qualifications, duties and 
remuneration rates applying to Naval Instructors in the 
year this study opens. 
There are two principal observations to be made about 
the position of the Naval Instructor at this time. The 
first is to note that while he was a member of the Civil 
Branch of the Royal Navy together with the Surgeon, Purser 
and the Chaplain, and although since the inception of the 
new rank in 1837 he had been a Wardroom member, unlike his 
fellows he was appointed not 'by Commission' but 'by 
Warrant'. The practical implications of this amounted to 
little more than a slight distinction within the ship 
heirarchy, yet it is nevertheless surprising. The 
Admiralty had set out quite deliberately to attract men of 
high attainment, who would mess in the Wardroom and whose 
original payment-by-bounty was abolished in favour of a 
salary. The Surgeon, Purser and Chaplain had received 
commissioned status in 1843 33 and a high proportion of 
Chaplains also served as Naval Instructors. Yet laymen 
serving in the Instructor branch had to wait a further 18 
years before they too received their appointments 'by 
Commission'. 
Lewis attributes this fine distinction to Admiralty 
conservatism towards the Naval Instructor, a relatively 
recent creation, who only a few years previously in the 
guise of 'the ship schoolmaster' had been slinging his 
34 hammock on the orlop deck. While there is substance to 
this argument there is also some evidence to suggest a 
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deliberate policy on the part of the authorities to 
encourage Chaplains to fill the ranks of Naval 
Instructors, at the expense of laymen. Not only were 
Chaplains 'commissioned' as opposed to 'warranted' but 
they were remarkably well paid - their own pay plus a 
further three quarters of the Instructors' rate, if they 
were prepared to combine both posts. An Order in Council 
of 1842 noted 
it would be attended with much benefit to Your 
Majesty's Service if greater encouragement were 
held out to the Chaplains of Your Majesty's Ships 
when properly qualified to undertake the tuition 
of young gentlemen 35 
To facilitate this a later Circular authorised special 
arrangements for Chaplains on foreign stations to take on 
th 1 f N 1 I t '1 1 ., b . 36 e ro e 0 ava ns ructor on a oca actlng aS1S. 
By uniting the two roles the Admiralty clearly felt they 
were getting men of good moral and religious tone and it 
was argued that 'a small saving of expense may be expected 
to result therefrom,.37 
Two important advances ln status were introduced in 
the period up to 1869. In April 1861 the long standing 
disparity between the Chaplain and the Naval Instructor 
was removed when the latter was appointed 'by Commission,38 
- the number of Chaplains serving in the dual role was so 
extensive that any difference in status was rendered 
meaningless. A further advance took place in July 1864 
when an Order in Counci1 39 (subsequently published as 
Circular Number 4lW of 22nd October 1864) decreed that 
Naval Instructors were to advance in rank according to 
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their seniority. Thus instead of receiving pay based 
solely on length of service, Naval Instructors were now 
matched against other officers ie Instructors having less 
than eight years seniority would rank with Lieutenants of 
the same vintage, Naval Instructors holding more than 15 
years service would rank with Commanders etc. 
Despite Sullivan's observation that 'oddly enough 
shortly before the Naval Instructor gained commissioned 
k h . th t . f . . f ,40 ran e was glven e op lon 0 wearlng unl orm or not 
there were in fact no amendments to the regulations at 
this time, for the uniform requirement for the Naval 
Instructor had already been through a number of changes. 
Although the rank had been introduced In May 1837, no 
mention of the Naval Instructor appeared in the Dress 
Regulations of the Navy List until 20 June 1842 when they 
were required to wear 'the same as Masters but without 
epaulettes or lace to the trousers,.41 This continued 
until 20 March 1846 when they were required to wear 'the 
same as Secretaries to Junior Flag Officers except that 
the buttons on the breast of the coat are to be regular 
and without epaulettes or lace to the trousers,.42 This 
became the standard uniform and was still extant in 1861 
. 8 43 h . f 11 with the caveat that from Aprll 184 t e wearlng 0 a 
uniforms for Naval Instructors had become optional. Thus, 
contrary to Sullivan's assertion, the onset of 
commissioned rank had no relation to modifications In 
uniform regulations, which had remained unchanged for 13 
years prior to 1861. 
Clearly any assessment of the efficiency of the 
system of education at sea must start by examining the 
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numbers of Naval Instructors serving In the Fleet from 
1857. Little previous work has been undertaken in this 
area, although Sullivan has looked at specific years up to 
1864 and concluded that the manpower situation was 
buoyant, noting that 'the numbers of serving Naval 
Instructors steadily increased and the Admiralty's aim of 
attracting better candidates with superior academic 
qualifications was gradually achieved,.44 In 1856 he 
cites 96 Naval Instructors serving and notes that five 
years later the total was 91. 45 By 1864 Sullivan sees the 
Navy's long standing recruitment problem in this field as 
being solved, observing that 
In the past, the Admiralty had often paid lip serVlce 
to the need for attracting well qualified men to 
enlist as naval educators. By 1864 glib sentiments 
had at last been translated into action. 46 
Although he does not offer any further statistics, on the 
basis of those already quoted and the evidence of an Order 
in Council of 1870 which reduced the active list of Naval 
Instructors to 75 47 , Sullivan concludes that by this time 
48 the r2cruiting problem had been solved. 
The reality, however, lS rather different for there 
are important shortcomings In both Sullivan's use of 
statistics and his understanding of the relevant 1870 
Order in Council. Statistically Sullivan fails to 
appreciate that until 1866 the names of all Naval 
Instructors, including those who had retired, appeared In 
the same list. Thus, the numbers grew steadily to a 
highpoint of 103 in 1865, not because the recruitment 
problem was being solved, but because as time went on the 
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number of retired officers increased. Only after this 
date does the number reflect those actually active. 
Perhaps more significant is his failure to appreciate that 
only a proportion of active personnel were in turn 
actually employed. It is only when the numbers ln this 
category, ie those on the active list currently employed 
in operational warships are considered, that an accurate 
picture of the efficiency of education at sea can be 
gained. 
When these two factors are applied, a considerable 
disparity between the nominal total of Naval Instructors 
and those actually undertaking the task emerges (See 
opposite.) Here it will be seen that Sullivan's figures 
have been artificially boosted by numbers of retired and 
'serving but not employed' officers, to the extent that 
his 1861 figure of 91 is inflated by one third. The most 
dramatic evidence appears five years later when the 
decision to account for retired staff separately resulted 
in a dramatic fall in the nominal figure, while the 
'active and employed' list had only a slight fluctuation. 
Similarly the decision in 1870 to restrict the Naval 
Instructor list to 75 once again caused the nominal list 
to plummet, while the 'active and employed' number 
actually increased. 
This was precisely what the 1870 Order in Council was 
designed to achieve. While Sullivan gives the impression 
that the directive was a specific response to the manning 
of the Instructor Branch, it was in fact a wider and more 
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comprehensive document pertaining to many branches of the 
Service including 'Navigating Officers, Inspectors of 
Machinery and Chief Engineers, Chaplains and Naval 
Instructors, Medical Officers, Paymasters and Assistant 
49 Paymasters'. A product of the radical economy imposed by 
the administration of the First Lord H C E Childers 50 the 
order was not a response to over-recruitment, but rather a 
measure to improve efficiency by introducing a 
comprehensive system of retirement. Table 2/1 shows that 
in the Naval Instructor branch it had exactly that effect. 
When the directive came into effect on 1 April 1870 the 
nominal figure of those borne on the active list dropped 
from 88 to 72 while the numbers who were 'active and 
employed' increased from 61 to 64. 
Table 2/1 shows that the number of Naval Instructors 
'active and employed' in the period 1857-1870 was much more 
modest than the overall Sullivan figure, and contemporary 
comment supports this, suggesting that great difficulty was 
experienced in filling the number of Naval Instructor 
billets. In 1860, for example, although there were 
nominally 89 men serving, only 64 were actually borne in 
, , d h' 51 
'commlSSlone s lpS. This attracted the attention of the 
Army and Navy Gazette which, while praising the efforts to 
regulate entry and initial education via the establishment 
of a training ship, noted the lack of sustained educational 
provision arguing 
will anyone pretend to say that SlX or twelve 
months preparatory work on board the Britannia 
is sufficient training to afford to our young 
officers such a store of knowledge as will enable 
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them to play their part with credit, as the future 
defenders of this mighty empire?52 
It was not the want of a system of further education that 
was lacking argued the Gazette, but rather the means of 
manning it with a suitable number of Naval Instructors who 
could 'supply the junior officers of the fleet with 
adequate means to obtain the prescribed standard of 
'f t' ,53 ln orma lon . 
The special value of this leading article was that it 
then proceeded to identify warships in commission that 
year, which by Admiralty regulation should be carrying 
Naval Instructors and were not. The paper revealed that 
Four of these ships are flag-ships, viz HMS Edgar 
flagship of Admiral Erskine; Bacchante, Sir 
J Maitland CB; Forte, Sir H Keppel KCB: Arrogant 
Commodore Edmonstone. 
Eight of the ships were line-of-battle ships, each 
bearing an average number of twenty young officers, 
viz, acting mates, acting second masters, midshipmen, 
cadets and master's assistant, all supposed to be 
under the tuition of the naval instructor. 
The fourteen other vessels are frigates and smaller 
ships bearing each an average of ten subordinate 
officers also supposed to be under daily instruction. 
Altogether 300 junior officers are at this moment 
deprived of the instruction the Admiralty are by 
their own regulations bound to supply them with. 54 
Such a state of affairs, argued the writer, demanded an 
inquiry and could not 'last much longer without seriously 
I f ' ,55 impairing the efficiency of a ga lant pro eSSlon. In 
fact 1860 was not an untypical year, and the figure of 64 
Naval Instructors 'active and employed' was slightly higher 
than the average figure for the period and was only ever 
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exceeded by two in anyone year from 1857 to 1870. 
Together with a steady and sustained lncrease In the 
number of Naval Instructors, Sullivan also envisages an 
improvement in quality, noting that by 1864 'a genuinely 
professional corps of naval educators had been established' 
consisting of men 'of superior social and academic 
standing', and that this had been prompted by the 
technological advances made in the Service. 56 Yet In fact 
once again close analysis of the Navy List statistics shows 
quite the opposite, with recruitment patterns in the 1860s 
demonstrating the success of the Admiralty policy, not of 
attracting specialists but rather of attempting to combine 
the posts of Chaplain and Naval Instructor in the one 
person. This was remarkably successful. If the most 
meaningful statistics ie. 'active and employed' are 
adopted, it will be noted that from 1858 the number of 
Chaplains grew steadily, exceeding laymen in 1859 and 
accounting for all the 10 Naval Instructors with a 
seniority of 1860. At the zenith five years later, there 
were 46 clergy and just 19 laymen actually employed In 
commissioned ships. While the latter figure slowly 
increased, at no stage between 1859 and 1870 was the 
Chaplain's majority threatened. See Table 2/2 opposite. 
This recruitment pattern hardly accorded with the 
creation of a band of professional educators reflecting the 
technological realities of the day. While the Chaplains 
were all university educated, it is hard to see how they 
represented an improvement in the system, prompted by 
technological advance. Indeed quite the opposite may have 
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been true for there is some evidence to suggest that even 
the modest task of instructing young officers in accordance 
with the requirements of Circulars 288 and 393 was less 
than adequately handled. The Revd J B Harbord, Chaplain 
and Naval Instructor, informed the Shadwell Committee that 
as a consequence of insufficient training 
Naval Instructors go to their duty dependent, ln a 
great measure, on their own pupils. At the College 
they never have taken any "sights" at sea. They do 
not know the use of the sextant for the purpose of 
taking sea observations when they go afloat. Some of 
them have never seen a chart; most of them have not 
seen a theodolite, or, if they have they 
t ' l' t t' '1 57 are en lre y 19noran as 0 ltS practlca use. 
This view was endorsed by Rear Admiral A P Ryder who noted 
that 
the small progress made by the subordinate officers 
in many of the ships is owing to this ignorance of 
the art of teaching and examining on the part of 
Naval Instructors 58 
Naval Instructor Charles R Tompkins agreed that it was 
almost certainly the case 
that when on board ship, though young officers are 
taught by Naval Instructors they are found at every 
succeeding six monthly examination to know less and 
less. 59 
and the Revd Thomas J Main testified that Cadets and 
Midshipmen 'will make better officers without a Naval 
Instructor than with one,60 
In fact, the evidence offered on the system of 
tuition on board ship, the majority of which came from 
serving Naval Instructors, was overwhelmingly condemnatory. 
146 
Apart from poor standards of professionalism in the Naval 
Instructor branch the report cites frequently unfilled 
billets, minimal periods allocated for the Naval 
Instructor's work, numerous interruptions to the Cadet's 
and Midshipmen's studies and general evidence of a system 
which 'is very imperfect and does little if anything 
towards keeping up, still less extending the knowledge of 
young naval officers,.61 
For the Shadwell Committee such evidence could only 
lead to one recommendation. In Section Nine of the Report 
it was concluded that 
Under these circumstances it becomes a matter of grave 
consideration whether the benefit obtained by the 
service from the employment of Naval Instructors in 
sea going ships, is at all commensurate with their 
cost to the country. 
The Committee therefore venture to lay before their 
Lordships the expression of their opinion, that the 
aid of Naval Instructors on board sea going ships 
might be generally dispensed with ... 62 
As an alternative the Committee wished to extend the time 
that young officers spent in the training ship, where more 
stability and continuity could be applied to their studies, 
with the overall aim of dispensing with education in 
operational warships completely.63 
The evidence of an ineffective Instructor branch 
characterised by low numbers, poor standards and a 
recommendation for their abolition is completely at odds 
with Sullivan'S version of events. However, it will be 
noted that his statistical evidence lacks the necessary 
discrimination to give any form of accurate picture and his 
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confusion over the 1870 Order in Council designed to 
dispose of non-employed Instructors, rather than limit 
recruitment to the active list, leads him to a 
fundamentally flawed conclusion. The fact that, despite 
extensive use of Shadwell throughout his work, he fails to 
mention its recommendation to abolish the branch, 1S 
inexplicable. 
The overall picture of continuing education at sea 
1857-69 is characterised by a series of contrasts. There 
can be little doubt that, having imposed a degree of order 
on the initial entry and education of young officers V1a 
the establishment of a training ship, the Admiralty 
attempted to extend this process to the lengthy period 
spent at sea prior to the Lieutenant's examination. The 
extensive requirements of Circulars 288/393, both in terms 
of monitoring progress via examinations and reports, and 
the demand for careful supervision by ships' officers, are 
evidence of a clear sense of purpose that stands in marked 
contrast to the 'ad hoc' arrangements prior to 1857. The 
, 
extension in 1859 of the training ship time to 12 months 
and the initially unsuccessful attempt to designate a sea 
training ship for particular service, were also a 
recognition of the requirement for a specialist training 
environment. 
Some progress in the pay, conditions and status of the 
Naval Instructor branch may also be noted although the 
familiar theme of inadequate provision, mediocre 
professional standards and attempts to economise by 
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combining the post of Chaplain and Naval Instructor 
persisted. While these factors led to a recommendation 
that the Naval Instructor branch should be abolished, it 1S 
important to stress that this measure was conditional on 
extending the length of time the Naval Cadet spent in the 
training ship. 
In some ways this was the key to understanding a 
period in which progress was more apparent than real. The 
overwhelming fact was that the environment of an 
operational warship with the intermittent services of a 
Naval Instructor of questionable expertise, often in 
distant waters and on active service, was not conducive to 
successful further study. Until an extended period of 
study in a more stable environment could be provided, there 
were clear limits to the extent that the system could be 
improved. Thus despite a recognisable effort on the part 
of the Admiralty to improve standards, many of the 
advantages gained in the training ship, were squandered 1n 
the difficult and demanding period that Naval Cadets and 
Midshipmen spent at sea. 
The Origin and Development of the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth to 1857 
While reference to the Royal Naval College Portsmouth 
appears sporadically 1n both the development of the 
training ship system and the progress of continuing 
education at sea, it must be appreciated that by 1857 the 
institution had already seen three quite separate and 
distinct incarnations. It had been founded originally 1n 
1729 as a Naval Academy for the 'better education of forty 
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young gentlemen to be trained up for your majesty's service 
at sea,64, and took its first pupils in 1733. Despite the 
impeccable background of the pupils 'young gentlemen, sons 
of noblemen and gentlemen', that it was willing to accept, 
the early progress of the institution was not a happy one. 
Considerable difficulties were experienced in maintaining 
discipline and offences such as breaking bounds and 
drunkenness were common. The result was a poor reputation 
and falling numbers of pupils to the extent that by 1801 
the First Lord of the Admiralty asked a prospective parent 
'Are you so partial to that Academy as to hazard a son 
65 
there?' This high level discontent was supported by 
other senior officers, and the Royal Academy was closed in 
1806. 
It was reconstituted as the Royal Naval College, a 
larger and improved establishment on the same site, in 
February 1808 and this time quickly gained a reputation for 
excellence due, suggests Lewis, to the improving presence 
of its principal James Inman, distinguished Cambridge 
scholar and Senior Wrangler in 1800. He was the author of 
Inmans Tables, still in use as a navigation aid to the 
present day, and a number of learned texts on gunnery and 
ship construction. It has been noted that Inman was 
'consulted by the naval and other authorities upon almost 
every conceivable subject which could be included under the 
head of mathematics, not excepting designs of ships, sail 
plans etc,,66 and under his guidance the establishment 
prospered. The percentage of the overall officer entry 
trained there gradually increased from about 3% in 1808 to 
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11% by 1837, although it is doubtful whether its capacity 
for 70 pupils was ever filled. 67 
To compensate for this, College activities were 
gradually expanded into other areas. While it remained 
first and foremost an establishment devoted to the initial 
education of young officers, from 1822 it accepted older 
students. In that year an Order in Council recommended 
that candidates for posts as Naval Instructors should be 
examined not as previously at Trinity House, but before the 
Lieutenant Governor and Professor of the Royal Naval 
68 College. In January 1829 it accepted commissioned 
officers on half pay who wished to study, and their number 
rose rapidly from 24 to 36 by June 1830, with an extra 
master recruited to assist students with their studies. 69 
The Royal Naval College also became the focus for 
academic support to the technical training that emerged ln 
the first three decades of the nineteenth century. Prior 
to this the routine of even central functions of the 
fighting ship, in particular gunnery, were felt to be a 
matter for each individual Captain. This lack of 
coordination eventually led to degrees of inefficiency that 
no amount of courageous conduct could disguise, and was 
noted in the American War of 1812, after which the 
Admiralty concluded that Captains 'appear to have omitted 
to exercise their crews at the great guns and in the use of 
small arms as frequently as this part of their duty 
. ,70 
requlres In the same year Colonel Sir Howard Douglas 
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wrote a pamphlet urging that 
Naval gunnery should have its permanent instructors 
and store of trained men ... These depots would become 
the resorts of zeal and talents; vast numbers of young 
naval officers would resort thither at their own 
expense 71 
This demand for formal training was taken up by other 
officers including Sir John Pechell and Captain W L Bowles, 
and eventually in 1830 the Admiralty was persuaded to 
establish a gunnery school on board HMS Excellent moored ln 
Portsmouth harbour. 
While this school was conceived out of a desire for 
uniform standards and as a means of producing professional 
specialist officers, it nevertheless had a strong 
educational dimension from the very beginnning. 
Mathematics, mechanical drawing, fortification and even 
'steam' appeared in the early curriculum and from its 
inception the school taught theory as well as practice. 
This caused initial difficulties for many of the officer 
students for, as Harris commented, there was 'an utter want 
of mathematical knowledge possessed by all save the few who 
had been collegians,.72 Close links were immediately 
established with the Royal Naval College and its Professor, 
James Inman. College students carried out target practice 
organised by HMS Excellent and ln 1828 Inman published a 
textbook on gunnery to be used in the school. This close 
connection was essential, suggested Harris, for the gunnery 
establishment served to provide a sort of substitute 
educational experience for the vast majority of naval 
officers who had experienced no previous formal training. 
152 
'The long course' he noted 'which a gunnery officer had to 
go through went to make up for the neglect of his earlier 
education,.73 
A similar implied need .for higher education was 
derived from a recognition of the importance of naval 
architecture which, like gunnery, witnessed a new sense of 
discipline and organisation in the first three decades of 
the nineteenth century. In 1791 a Society for the 
Improvement of Naval Architecture had been established ln 
London which produced papers, held meetings and proposed to 
carry out its own experimental work. Several naval 
officers were members and, although the Society ceased 
about 1799, it was an important influence on the 
government's decision to set up a commission 'to enqulre 
into and revise the civil affairs of the Admiralty,.74 
This Committee of Revision, which produced a series of 
reports between 1803 and 1808, expressed a deep concern 
over the low standard of education of dockyard officers and 
feared that this standard might fall further. Among a 
number of recommendations, they proposed the founding of a 
School of Architecture in Portsmouth Dockyard which would 
teach a seven year course to shipwright apprentices, who 
would enter the School via a competitive examination. 
The establishment was founded by an Order in Council 
75 
of 1810 and the first course commenced on 1 January 1811. 
While there were no naval officers amongst the first 
students, the classes were held in the buildings of the 
Royal Naval College. The director of academic studies, with 
the title 'President of the School of Architecture' was 
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again James Inman. Not content with writing text books for 
the gunnery school he also translated works on naval 
architecture from Swedish and French for use by the 
shipwright students. As with the study of gunnery, the 
nature of naval architecture implied the need for a broader 
education - the lack of satisfactory text books for example 
meant that students had to study French so that foreign 
texts might be used - although in 1819 a Select Committee 
recommended that this should be discontinued on the grounds 
that students might be poached by foreign governments. 76 
The School moved into its own buildings in 1817 but 
maintained its links with the College, Inman remained its 
President, and in 1829 a limited number of commissioned 
naval officers were permitted to study there. 77 
Despite a decline in numbers after 1817 the School of 
Architecture produced some distinguished students. Macleod 
makes the point that the school's products must be 
distinguished from the ordinary run of apprentices and 
there was 'a complete separation between the trade of 
shipwright and the profession of naval architect,.78 The 
School, with its close connections with the Royal Naval 
College, was producing both an officer class of dockyard 
official and exposing a limited number of naval officers to 
excellence in technical education. Brown has suggested 
that graduates of the School such as Thomas Lloyd, Engineer 
in Chief of the Navy, Isaac Watts designer of the first 
ironclad HMS Warrior and Joseph Large, vice president of 
the Institute of Naval Architects were to 'dominate the 
technical scene in the Admiralty during the 1850s,.79 
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It will be noted that there were separate strands to 
the developmental pattern of higher education in the 
Service. Two were provided by the respective schools of 
Architecture and Gunnery via their close connections with 
the Royal Naval College. The third was derived from 
widening the activities of the College itself and its 
involvement in the teaching and examination of officers 
already serving. Given the promising start to higher 
educational provision in the Service it was unfortunate 
that the years 1832-37 witnessed a concerted attempt by 
both naval and Civil Lords of the Admiralty to 'nip in the 
bud' such initiatives. These years were characterised 
principally by economic stringency in naval affairs. The 
two major administrations of the era those of Sir James 
Graham and the Earl of Minto, were notable for a vigorous 
examination of the naval estimates and, as Briggs comments, 
'nothing was heard of but proposals for reduction of 
establishments and the diminution of expenditure,.80 
The School of Architecture and the Royal Naval College, 
both of which were subject to declining roles in the late 
1820s, were thus subject to stringent economic review and 
despite some complaint within the Service, the economising 
zeal, particularly of Graham, received widespread approval 
in the press and the country. 
Perhaps of more importance, particularly for the later 
development of higher education in the Navy, was the degree 
of hostility to these institutions detectable during the 
period. It has been shown that there was considerable 
social prejudice against the Royal Naval College and its 
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products, such that many officers sought to disclaim entry 
into the Navy via the College for fear that it would 
adversely affect their careers. 81 Brown suggests that 
there was a similar feeling towards the School of 
Architecture which came partly from existing dockyard 
officers who were being displaced by graduates of the 
School, and partly from naval officers noted in this period 
for a preoccupation with status and a fixation with 
'gentlemanly qualities,.82 The Morning Post published 
letters attacking the personal backgrounds of the students 
with 'Captain Marriot the novelist being particularly 
offensive' .83 
The third factor, and certainly the most significant 
dimension in the period, was the widespread distrust of 
scientific method in naval affairs. This in turn seems to 
have stemmed from two sources. There was the well 
documented distrust based on ignorance and reaction as the 
Navy attempted to come to terms with the technological 
changes taking place. 84 But of more importance was the 
seemingly genuine belief that somehow scientific method was 
incompatible with practical training ,and that the former 
was achieving an unacceptable promlnence. Indeed some 30 
years after the demise of the School of Architecture Sir 
James Graham, who had been responsible for its closure, 
admitted as much. In evidence to the Royal Commission on 
the Control and Management of the Dockyards he noted of 
this period that he had been 'afraid that there was too 
much of science and too little of practical knowledge 
. . th N ,85 creeplng lnto e avy. 
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Thus in 1832 the School of Architecture was closed and 
a decision was taken to revert to the old system of 
entering only one class of apprentice into dockyard 
training. A similar 'uniform' system of education for 
naval officers was achieved by the closure of the Royal 
Naval College in April 1837 and the subsequent pursuit of 
education at sea for all young officers - an alternative 
which has been shown to be both chaotic and utterly 
, ff" 86 lne lClent. The third pillar of higher education ln the 
Service, the gunnery school at HMS Excellent also carne 
under attack, most notably during the 1834-35 
administration of the Earl de Gray, when naval lords Sir 
John P Beresford and Sir Charles Rowley petitioned to have 
the ship paid off. 87 This attempt failed, for despite 
contemporary criticism of the scientific method taught 
there, the practical utility of the establishment was 
'd 88 eVl ent. 
By the late 1830s the faltering progress of higher 
education had almost corne to a halt - a victim of economic 
stringency, social prejudice and distrust of science. Its 
'lifeline', however, the gunnery school at HMS Excellent, 
resisted all attempts at closure and despite what a 
contemporary commentator summarised as 'the numerous 
attacks made upon it by naval officers of all sorts who 
felt that innovations were being made which might seriously 
reflect upon byegone days',89 it was via the gunnery school 
that some semblance of higher education was retained. From 
1837 to 1839 the gunnery school was the only institution 
within the Royal Navy that gave theoretical instruction of 
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any sort. The flaw in its efficiency was that since the 
closure of the College, it could no longer calIon the 
academic expertise formerly provided by Inman and his 
staff. 
The shortcomings of this soon became apparent for, as 
Hope commented, the students 'felt the reproach upon their 
profession arising from the want of a proper educational 
system and the serious inconveniences resulting 
90 
therefrom'. The Admiralty response appeared in an Order 
in Council of July 1838 when it was announced that the 
Royal Naval College would reopen, this time as an 
institution of higher education, to provide 'additional 
means of scientific education to the young gentlemen and 
officers of the fleet,.91 It was to be a very different 
institution from the original College, for although it 
occupied the same buildings, it was administrably part of 
the gunnery school and was completely under the 
supervision of the Excellent's commanding officer, Captain 
Sir Thomas Hastings RN. Nevertheless, a small academic 
staff was recruited under the leadership of the Revd 
Thomas J Main, Senior Wrangler and Smiths Prizeman, from 
Cambridge University. Extra staff to teach engineering 
and mathematics were appointed in 1841 and seven years 
later a chemistry lecturer joined the College. 
The College Progress 1857-69 
Thus by 1857 the Royal Naval College Portsmouth, ln 
its third and final form, had been in operation for 18 
years. It took no new entrants to the Service and the 
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majority of its students were experienced officers who had 
spent some time at sea. The work of the College as a 
higher education establishment has received little 
detailed critical study and the few assessments of its 
efficiency are at variance. Callender has suggested that 
'From the first day of its opening the naval University 
proved an unchallenged success,.92 Rodger supports this, 
noting that courses were 'taught to a very high standard 
at least equal of the best Cambridge mathematics 
93 degree'. Lloyd, however, notes its amalgamation with 
HMS Excellent for the purposes of higher education but 
dismisses it claiming that the College 'rapidly 
deteriorated into a cramming establishment for mates 
(later sub lieutenants) wishing to pass the lieutenants 
examination about which many farcical stories have been 
related,.94 Sullivan also observes that 'the College 
reopened to provide special courses for a limited number 
of mates,95 but he then deftly avoids any further 
consideration of the establishment by claiming that 'these 
activities were more in the sphere of training than 
education,.96 
In view of this ambiguity and the fact that the 
College was the undoubted progenitor of the Navy's 
97 University founded at Greenwich in 1873, a more 
methodical study of its activities is required, for even 
the most cursory examination of the courses provided 
suggests that the College was more than a cramming 
establishment for Mates. Indeed it is known that in the 
30 years from 1839 the number of Mates was comfortably 
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exceeded by the total of other officers attending. The 
Shadwell Committee noted in 1870 that 
exclusive of 1,150 Mates or Sub-Lieutenants who have 
studied there before passing for Lieutenant, 1362 
other officers of whom 639 were on half pay have gone 
through the course of instruction, giving therefore a 
yearly average of 44 officers who have availed 
themselves of its advantages 98 
A breakdown of these courses with their dates of 
foundation appears at Annex A, where it will be noted that 
the College, while dealing with modest numbers, did serve 
a wide cross section of the officer class. 
The Mates were clearly an important part of this 
student profile and the background and purpose of their 
course needs to be made clear if an accurate assessment of 
College standards is to be made. The term Mate had an 
interesting and complicated lineage, to the extent that ln 
the first two decades of the nineteenth century there were 
two separate and distinct categories of men servlng, who 
bore the same title. The Mates entry into the Royal Naval 
College consisted of men who were originally midshipmen 
but, due to poor prospects of employment and advancement, 
had opted for and passed the examination as Masters' 
Assistants. While this brought an increase in pay, it 
frequently had the effect of displacing them from the 
original career path and as they grew older their place in 
the ship's heirarchy became increasingly incongrous. By 
the early l840s there were more than 400 in the Navy 
, 99 d' th 1 t' t the problem the L1St an seelng no 0 er so u lon 0 , 
Admiralty decided to convert 'Mate' into a substantive 
rank, award a commission, and invite applications to study 
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at the Royal Naval College Portsmouth with a v1ew to 
passing for Lieutenant. In 1861 the name of the rank was 
changed to Sub-Lieutenant. 
There can be little doubt that in the early years, 
when the backlog of Mates was considerable that a very 
high standard of examination was applied. Only two 
commissions per year were awarded and they were totally 
dependent on the highest marks gained in the Midsummer and 
Ch . t .. 100 rlS mas exam1nat1ons. Pressure on students was 
considerable - a contemporary commentator noting 
The papers set at the mates examinations were 
very difficult considering the time allowed to 
go through the course. They required a considerable 
knowledge of the higher branches of pure and mixed 
mathematics; and the problems in calculus, in 
astronomy and 1n mechanics, etc were such as might 
be met within the Cambridge examination papers. 
In fact the successful competitor for the 
Lieutenant's commission and his closest rivals had 
to go through a twelve months hard work, such as 1S 
known only to Cambridge wranglers; and instances 
occasionally occurred of the health of a candidate 
breaking down under the strain. lOl 
However, it is unlikely that this system persisted long, 
for the two decades from 1840 witnessed sustained 
Admiralty action to overhaul numbers in each rank via new 
systems of retirement and promotion. l02 The result was 
that the Mate's list gradually diminished as the pressure 
to obtain a Lieutenant's commission eased. This may 
account for a slackening of standards and the view of 
Moresby, a Mate at the College in 1849, that the final 
examination was 'purely rule of thumb working out a 
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college sheet with the aid of Inman's Tables,.103 The 
Mates scheme withered away, with Douglas noting that only 
three or four students were studying in 1851104 and 
Shadwell suggesting that no promotion via this system was 
awarded after 1854. 105 Hope writing a decade later, 
adhered that 'the course of study for a lieutenant's 
. . 106 
commlSSlon has of late years fallen to the ground'. 
Perhaps the most interesting courses, and the ones 
that most accurately conform to the term higher education, 
were those undertaken by officers on half pay. These men, 
Captains, Commanders, and Lieutenants, were admitted from 
February 1842 107 and while they were allowed to spend a 
maximum of 12 months following any aspect of the College 
teaching they chose, the study of steam machinery was a 
popular option. Studies took place in the College, afloat 
in the instructional tender, and visits were made to the 
headquarters of major manufacturers including the naval 
steam factory at Woolwich where, as Hope commented, 
officers 'did not disdain to wear the mechanics apron and 
work at the lathe or to take their turn in the stoke 
h 1 ' 108 o e . As the number of steam vessels in the Navy List 
grew, the desire to 'qualify in steam' increased and 
attendance on College courses for some officers became 
109 
commonplace. 
The College possessed good facilities for engineering 
study. The naval estimates for 1841/42, for example, show 
a sum of £980, more than half the total budget for the 
previous year, allocated 'for a small Steam Engine for the 
Instruction of Students,110 and in the same year the 
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College instructional tender Bee was launched. She was 
the first screw driven ship to be ordered for the 
Admiralty and had both a screw and paddles worked off the 
same engine. For instructional purposes these could be 
worked in opposition, with the paddles driving ahead and 
the screw thrusting astern - an evolution which Brown has 
noted must surely be the most bizarre trial of all 
t . ,Ill lme. Practical work was also carried out in the 
steamers Caradoc and Cyclops with students employed in 
engine rooms measuring cylinders and determining pressure 
levels. 112 
The 1842 Order allowed study at the College on half 
pay once in each rank and for some this was a popular 
option although it did not initially increase the 
likelihood of appropriate employment. Freemantle, who 
studied on half pay as a Commander in 1862 and again as a 
Captain ln 1871, claimed that it was a popular naval joke 
that 'if a commander wanted the command of a brig, his 
b . t ' ,113 est course was to pass ln seam. Nevertheless some 
perceptive officers identified the advantages of 
associating themselves with the College and the new 
technology, including the young Astley Cooper-Key, a 
future First Sea Lord, who in 1844 took the unusual step 
of requesting service in a stearn vessel. At this time 
114 
'steamer lieutenant' was considered a term of abuse, 
but Cooper-Key who studied at the College in every rank -
Mate, Lieutenant, Commander and Captain noted 'that the 
only way to get on in the service by one's own exertion 
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1n time of peace 1S to join a steamer and follow it 
, 115 
up . He rose from Mate to Captain in eight years. 
It 1S important here to note, in the light of 
Sullivan's refusal to examine the College on the grounds 
that 'its activities were more in the sphere of training 
than education' ,116 that Freemantle, Cooper-Key and the 
other 600 or so students who studied on half pay, were 
'military' officers ie Lieutenants, Commanders, and 
Captains, who aspired to the sea command of warships. 
While their motivation for undertaking such study varied, 
we can be quite certain they were not for example being 
trained as engineers, for as Penn has noted of the 
officer structure of the period, 'a man who considered 
himself a gentleman could never have practised as an 
engineer without opening himself to the charge of 
eccentricity,.117 Half-pay students wished rather to be 
educated in the technology of the Service they would one 
day command, and courses in steam machinery, which could 
be undertaken with like-minded companions, provided an 
ideal opportunity. 
Students were served by a talented, though small 
staff, some of whom undertook important innovatory work. 
The principal was the Revd Thomas J Main, Senior Wrangler 
and Fellow of St Johns College Cambridge and of the 
Astronomical Society, who held the post for 34 years. 
While at least one distinguished student noted that 'Main 
was of course very clever but he did not profess to teach 
us"llB there was no doubting his ability or his 
identification with the new technology, about which he 
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published two books, The Indicator and Dynamometer in 
1847, and The Marine Stearn Engine which appeared in 1849. 
Principal Instructor in Engineering was Thomas Brown 
who was employed at the College from 1841 until 1868. He 
was almost certainly the Royal Navy's first engineer 
having joined the Service in 1826 and, with the engineer 
of the Royal Victoria and Albert stearn yacht, was the 
f · t t b' d . 119 lrs 0 e glven War room offlcer status. This move, 
k bl . . d d 120 f .. d 1 a remar a e one ln a perlo note or rlgl c ass 
distinction in the Service, was presumably a measure of 
the personal and professional regard in which Brown was 
held. His deputy was Assistant Engineer Robert Naughton 
RN, and lectures were also given by a military officer 
Captain W J Williams RN who published A Stearn Manual for 
the British Navy. 
Another distinguished member of staff was long 
. Ch . t L t W D Hay.12l servlng emlS ry ec urer, He was an expert 
on marine corrosion who had originally mixed a paint with 
copper oxide suspended in linseed oil to form 'Hays 
Compound', which became the standard anti-fouling paint 
for the new generation of iron warships. Hay later 
persuaded the Admiralty to build a laboratory for him ln 
Portsmouth Dockyard which he ran for many years with the 
, d' 1 Ch . t' 122 title A mlra ty emlS . 
While there were good facilities for the study of 
stearn the level of Admiralty financial support for the 
general running of the Royal Naval College was remarkably 
sparse throughout. The buildings were adjacent to the 
main facilities of the dockyard, (See over), 
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but they dated from 1727 and their configuration remained 
largely unchanged up to closure in 1873. Admiral 
Freemantle studying there as a Commander in 1862, noted 
that 'the surroundings were not altogether suitable to 
make it a place of learning,.123 Captain Charles Hope, 
one of his fellow students, commented on the misuse of 
the College observatory which if 'properly fitted up and 
set apart for the use of officers studying astronomy, 
this very important science would at once be placed 
within the reach of all,.124 There seems to be substance 
in these comments for the primary criticism of the 
College made by the Shadwell Committee was that it was 
'deficient in comfort in its domestic arrangements and 
wanting in some important parts in the accommodation 
expected in the present day for educational purposes,.125 
A survey of the annual naval estimates demonstrates 
the niggardliness of Admiralty provision throughout the 
lifetime of what was officialy termed the 'Establishment 
for Scientific Education at the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth,.126 The sums allocated, together with 
explanatory notes appear at Annex B where it will be seem 
that in its first year it absorbed just £686 out of a 
budget for the Scientific Branch that amounted to 
£26,597. 127 By 1842, with the Professor's salary and the 
costs of purchasing a steam engine included, it had risen 
to £2912 128 but it then settled at a little under £2000 
per annum and took almost 20 years to exceed £3000. 
Nowhere does there appear any outlay on buildings and 
while annual rates of between £20 and £50 were included 
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for the students' library, the estimate was eventually a 
wage bill for the academic and domestic staff. 
An overall assessment of the activities of the Royal 
Naval College up to 1868 suggests that Sullivan's 
assumption that it was primarily a training establishment 
is not derived from detailed investigation. Clearly 
courses for personnel such as Assistant Engineers or 
Naval Instructors had direct professional relevance to 
the tasks they would undertake at sea and some study was 
necessarily vocational. Likewise the continual 
examination of candidates for naval cadetship and, as the 
Principal complained to the Shadwell Committee, 
'preparing backward sub lieutenants for the Lieutenants 
. . ,129 d d . . k examlnatlon were mun ane an repetltlve tas s. Yet 
the nature of these activities hardly seems to justify 
the exclusion of any consideration of the Royal Naval 
College from Sullivan's account of nineteenth-century 
education. Similarly, while the high standards and 
limited success rate that characterised the early Mates' 
course may support Lloyd's view of the College as a 
'cramming establishment', this assessment cannot be 
applied to the whole scope of the institution's 
activities. 
In fact there is much to support the Vlew that the 
Royal Naval College Portsmouth constituted a genuine and 
serious institution of higher education. Its initial 
purpose was to provide 'additional means of scientific 
education to the young gentlemen and officers of the 
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fleet,130 and this in turn was defined by a requirement for 
advanced study in direct support of professional naval 
skills such as gunnery and naval architecture. This was a 
persistent dimension in its activities. The College also 
had some claim to be undertaking innovatory work - Hay's 
research on marine corrosion or Brown's instruction aboard 
the Admiralty's first screw driven ship, are examples. 
Perhaps, more importantly, the College introduced the 
concept of providing facilities for voluntary study by any 
officer, no matter how senior, who wished to apply. The 
fact that this was achieved by a small staff with a paucity 
of funds, at a time when many officers ln the Service 
looked upon scientific attainments not so much as a waste 
of time, but as 'injurious to the acquisition of seamanship 
d h d t 'I f t ' ,131 d 1 ' , , an tee al s 0 rou lne, un er lnes ltS lmportance 
and emphasises its special place in the development of 
naval education. 
It will be noted that, prior to 1869, the overall 
development of naval education, exclusive of that 
undertaken in the Training Ship, falls into two distinct 
areas - the continuing education conducted in operational 
warships by Naval Instructors and the activities of the 
Royal Naval College Portsmouth. There are several 
conclusions to draw covering these separate activities and 
the general relationship between them. The first is to 
note that despite the advent of the 1857 short course 
, ln 
the Training Ship and its extension to 12 months some two 
years later, the bulk of the young officers' educational 
experience was, in theory anyway, conducted over a much 
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longer period while serving at sea. Thus although the 
introduction of the Illustrious/Britannia system was an 
epoch-making move, it did not significantly shift the 
balance towards formal controlled instruction in dedicated 
surroundings. While there was evidence in Circulars 288 
and 393 of an increased Admiralty concern to monitor and 
control education at sea, the bulk of the evidence suggests 
that this was unsuccessful. 
The immediate reason for this was the poor level of 
provision and competence of the Naval Instructors appointed 
to carry out the task. It was been shown that the numbers 
actively engaged in teaching at sea were considerably lower 
than the nominal figures suggested in the Navy List, and 
that even the Admiralty's ill-advised policy of attempting 
to combine the posts of Chaplain and Naval Instructor did 
not redress the problem. 
While insufficient numbers undoubtedly hampered the 
process, the principal inadequacy of the system up to 1869 
stemmed from the traditional difficulty of attempting to 
educate at sea in the first place. The practical problem 
of imposing dedicated instructional time on the routine of 
a warship, which inevitably would have first calIon a 
young officer's time, regardless of Admiralty stipulation, 
had long been recognised. Attempting to do so in an era 
when the Fleets were both overstretched and trying to come 
to terms with an extensive new technology only exacerbated 
the problem. In a sense the Admiralty was striving to 
regulate and improve a system that was fundamentally flawed 
and the Shadwell Committee's recommendation l32 that Naval 
Instructors at sea should be abolished, was tacit 
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recognition of this fact. 
In contrast, the activities of the Royal Naval College 
Portsmouth during the period constituted both a successful 
experiment and tangible evidence of the direction in which 
the Service would move in the future. To claim that this 
understaffed, sparsely resourced institution was anything 
more than tangential to the Royal Navy's activities would 
be to overstate its importance. Nevertheless, while the 
College saw only a fraction of the officer corps as 
students it did demonstrate its practical utility in 
support of the principal professional skill of naval 
gunnery, and it also provided an important opportunity for 
a small number of talented officers to explore and become 
acquainted with the new technology of the day. 
It is also possible to observe in the activities of 
the College the inklings of an embryonic naval educational 
bureaucracy. From 1857, for example, all officer 
candidates were required to attend for the purposes of 
undergoing the initial entrance examination prior to 
proceeding to the training ship. After initial training 
and a qualifying period at sea, during which they were 
taught by College trained Naval Instructors, young officers 
returned to the institution to be examined for the rank of 
Lieutenant. While it is still too early to see the Royal 
Naval College actually directing the Navy's educational 
policy, and while the amount of contact it had with the 
officer corps was too limited to characterise it as an alma 
mater, by 1869 College examinations and the standards they 
implied, had a general currency within the Service. 
171 
Annex A 
Classes of Officers Admitted * to the 
Royal Naval College Portsmouth 
Relevant Order 
in Council 
8th June 1837 
Months 
Course Study 
Mates for Lieutenants Commission 12 
20th March 1841 Marine Officers qualifying for 12 
the Royal Marine Artillery 
6th February 1842 Captains, Commanders and 12 
Lieutenants on half pay 
10th February 1852 Masters Not 
Specified (Navigating Lieutenants) 
15th August 1852 Candidates for Naval Instructors 5 
27th February l853)Chief or Assistant Engineers on 12 
7th June 1853 )full pay, doing duty in harbour 
11 April 1858 
10 August 1864 
Sub Lieutenants preparing for 
examination 
Lieutenants for gunnery appoint-
ments prior to study on board 
Excellent 
3 
6 
* Candidates for cadetships were also examined at the Royal 
Naval College, throughout the period. 
Source: Shadwell Report Para 5 & 6 
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Annex B 
Sums voted to the Establishment for Scientific 
Education at the Royal Naval College Portsmouth 
from Volumes of the Naval Estimates 1839-1873 
Year Sum Notes 
1839/40 £686 Does not include Professors' salary 
1840/41 £1442 Professors' salary £500 
1841/42 £2912 (a) Extra Staff - Assistant Instructor 
- Mathematical Master 
1842/43 £1942 
1843/44 £1956 
1844/45 £1956 
1845/46 £2052 
1846/47 £2115 
1847/48 £2162 
(b) £980 'for a small steam engine for 
Instruction' 
1848/49 £2462 Chemical Lecturer appointed. Salary £300 
1849/50 £2462 
1850/51 £2452 Messengers wages reduced by £10! 
1851/52 £2502 Chemical Lecturers salary increased by £50 
1852/53 £2496 
1853/54 £2321 
1854/55 £2418 
1855/56 £2641 
1856/57 £2782 Teacher of Sword Exercise appointed. 
1857/58 £2782 
1858/59 £2783 
Salary £150 
1859/60 £2890 Extra £50 to Chemistry Lecturer for 
teaching Cadets in Training Ship 
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1860/61 £3083 (a) French Instructor appointed. 
Salary £150 
(b) £30 for rent of Cricket Field 
1861/62 £3212 
1862/63 £3408 Salary of Professor and Assistant 
Professor increased 
1863/64 £3413 
1864/65 £3517 (a) Cricket Field discontinued 
1865/66 £3561 
(b) £20 for purchase of models of steam 
machinery for use of officers studying 
at Royal Naval College 
1866/67 £3233 Chemists' salary transferred to Dockyard 
vote 
1867/68 £2985 Mathematical Master/Messenger & Porter do 
not appear 
1868/69 £3037 
1869/70 
1870/71 
1871/72 
1872/73 
1873/74 
£2817 
£5385 
£6136 
£6368 
Teacher of Sword Exercise does not appear 
In 1870 the accounting system is changed 
and a number of staff borne on the 
books of HMS Excellent are now 
accounted for in the expenses of RNC. 
Although a sum is given, no individual 
allocations are listed. The figure is 
quoted as 'under revision'. 
The Royal Naval College Greenwich is 
established at the cost of £18,030. 
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Abstract 
This Chapter considers the progress of the training ship 
from the autumn of 1862 until December 1868. It examines 
the decision to move the Britannia from Portsmouth, the 
attempt to find a satisfactory new location, and concerns 
about habitability and health of Cadets evident throughout 
this process. 
Existing assessments of life in the training ship are 
challenged, in particular the extent and nature of the 
punishment routine on board is re-examined, and the 
content of the syllabus re-evaluated. 
This Chapter concludes by examlnlng the establishment of 
the post of Director of Education for the Admiralty and 
considering the extent and nature of his connection with 
officer education during the period. 
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The Move to Portland and Dartmouth 
By the end of 1861 the Britannia had become an 
established part of the Portsmouth naval scene. She was 
positioned close to the harbour entrance at the mouth of 
Haslar Creek, and Cadets had access to safe landing in all 
weathers. Her Captain, Robert Harris, considered the 
mooring to be ideal for both instructional and 
. 1 1 recreatlona purposes. Classes could land at Blockhouse 
beach to undertake nautical surveying, and a drill ground 
and safe bathing place were equally adjacent. He also 
stressed the advantages of proximity to the dockyard and 
the opportunity this gave for Cadets to observe movements, 
ship construction and fitting out work. Mindful of the 
reputation of the great naval port, Harris assured parents 
that 'at no period of their future career will the Cadets 
be less exposed to temptation than their year of probation 
h . .,2 ln t e Brltannla. 
That officer training was conducted at Portsmouth was 
of course due to nothing more than th~ fact that the 
ratings training ship was moored there when it was adapted 
for the purpose in 1857. While there were some advantages 
to the situation there were also considerable drawbacks. 
The vessel was not in fact moored in particularly healthy 
surroundings, for the creek dried out at low water leaving 
extensive and foul smelling mud flats close by. On the 
Gosport shore sporting facilities were limited and the 
close proximity of both a prison and the great naval 
hospital at Haslar - the surroundings of which had a long 
standing reputation for disorder 3 - were far from ideal. 
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Across the harbour the town of Portsmouth was even 
less attractive. Despite various reforming measures in 
sailors' welfare during the l850s, including the advent of 
continuous service, leave, and an established uniform, 
Portsea and the area around the Royal Dockyard retained a 
notorious reputation. The system of withholding pay until 
the end of a commission, for example, ensured that 
sailor's behaviour ashore remained as riotous as ever. 
Capper's earliest recollections of blue jackets were as a 
child clinging to his mother's skirts, as sailors fought a 
pitched battle against the police in a normally quiet 
Portsmouth side street. 4 In 1864 he noted gangs of 
sailors paid off after a long foreign commission 
processing with 'the tooting of horns and the strains of 
shanties', to the surrounding villages, 'where 
5 
unrepeatable orgies took place'. 
This unseemly behaviour was reflected ln the state of 
public health in the town for, in the years after the 
Crimean War, the incidence of venereal disease, for 
instance, reached epidemic proportions,creating for the 
Admiralty their principal public health problem in the 
6 three decades up to 1880. Portsmouth was declared an 
infected area in 1860 and three years later the police 
reported identifying 1791 known prostitutes - one in every 
, l' 7 53 of the town s popu atlon. Not surprisingly the town 
was one of the first to be scheduled under the Contagious 
Diseases Act of 1864. 8 Clearly such surroundings were not 
ideal for the recreation of young Cadets, or indeed the 
sailors who trained them - amongst whom 24 cases of 
sexually transmitted diseases were reported in 1861 
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alone. 9 
The Naval Chronicle acknowledged the pernicious 
atmosphere of Portsmouth and noting how 'the petty 
influences by which we are surrounded increasingly instil 
themselves for good or evil into the very growth of our 
10 
natures', argued that Cadet training should be conducted 
elsewhere. Portsmouth was unsuitable argued the paper 
because of its notoriously immoral character, 
its squalor abominations, evil influences and 
examples and the little or no opportunity it 
offers for the enjoyment of fresh country, 
d . 11 alr an exerClse. 
This attack provoked considerable local hostility and a 
municipal delegation was despatched to the Admiralty to 
oppose any move, stress the advantages of the ship's 
situation and lobby for its retention in the harbour. 12 
Their failure to achieve a successful outcome would, 
argued the Army and Navy Gazette, mean that 'one, if not 
both, of the gentlemen who now represent the town may run 
a risk of being ousted at the next election,.13 
However, despite the efforts of tradesmen and C1V1C 
dignatories alike the Admiralty directed in December 1861 
that the Britannia would leave, on account of the 'great 
objections to the ship being there because of the 
temptations to which the boys were exposed when allowed to 
14 d go ashore'. Although the Board statement assure 
Portsmouth inhabitants that their decision was taken 
'entirely irrespective of the sanitary conditions of that 
15 part of the harbour where the ship has been moored' 
evidence in the Statistical Report on the Health of the 
Navy16 the following year suggested the contrary. 
184 
From 1861 the alm of this annual pUblication was not only 
statistical, but also to indicate as far as possible the 
probable causes of sickness and mortality in the Service, 
and this it attempted to do in reporting a bout of 
sickness in Britannia ln the October of that year. While 
the author A E Mackay remained sceptical, he admitted 
there was 
the opinion entertained by some that these 
fevers were altogether caused by the emanations 
from the mud and sewer drains which empty 
themselves into the Haslar and Gosport creeks 
off which this vessel was moored. In order, 
however, to remove any possible risk from such 
th h ' d 17 a cause e s lp was remove ... 
Thus the decision to move was apparently based on moral 
and physical welfare and the need for young men to avoid 
the tempations of a large seaport, and also because the 
immediate surroundings of the ship were felt, by some at 
least, to be physically unhealthy. 
The new location appeared, initially, to solve both 
problems, for it was decided that the ship would relocate 
to an isolated anchorage off the coast of Dorset in the 
Portland Roads. The move took some months to organise and 
it was not until the afternoon of 6 February 1862 that the 
Britannia, assisted by the tug Lucifer and the stearn two 
decker HMS Trafalgar, slipped from Portsmouth for the last 
time. She arrived the following morning and picked up 
moorings in the lee of the breakwater of Portland Harbour, 
where she was to lie until September of the following 
year. 
The 18 months spent at Portland have received little 
detailed attention. The ideal witness to the era should 
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be Statham, for he joined the Service in December 1861 and 
thus spent almost all his training time at Portland. Yet 
he has little to say about events and, apart from 
bemoaning the lack of recreational facilities, he confines 
himself to ephemera, concluding that 'Of the period at 
Portland, which as will be seen was not very long - the 
principal characteristic was its monotony,.18 No other 
commentator devotes more than a paragraph to the topic and 
all are content to support Statham's contention that this 
period was uneventful. 
If one of the justifications for moving the ship was 
to distance young officers from pernicious surroundings, 
then Portland was an appropriate choice. There was no 
centre of population nearby, and the hinterland consisted 
of only a small village with a single street. The nearest 
sizeable town was Weymouth but this was some distance away 
and could only be visited on half holidays and special 
occaslons. In fact, apart from relative isolation, 
Portland as a venue for training had almost nothing to 
offer. 
Although Cadets sick quarters were established 
ashore shortly after arrival, the surrounding area was 
generally unsuitable for shore based facilities - the 
peninsular being so steep, that no playing field could be 
found. Apart from sailing and boating there was little to 
occupy the Cadets spare time. This drawback was 
emphasised by the death of Cadet Alfred P Cox, who fell 
while collecting birds' eggs on the cliffs and was 
19 . 1 1 
'discharged dead' on 4th June 1862. HarrlS was c ear y 
unhappy with the new 10cation,20 for the anchorage was 
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exposed to both easterly and northerly gales and so much 
time was spent getting from ship to shore that a routine 
was difficult to achieve. Shortly after the ship's 
arrival it was necessary to engage, at private expense, a 
small steam tender, for as Harris noted, even daily 
supplies could not be depended upon, when using the ship's 
own boats. 21 
It has been established that a concern about the 
habitability and environs of the ship had been a factor In 
her relocation, and on arrival at Portland she was 
deliberately moored In an isolated position '600 yards 
from the shore in a locality where there was neither mud 
22 
nor sewerage' ,to try to minimise the incidence of 
sickness and improve habitability on board. By this stage 
the removal of her guns enabled her to float proud of her 
load-line and the scuttles had been enlarged to provide an 
increased alr flow. Large instructional spaces were 
situated in previously cramped and crowded gundecks and 
instead of 995 men, she had a complement of less than 300 
Cadets. Although Cadets still used the lower decks for 
living space, they were given almost twice the room to 
23 
sling hammocks as in the ship's operational days. 
Despite these measures, within two months of her 
arrival the ship was again subject to widespread sickness 
amongst Cadets. In April 1862 the Naval Chronicle 
reported cases in the ship, which it noted were serious 
enough to be employed by the Portsmouth lobby to rekindle 
24 
arguments for the ship's return to Haslar Creek. In 
November the Army and Navy Gazette noted 'the many defects 
which exist on board in connection with the sanitary 
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arrangements which keep the doctor's list far longer than 
could be desired' .25 It also reported sickness aboard and 
announced that the Inspector General of Fleets and 
Hospitals had been despatched to the ship on behalf of the 
Admiralty Board so that 'an opinion of the highest order 
might be at their disposal in the event of an explanation 
being required from them' .26 In December a leading 
article in the same paper noted that 
the state of the Britannia has not only caused 
deep anxiety to the relatives of the boys on 
board but has for some times past, given their 
Lordships no little trouble. 27 
It also alleged that fever was rife on board and that at 
least one Cadet had died. 28 
An examination of the relevant Report of the Health 
of the Navy reveals that this concern was well justified 
with the author noting that in 1862 there had been 295 
cases of primary fever on the Horne Station and that the 
Britannia with 43 cases, four of them fatal, had been the 
most seriously affected ship in the fleet. While it was 
noted that In character 'this was unquestionably a very 
29 grave form of fever' ,there seemed little attempt to 
analyse the cause. Mackay's editorial content, which has 
been described as exuding 'a truly mid-Victorian 
30 
complacency about the health of the Navy' ,ventured only 
to note that the Surgeon of the ship was at a loss to 
understand why the epidemic had occurred and to conclude 
that the fever was 'imported on board and spread to a few 
31 
of the cadets in the mysterious manner so cornmon' . 
The following year a further epidemic, this time of 
scarlet fever, struck the ship with 24 cases reported, two 
188 
As part of a project initiat e d in 197 2 for the 
disciplined recovery of artifacts from the site of HMS 
Britannia and Hindostan at Dartmo u t h, the posi t i on of bot h 
ships ha s been determined with great accuracy. Work by 
Parker and others using a combination o f perspect ive 
information from old photographs a nd a d e t a iled 
examination of debris on the rlver b e d has e nabl e d the 
position of t h e ship to be meas ured to a probability error 
of le ss t han one metre . 
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f h ' h - 32 o W lC proved fatal. Although the majority of cases 
were treated in the infirmary ashore, at least one patient 
had to remain on board due to the difficulty of landing in 
rough weather. By the time of this outbreak however, the 
disadvantages of Portland had become obvious to the 
Admiralty and the decision was again taken to move. The 
incidence of ill health was not acknowledged as a factor, 
the Private Secretary to the First Lord perferring to note 
'an objection that for two or three days together boats 
could not leave the ship without risk to the boys,.33 The 
Admiralty were already in possession of an extensive 
survey of south coast locations for naval training, drawn 
up in the wake of a Select Committee recommendation 34 to 
establish a naval college ashore. Dartmouth with its 
enclosed anchorage, extensive surrounding countryside, 
safe landing in all weathers and proximity to a small town 
appeared ideal, and while the possible detrimental effects 
of a close harbour were considered35 , the River Dart was 
chosen as the new location for Cadets' training. 
On the morning of 29 September 1863 under tow from 
the paddle sloop Geyser and the tug Prospero, the training 
ship left Portland and arrived at the mouth of the Dart 
the next morning. She proceeded up river and was moored 
about half a mile from the town close to the western bank 
of the river (See 3/1). While Statham notes that her 
arrival was greeted by 'the enthusiastic cheers of the 
inhabitants,36, this zeal might have been tempered had 
they known what was actually happening on board the ship, 
for it was yet again in the grlp of an outbreak of scarlet 
fever. 37 Eleven cadets had been left in the sick quarters 
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at Portland and on arrival at Dartmouth the remainder were 
given a short holiday while 'the decks were scrubbed with 
a disinfecting powder and the beams and sides of the ship 
were well white-washed,38 
These measures had little effect, for when the Cadets 
returned from their Michaelmas holiday the disease 
persisted with additional cases being reported in October 
and November. In the close confined spaces of mess decks 
there was little hope of treating the infectionary cycle 
and Staff Surgeon William Saunders noted that by the 8th 
November 1863 
the parents of the cadets being in a great state 
of alarm and no prospect of the disease dis-
appearing, a fresh outbreak having just taken 
place, my advice was that the cadets should be 
sent to their homes which was immediately acted 
39 
upon. 
Thus, all those not passing out at the end of the 
Christmas term were medically examined and removed from 
the ship, leaving about 50 Cadets to complete their 
course. Amongst those remaining no further sickness was 
observed and when they left, Saunders reported that 
the ship was fumigated, the decks were washed 
with a solution of chloride of zinc, the beams 
and sides of the ship were white-washed, all 
the counterpanes and sheets were washed and 
the beds well aired. 40 
These measures apparently solved the problem and no 
further cases were reported after the end of the autumn 
term, until late in 1865. 
The Portland era was undoubtedly an unhappy one and 
the decision to relocate there ill considered. The lack 
of recreational facilities, exposed position of the ship 
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and subsequent high percentage of time spent on board, 
particularly in bad weather, did little to enhance the 
quality of training. While the incidence of sickness was 
probably no worse than in a contemporary public school, it 
did focus attention on the environment in which Cadets 
lived. By this stage the Britannia was over 40 years old, 
had an appalling previous history of sickness (See Annex 
A.) and in common with other ships of her age had 
acknowledged difficulties in ventilation and the 
extraction of foul air, particularly from the lower 
reglons of the vessel. It has also been suggested that, 
even by 1866, her routine still included the daily washing 
down of decks with salt water4l - a highly questionable 
practice which resulted in persistent damp, humidity, 
difficulty in extracting foul water from the bilges and a 
consequent debilitating effect on the health of 
42 personnel. 
It will be noted that despite the fact that Statham 
was actually on board the ship at Portland these events 
remain unacknowledged - indeed at no time in his history 
of the ship are health or habitability ever fully 
addressed. This clearly places a question mark against 
the overall veracity of his account for it is quite clear 
from the annals of the Service press, from official 
medical reports and from an examination of the factors 
leading to the establishment of the Committee on the 
System of Training Cadets on board HMS Britannia of 1875, 
that these subjects were matters of serious concern. The 
issue of health had been a principal factor in the 
relocation of the training ship, and was to continue both 
to promote Admiralty concern and underpin arguments about 
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whether training should take place afloat or ashore, until 
the end of the period. 
During the time at Portland Captain Harris 
relinquished his appointment. He had been in command 
successively of the Illustrious and the Britannia since 
1854 and had thus superintended both boys and Cadets 
training from the inception of the scheme. In both his 
personal conduct in command and in his lengthy pamphlet 
published in 1863,43 he is revealed as a thoughtful and 
perceptive commentator, keen to initiate an educational 
debate within the Service and to stress that 'no pecuniary 
consideration should interfere with the full development 
of whatever institution may be considered best suited to 
promote this great object,.44 Perhaps most pertinent, 
given his extensive personal involvement with the training 
ship concept, were his efforts to balance the advantages 
of shipborne and shoreside education and his conclusion 
that 'a College might be nearly as advantageous for 
h "h' , 45 training and far less expenslve t an a tralnlng s lp . 
Harris paid a price for his dedication, for having 
spent eight years in a non-sea going command, he was 
debarred from further promotion. Although ln November 
1862 it was suggested that he might become the 
46 Superintendent of Deptford Dockyard, this did not 
materialise and he was not employed in the Service agaln 
prior to his death in January 1865. While such an 
injustice was not untypical of the archaic system of 
advancement that typified the period, it was an 
unfortunate end to a distinguished career, and one that 
failed to recognise a major contribution to the 
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development of officer education in the Service. 
The new Captain was Richard A Powell, who had joined 
the Service at the Royal Naval College Portsmouth and 
graduated in December 1831. He passed for Lieutenant ln 
1836 and was promoted six years later. Apart from his 
time at the gunnery school in HMS Excellent, Powell spent 
an unusually large proportion of his service in steam 
ships - Hydra in 1842, Penelope the following year and, 
after twelve months half pay, as First Lieutenant of the 
steam sloop Styx. He was promoted Commander in 1851 and 
Captain four years later. Prior to his appointment in the 
training ship he had been in command of the new ironclad 
HMS Defence, in the Channel Squadron. 
The period at Dartmouth under Powell's command saw a 
series of modifications and improvements in new entry 
training, including the provision of a second ship to 
provide further classroom and accommodation space for an 
increased number of Cadets. This was necessary because 
numbers under training were still largely based on the 
relative strength of the Lieutenant's list and thus the 
annual intake was subject to fluctuation. In 1863 for 
example the entry had numbered 122,47 but the following 
year a potential paucity of Lieutenants was identified and 
some 217 48 new entrants joined the Service, pushing the 
complement of the Britannia to over 300. To counter 
possible charges of overcrowding, the Admiralty decided 
that the old two decker Hindostan should be brought from 
Devonport and used in conjunction with the training ship. 
She was an unconverted 84 gun second rate ship displacing 
2029 tons, originally laid down in August 1828 but not 
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The Britannia and Hindostan 
moored stem to stern with 
inter-connecting walkway 
Photo: College Archive 
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launched until 1841, by which time she was virtually 
obsolete. The Hindostan arrived at Dartmouth in 1864 and 
was moored ahead of Britannia (See 3/2) with a connecting 
bridge constructed between the two and continued to be used 
up to the advent of shore training in 1905. 
Other improvements during Powell's regime included the 
establishment of a beach for landing Cadet's boats and the 
construction of a cricket ground which could be reached 
without walking through the town. In 1865 a gentleman's 
residence was acquired on lease for use as Cadet's Sick 
Quarters and supplemented by an adjacent cottage for the 
t ' f' f t' 49 recep lon 0 ln ec lOUS cases. While this was considered 
by medical staff to be 'well adapted for the purpose', it 
was not sufficient to deal with wide spread illnesses and it 
was noted that property ln the town had to be rented 
periodically to provide additional patient accommodation. 50 
In the same year revised regulations for the entry and 
examination of new entrants were issued. These were similar 
to the instructions contained in Circular 393 of 1859,51 
with some small exceptions. From February 1865 it was no 
longer necessary for candidates to demonstrate proficiency 
in Latin on entry, the ability to 'read translate and parse 
a passage from French or some other Foreign Living 
52 Language' being deemed sufficient. Other modifications 
included an acknowledgement that no sea training ship was 
available,53 and thus on passing out of the Britannia,Cadets 
would be posted to operational warships. Finally the system 
of awarding seniority on the basis of academic performance 
was abolished. In future, those who passed the course would 
be appointed to a new ship and those who failed would be 
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discharged from the Service. 54 
Meanwhile the debate about whether the Britannia might 
better be replaced by a shores ide college rumbled on. The 
Army and Navy Gazette reported that, with the advent of the 
financial year 1864/65, it was rumoured that the 
'supplementary vote which will be brought forward by the 
Secretary to the Admiralty will include a sum of £100,000 to 
be devoted to the erection of a naval college,.55 The 
publication of the estimates, however, revealed the familiar 
pattern of reduction. Over one million pounds had been 
lopped off the 1863 budget, the following year saw a further 
fall of £30,000 and in 1865 a further £300,000 was saved. 56 
The estimates for 1864/65 showed no evidence of any 
intention to spend on a naval college and although it has 
been noted that the First Lord was personally in favour of 
57 
such a scheme , the climate of reduction precluded the 
capital outlay. While the 1864/65 budget did include a 
supplementary estimate, it was not for education, but to 
d 'f' " , 58 cover mo 1 lcatlons ln seaman swages. 
In late 1865 it was announced that Powell, who had 
spent three years in the Britannia, was to be reappointed. 
This period had not been an easy one and it was to his 
credit that considerable advances had been achieved. The 
principal improvement was clearly the relocation of the ship 
to Dartmouth and the expansion of the facilities there. 
When he left in April 1866, the Britannia now supplemented 
by Hindostan, safe in an enclosed harbour with recreational 
and medical facilities established ashore, stood in marked 
contrast to the command he assumed in the Portland Roads in 
1862. 
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Powell had corne to the Britannia from commanding the 
Navy's latest ironclad battleship and had spent most of his 
career in stearn ships. He had studied at the Royal Naval 
College Portsmouth, as had Harris who had been there on half 
pay ln 1842. The regime of both men was characterised by a 
strong sense of pastoral care and an enlightened and 
improving approach to the training of young officers. This 
had been the cause for occasional criticism from some 
elements in the Service who favoured a harsher regime and 
questioned whether 'the system on board the Britannia is 
adapted for training up future Nelsons and collingwoods,.59 
This sort of view was persistently in evidence in the 
columns of the press in the early years, although it seldom 
received editorial support. Harris, commenting on his own 
time and on Powell's early months in command, noted that 
it was fortunate for the Naval cadets on board 
Britannia as well as for the Service, that the 
views of discipline frequently proposed by 
persons incapable of taking a broad view of the 
subject and sometimes urged through the columns 
60 
of the press, were not adopted. 
The arrival of Powell's successor on 20 April 1866 
however, marked a distinct change, for Captain George G 
Randolph was an acknowledged disciplinarian and one who 
'enjoyed a great reputation for strictness and of whom his 
d . , 61 subordinates stoo ln awe . He had obtained his first 
commission in June 1838 and spent a large proportion of his 
career in sailing ships often in distant waters. As a 
Lieutenant he had commanded a ship's boat in bitter fighting 
at the destruction of fortiftcations in the Brunei River ln 
1845. 62 He was promoted Captain nine years later and 
immediately prior to the Britannia he had commanded the 
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screw frigate Orlando where it was noted 'the times put up 
by his crew for handling spans and sails remain records,.63 
Statham noted ominously that although fair, 'he was a man 
disposed to err perhaps on the side of severity,64 and that 
he would 'carry out any threat or promise to the bitter end, 
even though it may invoke the antagonism of the whole of his 
subordinates,.65 During his short time in command, the 
Britannia was subject to both national press coverage and 
questions in the House of Commons concerning the nature of 
the regime in the ship and in particular the extent of 
corporal punishment. 
Corporal Punishment. 
The history of this practice is discussed by most 
commentators on naval education and is perhaps the best 
example of the unsubstantiated repetition of events 
orginally cited by one source. As with most other detail 
Statham is the original narrator who notes that the practice 
was not evident in Harris' time but that at Portland 'the 
Admiralty decided to re-introduce corporal punishment for 
66 
serious offences among the Cadets'. No Circular, Order in 
Councilor other reference 1.S cited in support of this 
policy change and the date of its introduction 1.S only g1.ven 
as 'not long after the appointment of Captain powell,.67 
Similarly no explanation is offered other than 'it is not 
quite clear at the present time what gave r1.se to the 
. ., 68 l.nnovat1.on . Statham appears, however, to be in no doubt 
about the manner in which punishment was administered, 
claiming that Cadets were mustered, drawn up and 'the 
culprit was lashed in true man 0' war fashion on one side of 
the deck facing a port, while his comrades were drawn up 
. ,69 Opposl.te • 
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This pastiche of punishment more common in the 
eighteenth-century navy is repeated similarly unreferenced 
by almost all other commentators. Walker notes that 
an official beating 1n the Britannia was a much more 
ceremonial affair than its counterpart at public school' 
and that 'the culprit was lashed down in true old navy 
70 
style'. Pack claims that previous punishment had been 
found an insufficient deterrent and thus 'Cadets were 
assembled to witness punishment. The first victim was 
leashed to the ship's side opposite a port. The beating 
71 began'. Penn's account so closely resembles Statham's 
that they differ by only one word, the former substituting 
72 
'messmates' for comrades'. Lewis tells the same story 
claiming that 'the culprit was lashed to a grating,73 and 
that the practice was a deliberate attempt to reproduce the 
grim conditions of a flogging in a man 0' war - a 
f h d 'b ' d I' , t' 74 per ormance e escr1 es as pseu a-rea 1sm run r10 . 
Clearly the absence of any independent verification for 
these lurid accounts and the high coincidence of their 
detail demands further investigation, not simply in search 
of authenticity but because such descriptions have also been 
the source of wider statements about the nature and quality 
of naval training of the period. Bonnett for example claims 
that in the 1860s 'Teaching remained unchanged and the 
h b ' h' 75 R k'll sternest injunction to study was t e 1rc. os 1 , 
examining initially the 1880s but then commenting generally 
on the training ship system, notes that it was 'based on 
forcing cadets into a pre-conceived and rigid mould by the 
, d" l' ,76 All' d application of harsh and even 1nhuman 1SC1P 1ne . 1e 
to arguments that intellectual achievement was not of 
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importance and that the curriculum was both behind the 
times and dominated by seamanship,77 training in the 
Britannia has been seen as synonomous with the rlgorous 
ascetism that served officers well in times of battle or 
hardship.78 
Yet, despite these views, there is much evidence to 
suggest that for at least the first 15 years of the 
training ship system the descriptions and extent of 
punishment are grossly exaggerated. The general background 
to these years for example was notable for a transformation 
ln punishment practice in the Royal Navy, with a series of 
Discipline Acts in the period 1860 to 1866, designed to 
eradicate the scenes of quarterdeck punishment that the 
Britannia was supposedly recreating. The caning of both 
boys and officer cadets was always an exception to 
legislation restricting corporal punishment in the fleet. 
However, the overall climate and approach to the discipline 
of man and juvenile alike was an increasingly sensitive one 
and unlikely to tolerate the scale of punishment and re-
enactment of practices, fast becoming an embarrassment to 
the Admiralty - particularly in a forum as sensitive to 
public and press scrutiny as the quarterdeck of the 
officers' training ship. 
Neither is there anything in Powell's background to 
suggest the slightest eccentricity in this matter. On the 
30th October 1865, in common with all commanding officers, 
he submitted to the Admiralty a resume of his views on the 
modification of punishment practice in the Service. In 
this letter he reveals himself to be a vigorous supporter 
of reform, noting that: 
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During the last few years many changes most 
beneficial to the seamen of the Royal Navy have taken 
place. 
Their Lordships have held out great inducements for 
good conduct. 
They have improved the position of our men ln pay, 
provisions and general comfort. 
They have gone far to establish a standing Navy and 
by bringing up boys carefully from their youth, they 
have created a feeling of attachment to the service, 
being discharged from it is now considered a most 
severe punishment. 
Whilst the Navy was thus becoming popular with our 
seamen, their Lordships introduced the Naval 
Discipline Act and the improved conduct of our men on 
board their ships shews (sic). I think the wisdom 
of the measure. 79 
On the subject of corporal punishment Powell noted that the 
creation of a class of men exempt from corporal punishment 
'does not appear to have injured the discipline of the Navy 
and I believe that it has been the best answer to erroneous 
statements made on that subject,.80 
In addition to noting the improving climate in 
punishment practice and the views of an enlightened 
commanding officer, it is also possible to analyse for the 
first time in detail, the exact nature and extent of 
discipline ln the officer's training ship of the period. 
In the archive of the Britannia Royal Naval College 
Dartmouth are the records relating to the disciplinary 
offences committed by Cadets and the subsequent punishment 
awarded during the period from September 1860 until the 
demise of the training ship in the late summer of 1905. 
These comprise some 34 volumes each containing 
approximately 800 pages and are completed in great detail. 
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No general analysis of their contents has ever been 
conducted or cited in previous work to date. 
While the style and notation of the 'punishment books' 
1S subject to some variation, the three volumes pertaining 
to the regimes of Captains Harris, Powell and Randolph are 
1n standard format and kept in accordance with Admiralty 
Circular 428 of 1860. 81 This is an important factor in 
establishing the validity of the records, for Circular 428 
was one of a series of improving measures during the decade 
which established in operational warships a Record of 
Seaman's Conduct Book, in which all punishment was to be 
recorded. One of the intentions of doing so was to make 
Captains' actions publically accountable - thus, although 
it is possible that entries were omitted or falsified, it 
seems most unlikely, particularly in a ship on the horne 
station and under the constant gaze of the Admiralty. 
The punishment book series is not related to the 
incumbency of a particular commanding officer, but is 
organised chronologically on the basis of a student's date 
of entry into the Service - a system that produces a 
considerable overlap between volumes. For example, 
although the first of series has the title Record of 
Conduct 1860-62, it is actually the record of punishment 
awarded up to date of discharge of the last of the 1862 
entry - namely 22nd March 1864. While this means that each 
student's personal record is easily accessible, it is more 
difficult to draw conclusions on the overall disciplinary 
regime of each commanding officer - for every volume 
reflects the actions of at least two and sometimes three 
individuals. Thus Volume Al applies to both Harris and 
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Powell, A2 to Powell and Randolph and A3 to Powell, 
Randolph and his successor Captain John Corbett. 
Nevertheless, the extensive nature of the records does 
allow the assertions advanced by Statham and others to be 
examined in some detail. 
Offences committed by Cadets during Harris' time are 
entered in the records in very general terms -
'disobedience', 'repeatedly troublesome', 'constantly 
disorderly', 'skylarking' etc. Only rarely lS an insight 
given into the exact breach of regulations, as In February 
1863 when Cadet Eustace Maude received five days stoppage 
of leave and two days extra drill for 'throwing coal out of 
82 the Mess Room port when told not to do', or in the same 
month when Cadet Charles Last was punished for the 
seemingly innocuous crlme of 'Whistling immediately after 
D" S ' ,83 lVlne erVlce . While the detail of misdemeanours 
remained unamplified it was unlikely that they were 
serious, for it was clearly expected that at some time each 
Cadet would be punished, for an entry appears for every 
student who joined the ship and it is rare to find an 
instance of conduct described as 'most exemplary' - l.e. no 
punishment awarded at any stage during training. 
Yet the nature of punishment under Harris seemed mild 
enough. While the nature and variation was considerable, 
only limited restriction was involved with examples such as 
stoppage of leave, extra drill or confinement to a specific 
part of the ship - 'Seven evenings in the model room' or 
'Confined to the middle deck in the evenings' are recurrent 
examples. Nowhere during Harris' time are there any 
entries relating to corporal punishment. Cadets who were 
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repeatedly troublesome, undisciplined and who committed a 
specific serious offence were dismissed from the Service, 
as in the cases of Cadets John Beresford and Charles 
McPherson who were discharged by special Admiralty Order ln 
Council in April 1862. 84 This appeared to be the ultimate 
disciplinary sanction. 
The arrival of Captain Powell in October 1862 saw a 
modification to the routine which limited the range and 
variation of penalties and placed punishment into three 
main categories. Fortunately these regulations, written 
and signed by Powell have survived in the frontispiece of 
Record of Conduct, Volume Al and are reproduced opposite. 
Three classes of punishment were established. 'Number One' 
was basically a series of additional duties including early 
rising '2 Bells ln Summer' (0500) and '4 Bells in winter,85 
(0600), additional drill during the lunch hour and 
restricted movement about the ship in the evening when 
Cadets were confined to the French study and required to 
copy out the punishment regulations. 'Number Two' 
punishment was merely a reduced version of the first and 
'Number Three' or 'Cockpit Mess' was a special diet which 
although sparse, still featured three meals per day to be 
taken apart from the other Cadets in the 'cockpit' or 
orlop deck of the ship. It will be noted that, as under 
Harris, there was no mention of any form of corporal 
punishment in the regulations. 
These rules seem to have been applied, unmodified, for 
almost the first two years of Powell's time, with 
'indifferent conduct' continuing to be grounds for 
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discharge - Cadets Henry Fletcher86 , Amos Giblings 87 and 
CAM Patmore 88 being dismissed under this category between 
March and September 1863. Statham's assertion that 'not 
long after the appointment of Captain Powell the Admiralty 
decided to introduce corporal punishment for serious 
ff ' 89 . o ences, 1S not supported by the evidence for there 1S 
no entry to this effect in almost the first two years of his 
regime. However, it is correct to note that corporal 
punishment was introduced under this particular Captain, for 
a 19th September 1864 Record of Conduct Volume A2 notes that 
due to 'Repeated Disobedience of Orders' Cadet W G Alexander 
received 'ten stripes with a birch rod,.90 
There is no explanation in the records as to why the 
punishment was introduced and nothing to suggest Admiralty 
interference in the matter. Neither does it seem to have 
significantly altered the overall pattern of discipline, for 
between September 1864 and Powell's departure in April 1866, 
while other cadets were sometimes similarly punished, the 
ship's routine remained rooted 1n the regulations outlined 
in the Captain's Orders. Even persistent offenders avoided 
being beaten. In one day in August 1864 Cadet Charles Hicks 
was listed as dancing at a general muster, killing a cat 1n 
a water tank and laughing while being admonished on the 
quarter deck,91 yet received only four days Number One 
Punishment. Cadets Arthur Stackpole and Edward Knipe were 
reported 26 and 28 times respectively for a series of 
offences during training, yet were never physically 
punished. In fact, of the 416 Cadets entered in the 
punishment books pertaining to Powell's time, only seven 
were listed as being subject to any corporal punishment, 
over a two year period. 
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The organisation of the third volume of punishment 
records, which covers the whole of Randolph's captaincy, 1S 
slightly different. This book is entitled 'Conduct of 
Cadets' and although locally produced and printed, is a more 
comprehensive record of each candidate including parental 
addresses, comments on academic performance and positions 1n 
class examinations. A survey of this work reveals that, as 
under Powell and Harris, the standard punishment remained a 
combination of extra duties and reduced diet, awarded in two 
variants 'cockpit mess' or 'defaulters mess'. More serious 
offences still merited dismissal from the Service but from 
1866 this sentence could be suspended and the offender 
allowed to continue his training under what was termed 
'Admiralty probation'. From late 1866 it was also possible 
to lose seniority for misconduct, as in the case of Cadet 
Duncan Ross who in December of that year breached 
regulations by 'entering a farmhouse' and duly lost SlX 
months time for advancement. 92 
The principal characteristic of the punishment records 
1n the Randolph era however, is the increase in both 
severity and frequency of physical punishment. From seven 
instances in almost four years under Powell, beatings grew 
to an average of one per month in term time in Randolph's 
first half year. The awards also became more severe with 
two Cadets, one of whom was subsequently discharged from the 
Service, receiving 24 strokes of the birch each in October 
f I
, 93 
1866 for separate offences 0 stea 1ng. In the following 
year carne the incident that attracted wider attention to the 
ship's punishment practice, when several Cadets were birched 
for bullying. Statham outlines this only in general terms 
noting that it took place in Spring 1867, and that 'four or 
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f ' 94 lve cadets' were involved. The records show the date to 
be the 12th of February of that year and those involved were 
Cadets Alfred Paget, Richard Mansergh, William Elliot and 
John Bennett who each received 24 strokes for combining to 
'bully and attack some Junior Cadets and throwing one, 
Mr E J White against the Pumps so violently as to inflict 
" ,95 lnJury . 
The punishment of these young men led to a question in 
the House of Commons on 25th July 1867, when Michael Bass, 
Liberal member for Derby, rose to ask the First Lord whether 
he had made 'further inquiry respecting the mode of 
punishment of Cadets on board the Britannia,96 and that 'it 
was alleged from many quarters that excessive cruelty was 
practised on board that ship,.97 How the matter reached 
this stage is not entirely clear. Bass was an infrequent 
speaker and was noted, not for an interest in naval matters, 
but rather a concern with working-class welfare. 98 However, 
it is probably relevant that he had been a fellow Liberal MP 
and parliamentary colleague for almost 20 years of Lord 
Alfred Paget, the father of one of those punished. There 
was also a politico/naval connection, for at the time of the 
incident Cadet Paget's uncle was Commander in Chief of the 
Mediterranean Station and had been Secretary to the 
Admiralty Board in the previous Liberal administration 
1859-66. 
Whatever the substance of this connection the question 
was clearly designed to cause maximum discomfort to the new 
Tory First Lord, H T L Corry, and Bass pressed his advantage 
by asking if 
when a cadet was punished his arms and legs were 
tied to ring bolts so that he could not move and that 
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he was flogged with a birch boom which had previously 
been steeped in water to make it more pliant, that 
fifteen cuts were inflicted with it on the back and 
that doctors invariably attended. 99 
These accusations were vehemently denied, with Corry 
asserting that in Vlew of the statement a detailed enquiry 
into punishment on board Britannia had been undertaken and 
'the result was a complete denial that the punishment of 
cadets was accompanied by the cruelty described,lOO and far 
from being chastised with a birch broom the punishment was 
'precisely similar to that used at schools,.lOl Corry 
further emphatically rejected the allegation that Cadets 
were tied down and there was a 'complete denial of any such 
102 
cruelty as had been alleged'. The matter was closed with 
the announcement that the Admiralty' having taken the whole 
subject into consideration have thought it desirable that 
the punishment of flogging on board the Britannia should be 
d ' 'd' 103 lscontlnue . 
Thus came to a close the relatively short period in 
Britannia's early history when corporal punishment featured 
in the training routine. In the first seven years it was 
unknown and was thence used only sparingly in the two years 
preceding the arrival of Randolph in April 1866. 
Thereafter, while its frequency and severity did increase, 
this particular period lasted less than 18 months and 
following cessation ln July 1867, it was almost six years 
104 before the practice reappeared. Thus from the inception 
of the training ship in 1857 until December 1872 there was 
only one short period identified with a particular Captain 
when corporal punishment could be said to be a regular 
feature of the ship's routine. 
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There can be little doubt that glven the firm foundations of 
pastoral care established by Powell and Harris, that the 
choice of Randolph as the third Captain was unfortunate, and 
he was quickly reappointed in the wake of the parliamentary 
question. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that there 1S 
nothing 1n reliable personal memoirs or the punishment 
records to support the allegations made in the House of 
Commons 1n July 1867. Indeed it is difficult to see this 
parliamentary episode as much more than mischief making by a 
Liberal member who was an infrequent speaker, with no 
previous naval interest, on behalf of the equally political 
family of one of the Cadets involved. This impression 1S 
reinforced when it is borne in mind that the corporal 
punishment of which he complained was actually introduced 1n 
1864 and superintended by a Liberal Admiralty Board for two 
years without comment or query. 
The basis of the lurid accounts of punishment routine 
related by Statham and repeated by others is unclear. While 
they cannot be completely dismissed, there seems little 
evidence to support the picture of Cadets tied to gunports 
or seized to gratings and certainly nothing 1n the 
punishment book series to verify the story. What the 
official records do confirm is that Statham was not an eye 
witness to the events he describes, for he completed his 
training on 20 March 1863,105 fully 18 months before the 
introduction of the birch into HMS Britannia. We are thus 
left with a description based on hearsay or unspecified 
memoir which, if accepted, would mean that in denying the 
allegations, the First Lord had quite deliberately misled 
the House of Commons. 
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Curriculum Development 
The new commanding officer appointed in September 
1867 was Captain John Corbett. He had first seen active 
servlce off the coast of Syria in 1840 and had been 
present at the bombardment of Ac're. He passed his 
examination in 1843 and was promoted Lieutenant three 
years later, subsequently serving ln the first rate HMS 
Queen and as Senior Lieutenant of the gunnery school ln 
HMS Excellent. He was promoted Captain in 1857 and 
commanded the flagship HMS Hastings at Queenstown from 
June 1864. Immediately prior to his appointment to the 
Britannia he had commanded the ironclad HMS Black Prince, 
also serving as a flagship, from 1866 to 1867. His 
appointment represented a return to the traditions of 
pastoral care established under Harris and Powell, with 
his First Lieutenant noting that he had been deliberately 
appointed to the command with 'a view to establishing a 
milder rule than prevailed in Captain Randolph's time,.106 
He was to remain almost four years until August 1871 and 
superintend considerable changes. 
The first of these related to the syllabus which, 
since the inception of the training ship, had been both 
taught and examined by the ship's instructional staff. 
The original course had been outlined in Circular 288 of 
1857107 and was divided between elements of practical 
seamanship and academic studies, which were largely 
mathematical in nature. The list included Arithmetic, 
Algebra, Geometry, Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, 
Navigation, French and various explanatory lectures on 
. 108 
astronomy, mechanics and hydrostatlcs. 
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The Circular did not specify the amount of time or 
weighting given to each, but merely required the Master of 
the Ship to endorse proficiency in seamanship and the 
Naval Instructor to certify 'the Candidates attention to 
the various branches of his education as well as his 
general conduct whilst on board,.109 It is known that 
while the training ship was at Portsmouth alternative 
days were devoted to academic and seamanship 
, ,110 d h lnstructlon, an per aps for that reason it has been 
assumed that the latter had equal prominence. Temple 
Patterson takes this view, arguing that the curriculum was 
'behind the times being entirely geared to the sailing 
ship era that was passing away and ignoring the 
tl 1 d 1 ' , f ' III ungen eman y an unwe corne lntruslon 0 stearn. 
Walker supports this, noting that 'the curriculum at this 
time consisted almost entirely of navigation and 
h ' , 112 seamans lp . 
Fortunately access to original records makes it 
possible for the first time to examlne these assertions In 
more detail, via the Record of Passing Certificates held 
at the Royal Naval College Dartmouth. This document 
details the diligence, conduct, examination results by 
subject and the class of certificate awarded to every 
Cadet who passed out of the training ship from December 
1862 until midsummer 1878. As such it is not a detailed 
explanation of the syllabus, but if the premise is 
accepted that what was examined was also taught and that 
the greater the weighting of the subject in the exam, the 
more it featured in the syllabus, then this record is the 
most detailed analysis of the training routine in HMS 
Britannia available. 
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This evidence suggests that, throughout the period to 
December 1870,the original central division between 
academic work and seamanship envisaged in Circular 288 was 
maintained and, although individual subjects and their 
appropriate weighting were subject to fluctuation, the 
total marks available for the two areas of work remained 
constant. The most immediate observation on this general 
organisation, particularly in the light of previous 
comment about the syllabus, is that at no stage between 
1862 and 1870 did seamanship marks ever account for more 
than one third of the theoretical maximum - the division 
being 2000 marks for academic work and 1000 for 
seamanship. Furthermore within the former area, the total 
mark for the six subjects classified as 'mathematics' -
namely Arithmetic, Algebra, Euclid, Plane and Spherical 
Trigonometry and Navigation - was always greater than the 
seamanship total. 
Thus it is apparent that from the date when records 
were initiated, the course in the Britannia was 
predominantly academic, with a strong emphasis on 
mathematical skills. The first examination schedule shows 
14 standard subjects which, apart from the six 
mathematical topics already mentioned, included Geography, 
English History, Scripture History, French, Drawing, 
Construction of Charts, Instruments and English 
Composition. Reading and writing were also examined as 
supplementary subjects, and despite assertions to the 
contrary, 100 marks were awarded for an examination In 
'Steam' .113 While the choice of standard subjects 
remained constant, in accordance with the provisions of 
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Examination Mark Profiles HMS BRITANNIA 
December 1862 Jul~ 1867 Change Notes 
-
Arithmetic 150 Arithmetic 150 
Algebra 150 Algebra 150 
Euclid 150 Euclid 200 +50 
Plane Trigonometry 200 Plane Trigonometry 150 -50 
Spherical 100 Spherical 150 +50 
Trigonometry Trigonometry 
Navigation 300 Navigation 300 
Geography 150 Geography 100 
English History 100 English History 50 -50 
Scripture History 100 Scripture History 50 -50 
French 100 French 200 +100 
Drawing 100 Drawing 100 
Construction and 50 Construction and 50 
use of Charts use of Charts 
Instruments 100 Instruments 150 +50 
Now incorporates 
English Compositio 50 English Com~ositio 100 +50 'Writing and Reading' 
Writing 50 Analytical 100 New subject from 
Trigonometry April 1867 
Reading 50 
St~cm 100 Steam deleted 1864 
Marks obtained in 2,000 Marks otained in 2,000 
Study Study 
Marks obtained in 1,000 Marks obtained in 1,000 
Seamanship Seamanship 
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Circular 288, the supplementary topics were subject to 
change without explanation. 'Stearn' for example was 
examined in December 1862, dropped in September 1863, 
reinstated the following November and subsequently 
replaced by 'extra navigation' in March 1864. This, In 
turn, became a subject simply described as 'extra 
questions' in April 1865. Writing and Spelling were 
subject to similar fluctuation and were eventually 
incorporated under 'English Composition' the following 
year. 
The weighting of subjects was also subject to 
constant revision although the mathematical group 
consistently dominated the mark profile. No particular 
trend can be identified in the shifting balance up to 
1870, although French seemed to grow In importance, 
meriting 100 marks in December 1862, 150 in June 1864 and 
200 by March the following year. As the course was both 
taught and examined by the same staff without external 
verification or interference, the shifting emphasis would 
seem to be due to the individual preferences of the Naval 
Instructors involved. A comparison of examination 
profiles for December 1862 and July 1867 appears opposite. 
It will be seen that, assuming the examination 
subjects and weightings were a reliable indicator of the 
nature of the course, the emphasis in young officer 
training was principally academic - as one might expect 
for boys betwen 12 and 14 years of age. Clearly 
seamanship was important, although the idea that it 
dominated all aspects of training is misplaced. Indeed 
from 1870 the subject ceased to be formally 
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examined and the 1000 marks allocated were deleted from 
114 
the record. While elements were still taught in 
Britannia after this date, the bulk of seamanship 
instruction was shifted into the seagoing training ship 
where the practical and theoretical aspects of the subject 
were more compatible. 
Apart from a major imbalance in favour of 
mathematical subjects the principal shortcoming of the 
academic course was ln the area of organisation and 
validation. Providing the general stipulations of 
Circular 288 were met, the instructional staff appear to 
have had the power to teach, examlne and amend subjects 
and their weightings, without any form of external 
reference or control. In the early years this situation 
seems to have passed without comment, but in 1862 the Army 
and Navy Gazette, while unstinting ln pralse of all in the 
Britannia, expressed surprise that Cadets should be 
examined by their own teachers - a system it claimed that 
made instructors 'auditors of their own accounts,.llS The 
matter arose again in 1867 when complaints were raised 
within the Admiralty that 'examiners know too much of the 
cadets; that they know more of them personally than was 
consistent with their position as examiners,.116 Although 
there was no direct accusation of complicity or unfairness 
the possibility was suggested that 'boys were passed out 
of the Britannia before by masters in accordance with what 
they knew of the boys rather than by the actual 
. t' 117 acqulremen s . 
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Joseph Woolley. 
To deflect this sort of criticism, the First Lord, 
H T L Corry directed that from September 1868 all academic 
examinations in the ship would be made subject to the 
scrutiny and moderation of external authority, ln the form 
of the Director of Education for the Admiralty. This post 
had been founded four years previously but up to this 
point had no responsibility for officer training. Never-
theless it was a most significant advance in the overall 
development of naval education and must be examined in 
some detail. The first and only incumbent during the 
nineteenth-century was Revd Joseph Woolley who took up the 
. . 1 1864 118 . appolntment ln Ju y . Desplte the fact that the 
post was extant for almost ten years and that the Director 
either gave evidence to, or was a member of, every 
committee to examine the subject over the period, the 
position has received almost no critical attention. No 
mention of the post, for example, appears in the seven 
volume official history of the Service, and the Dictionary 
of National Biography fails to mention Woolley's 
contribution in this area. Similarly, while Sullivan 
claims the appointment represented 'the most convincing 
manifestation of genuine Admiralty concern for educational 
efficiency,119 to date, he devotes less than 800'words ln 
total to a consideration of Woolley's work. Lloyd, 
examining the progress of higher education in the Service 
persistently refers to the 'Director of Education and Dr 
woolleY',120 when in fact they were one and the same. 
The reason for this reticence and uncertainty is not 
clear, for even by the time of his appointment Woolley's 
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connection with the Service was both long and 
distinguished. Like James Inman and T J Main, 
respectively first and second Professors at the Royal 
Naval College Portsmouth, Woolley was a product of St 
John's College Cambridge where he had graduated as third 
Wrangler in 1839, and his academic interests were 
similarly rooted in mathematics and naval architecture. 
He had entered Admiralty employment as the first Principal 
of the Central School of Mathematics and Naval 
Construction founded in Portsmouth Dockyard in 1848. 
The school occupied the buildings of the original 
School of Naval Architecture erected in 1816121 and was 
thus known colloquially as 'the second school'. It opened 
as the sequel to the system of dockyard schools for the 
education of apprentices which had been established in 
1843. From these schools at Portsmouth, Devonport, 
Chatham, Sheerness, Pembroke, Deptford and Woolwich 
outstanding pupils were chosen to complete their education 
at the Central or 'second school', where they followed a 
four year course of mathematics, naval architecture, 
chemistry and practical skills. As with the original 
School of Naval Architecture there were close links with 
the Royal Naval College - Professor Main leading the 
. D H 122 
mathematics teaching, and corrOSlon expert W ay 
teaching chemistry and experimental philosophy. Woolley, 
in addition to his duties as Principal, also taught 
mathematics and religion. 
The Central or Second school opened on 17th June 1848 
with eight pupils sent from the various dockyard schools. 
Woolley imposed a rigorous routine with instruction 
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commencing before seven ln the mornings and private study 
expected in the library until after ten ln the evening. 
It was noted that the Principal completely identified 
himself with the life and study of his pupils, and that he 
was responsible not only for their professional progress, 
but also for their moral and religious education as 
11 123 we . In 1850 Woolley published The Elements of 
Descriptive Geometry which was used as a standard text ln 
the school and was for many years the primary work on the 
processes of 'laying off" ships on the mould loft floor. 
There can be little doubt of the high standards 
imparted by the school or the success of its pupils, two 
of whom, E J Reed and Nathaniel Barnaby, were to reach the 
pinnacle of the profession as Chief Constructor of the 
Navy and Director of Naval Construction respectively. 
Student entry, however, was highly selective and numbers 
attending the school remained low, with the theoretical 
maximum of 16 pupils closely applied and the entry 
suspended altogether in 1850 and 1852. It is known that 
as late as August that year the government were content 
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with the progress of the school, but a change of 
administration ln late December brought the return as 
First Lord, of the old enemy of scientific branch 
expenditure ln the Service, Sir James R G Graham. 
Graham, who had been responsible for the closure of 
the first school in 1832 and for the demise of the Royal 
Naval College as an initial training establishment, was a 
keen supporter of the development of practical as opposed 
to theoretical skills, and the Central School with its 
already established reputation for producing 'Euclid boys' 
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was an early and easy target. In a tone reminiscent of 
his announcement closing the original school 30 years 
previously, Graham informed the House of Commons on 18th 
February 1853 that the second school would cease on the 
grounds of its 'not having been found to answer its 
125 purpose'. Quite what the specific shortcoming of the 
institution had been was not made clear and its demise was 
a component in a series of reductions in the scientific 
vote for that year. The school remained open until the 
four pupils of the 1851 entry had completed the course 
with the last, Samuel Willcocks, departing in February 
1855. 
The First Lord was keen to assure the House that the 
reduction in the scientific estimates would not impede the 
development of education in either the dockyard or HM 
Ships. To this end he announced that Woolley would remain 
in Admiralty employment at Portsmouth where he was charged 
with: 
the general supervision of the Dockyard School 
there; giving the Surveyor of the Navy mathematical 
suggestions in the construction of ships; selecting 
masters for the naval service from the Upper School 
at Greenwich; and supervising the education of 
Sh ' 126 young gentlemen on HM lpS. 
He was given the title 'Inspector of Dockyard Schools' and 
commenced his duties on 1 October 1853. Under Woolley's 
guidance the number and value of prizes was increased and 
the standard of entry was raised, particularly after 1857 
when apprentice candidates were examined by the Civil 
Service commissioners. 
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In 1858 Woolley was appointed an assistant 
commissioner to the Newcastle Commission investigating the 
state of popular education in England. His duties were to 
examine the provision of education in the seaman's harbour 
training ships at Portsmouth, to interview naval officers 
personally and by letter on the subject of naval education, 
and to comment on the standards of seaman's schoolmasters 
serving in the fleet. He appears to have approached these 
tasks assiduously and it is clear that his established ten-
year association with the Admiralty did little to temper 
his view about the poor state of their educational arrange-
ments. 
While generally complimentary about the voluntary 
efforts of some senior officers to organise classes for 
boys and men aboard their ships, he was scathing about 
official Admiralty provision, and in particular about the 
competence of the seaman's schoolmasters, who he felt ln 
1858 were 'generally without method and deficient in those 
qualities calculated to produce a beneficial effect moral 
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or intellectual on a ship's company'. A year later the 
Commissioners quoted Woolley's view that: 
it is hopeless to expect that either men or boys 
serving on board Her Majesty's ships will do 
anything effectively towards supplying the 
defects of early education, and acquiring the power 
and taste to spend a leisure half hour rationally 
until, as in the army, a much higher class of 
instructors has been entrusted with the duty of 
. d' . 128 directing their efforts in thlS lrectlon. 
As the principal naval inspector there can be little doubt 
that woolley's findings concerning inefficiency, 
irregularity of attendance and incompetent staff influenced 
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the Commissioners' two principal conclusions namely that 
'The organisation is inferior and the Admiralty does not 
appear to take an equal interest with the war office ln 
t ' ,,129 d promo lng lt an that 'the necessity of education for 
the Navy is acknowledged but little earnestness is 
displayed in carrying it out,.130 
In January 1860 Woolley was appointed a Vice President 
of the new Institution of Naval Architects and, with fellow 
committee member John Scott Russell soon directed the 
purposes of the new learned society towards education. The 
result was a proposal to found yet another School of Naval 
Architecture (since known as 'the third school') which was 
instituted at South Kensington under the Science and Art 
Department ln cooperation with the Council on Education. 
The Admiralty met the initial expense and the prime source 
of students was the Dockyard school system, although entry 
was not confined to those officially sponsored. The 
institution opened in November 1864 as the Royal School of 
Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering with Joseph 
Woolley as Director of Studies and Inspector General. 
Woolley held the South Kensington post until the 
School was amalgamated into the Royal Naval College 
Greenwich in 1873, but additionally in July 1864 he 
accepted the newly created post of Director of Education 
for the Admiralty. The Order in Council of the 20th of 
that month noted that he should: 
inspect periodically the educational establishments 
in Your Majesty's dockyards, in ships at the home 
ports and at the divisions of Royal Marines, who 
should examine candidates for admission into the 
Royal School of Naval Architecture, hold periodic 
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examinations of engineers and engineer students and 
further advise us upon all questions of education 
which we may from time to time think fit to refer 
t h ' 131 o 1m. 
The appointment was to date from the first of the month and 
salary and allowances amounting to £940 per annum were to 
be paid for the post. 
It will be seen that the duties outlined in the Order 
ln Council were largely an acknowledgment of the work that 
Woolley had been undertaking both at South Kensington, as a 
Government Inspector, and as an examiner for the Science 
and Art Department. The requirement to examine engineers 
was similarly already established in a Select Committee 
R t f th ' 132 epor 0 e prevlous year. Thus the title Director of 
Education for the Admiralty was, at least initially, a 
formal recognition of existing arrangements, rather than 
the creation of a new separate area of authority. 
The appointment was, nevertheless, a significant one, 
for Woolley in his various connections with the Admiralty 
since 1848 had shown himself to be a man of integrity and 
independence, more than willing to criticise the level and 
nature of educational provision ln the Service. This was 
evident both in his work for the Newcastle Commission and 
in his long campaign, in the wake of the closure of the 
Central School and in the face of opposition from the 
Surveyor of the Navy's department, to establish a school of 
naval architecture. Thus while the appointment of Director 
of Education was to some extent a reflection of the status 
quo, the choice of Woolley to undertake the task was an 
acknowledgement of a requirement for criticality and 
independence. 
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The Record of Passing Certificates reveals that the 
first Britannia examinations to be subject to external 
supervision took place on 28th July 1868 in the presence of 
the Director of Education assisted by Naval Instructors 
J H Lang and J R Harboard. 133 What their exact role 
constituted is unclear, however it apparently required the 
physical presence of Dr Woolley on board the ship and, 
despite the fact that from 1869 some 24 days per two year 
training cycle were directed to exams and that the final 
assessment consisted of at least 14 separate papers, 
Woolley was present on every occasion but one, until his 
retirement in December 1873. 134 
The appointment of an external moderator for the 
Britannia examinations was the last significant action 
pertaining to naval education by the Corry administration, 
for in December 1868 the Liberals were returned to power, 
with a reforming and controversial First Lord ln H C E 
Childers, who was to make significant changes ln both 
initial training and higher education in the Service. Thus 
the end of 1868, or more accurately the 7th January 1869 
f · . 1 . d 135 k d when the new Board's lrst Clrcu ar was lssue, mar e 
the end of a distinct phase in the evolution of young 
officers' education that had started with the decision to 
move the training ship in early 1862. 
Conclusion 
This six year period may be seen as one of modest 
general progress. There can be little doubt that by 1868 
the Britannia, moored in the physically and morally secure 
surroundings of the River Dart, with extra space provided 
in Hindostan and the establishment of shoreside medical and 
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recreational facilities, represented a considerable advance 
on her original situation at the head of Haslar Creek. 
Similarly, although it was only at an embryonic stage, the 
principle of external educational supervision was 
established and the public accountability of the ship's 
disciplinary procedures recognised, during the period. 
While none of these changes was particularly substantial 
and some, such as the decision to move to Portland seemed 
shortsighted, there can be no doubt of the Admiralty's 
desire, within clearly defined limits, to improve the 
nature and quality of officer training. 
The events of these years have received very little 
prevlous coverage and existing comment is characterised by 
selectivity and inadequate analysis. Statham, the 
principal authority, has little to say of substance for the 
years 1862-68 and his narrative lS largely concerned with 
ephemera. His failure to discuss the question of health 
and habitability aboard the ship - particularly in the 
light of Admiralty and press concern is a serlOUS omission. 
Having personally lived on the ship for 15 months during 
this period it is inconceivable that he could have been 
ignorant of the incidence of ill health, and to chronicle 
the arrival of the Britannia at Dartmouth for example, 
without mentioning that she was in the grip of a scarlet 
fever epidemic which resulted in the vessel finally being 
evacuated, must question the overall validity of his 
account. 
Conversely, there must be some scepticism about the 
accuracy of the detail that he does include, particularly 
as it pertains to punishment practice. Despite the eye 
witness style of narrative, a comparison of Statham's 
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service details and the ship's punishment books reveals 
that he could never have witnessed the scene he describes. 
It is especially unfortunate that his account should 
subsequently have been taken, uncorroborated, by at least 
four other commentators to be an accurate portrayal of 
typical punishment practice in the ship. A broader 
examination of the history of Britannia in these years 
shows that, despite the assumptions of rigorous asceticism 
and harsh discipline, in fact corporal punishment was 
extremely rare and that while living conditions were 
spartan, the training was characterised by a strong sense 
of pastoral care. 
Scrutiny of original records also dispels some of the 
myths about the nature of the syllabus in the Britannia, 
particularly the view that it was dominated by the 
acquisition of seamanship skills. Why this view should 
have prevailed is unclear, for it was virtually axiomatic 
within the Service that seamanship was best taught in 
seagoing ships - a point emphasised by the withdrawal of 
formal seamanship training from the Britannia syllabus in 
1869. While there can be no doubt that the scheme of study 
scarcely reflected a satisfactory balance of subjects and 
that History, Geography and English were largely ignored, 
it was essentially an academic course - or at least a pre-
vocational course in the guise of academic education. The 
preponderance of mathematics was thus directly related to 
the work an officer would undertake in command of a 
warship. Although it has been suggested that intellectual 
1 . 136 accomplishments always came a bad second to ath etlcs, 
the records demonstrate that to complete the Britannia 
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course, academic ability, in particular skill in 
mathematics, was the essential quality required. 
The establishment of the post of Director of 
Education for the Admiralty and his connection with the 
Britannia during the period are of considerable 
significance and have largely been misinterpreted or 
ignored. Only Statham amongst published commentators 
mentions the post and he confines comment to a factual 
account of Woolley's evidence to the Rice Committee ln 
1874. Sullivan, although he devotes similar scant 
attention to the topic, draws the conclusion that the post 
was merely a consultatory one and that Woolley 'was not 
able to initiate policy which function is implicit in the 
title Director but would merely give his opinion when 
asked for it,.137 Missing the 1868 connection between the 
Britannia and the Director of Education, he then argues 
that the lack of reference to officer education in the 
rubric of the appointment, implied that the Director had 
138 little influence in this sphere. 
The basis for this argument is particularly weak, for 
it is derived solely from Woolley's evidence to the Select 
Committee on Scientific Instruction in May 1868, which 
Sullivan summarises as: 
Woolley's evidence before the Select Committee 
confirms the consultatory nature of the post. When 
asked if he had anything to do with the education 
of cadets he replied that matters concerning them 
were referred to him if the Admiralty pleased. 
In answer to further questions he stated that he 
did not inspect the cadets, except for a special 
visit made on the Admiralty's order the previous 
139 November ... 
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While it cannot be denied that the impression given here 
was of peripheral contact with officer education, the key 
point about this evidence was that it was given at a stage 
when the post of Director of Education was less than four 
years old and still in the process of development. To 
draw conclusions on the overall nature of the role at this 
stage is premature, for just three months later the 
examination link with the Britannia was made, and in 
October 1869 Woolley was appointed to head a committee 'to 
consider and draw up a scheme of education for the naval 
d . . d' 140 an navlgatlng ca ets This report formed the basis 
of the new regulations for entry and education of Naval 
Cadets published in January 1870,141 and this committee 
was responsible for the new syllabus introduced on the 
142 15th of January of that year. From this date until his 
retirement Woolley was either a member of, or gave 
evidence to, every enquiry into the subject of officer 
education, including the investigation of higher education 
by the Shadwell Committee of 1870 and the major enquiry 
into Cadets' education by the committee headed by Rear 
Admiral E B Rice in 1875. 
\ 
Thus, far from being 'consulted as the Admiralty 
pleased', Woolley was at the centre of educational 
activity, and sullivan's assessment based on less than 
four years of a post that lasted a decade is a misplaced 
one. Perhaps, more importantly, sullivan's failure to 
take into account Woolley's work after 1868 means that not 
only does he miss the connection between the Director of 
Education and the Britannia but he also fails to recognise 
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that this external input was the start of a process which 
attempted to integrate naval education with the 
preparatory and public schools from whence the Cadet entry 
was drawn. This included, from 1869, the reintroduction 
of Latin into the entrance examination, the scrapping of 
seamanship from the Britannia syllabus, and the 
recruitment of a public schoolmaster with no previous 
Service experience to act as Chief Naval Instructor ln the 
ship. The culmination of these measures was the 
recommendation of the Rice Committee of 1875 that 'it 
would be desirable to substitute for the two year course 
on board the Britannia, a three year course at a college 
on shore,.143 
The theme of this chapter has been one of modest 
general advance in the development of initial naval 
education both in terms of the syllabus and the 
environment in which it was taught. Yet it may be argued, 
as Bonnet has, that this activity stood in stark contrast 
to the rapid progress of education in the universities, 
public schools and working men's institutes ashore during 
h . d144 t e same perlo . Similarly, considering the Royal Navy 
was the largest, most technologically advanced naval 
service in the world acclaimed, as Clowes has suggested as 
f ., 145 . t 1 b b ed that the 'Mother 0 Navles, 1 maya so e 0 serv 
its officer education system compared unfavourably with 
major competitors such as France, Russia and the United 
States, all of whom entered students at a later age, and 
gave at least some access to shore based institutions 
during training. 
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Clearly arguments such as these help to emphasise the 
relative nature of the progress. There can be no doubt 
that there were many in the Service, including those of 
high rank, who would have liked to have seen a more 
radical and enlightened approach to education and 
training. Similarly, had the financial climate been more 
favourable and the political position of the First Lord, 
both in relation to his fellow cabinet members and the 
Naval Lords, been a more autonomous one, then rapid 
progress would undoubtedly have followed. It should also 
be pointed out that, in addition to the persistent demands 
for reductions in naval expenditure, the years 1862-68 
presented naval policy makers with a series of pressures 
in areas as wide ranging as ship design, manpower policy, 
the redistribution of foreign squadrons and the usual 
requests for action from the foreign and colonial offices. 
On this crowded agenda officer training and education had 
to take its place, and it is indicative of both the 
plethora of lssues and the acute financial background that 
even measures which had the First Lord's personal support, 
such as the establishment of a naval college, did not corne 
to fruition in these years. 
Perhaps the most powerful argument to emphasise 
progress in officer education up to 1868 is to contrast 
the situation in this year with the state of training just 
over a decade before. Prior to 1857 no formalised 
training existed and young men entered the Service solely 
via the patronage of senior officers, with a subsequent 
lack of bureaucratic control over educational standards 
and numbers involved. Eleven years later the Admiralty 
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was winning the battle against patronage, and formal entry 
and education, via the Britannia, was mandatory for all, 
with failure to achieve minimum educational standards 
penalised by discharge from the Service. While the 
physical conditions in the old hulks were unsatisfactory 
and compared unfavourably with shores ide institutions, the 
regime in the ship was, for the majority of the period, an 
enlightened one. Safe in the River Dart, with medical and 
recreational facilities established ashore and her 
educational practice subject to external supervision, the 
Britannia in 1868 represented a significant advance over 
the system she replaced a little over a decade earlier. 
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Annex A 
HMS Britannia - Previous Health Record 
The choice of the Britannia as a training ship was 
perhaps a surprising one given her previous health record. 
While almost all published work cites her previous career 
as the flagship of Admiral Dundas at the bombardment of 
Sevastopol, her main claim to fame prior to the training 
ship era was less glorious. In July and August 1854 she 
was the victim of a cholera epidemic which according to 
the Navy's chief medical officer 
for the suddeness of its advent, the tempest 
violence with which it raged and the wreck 
it left behind, has surpassed anything of the 
kind in the annals of the service. l 
Out of a complement of 995 some 625 intestinal cases were 
reported of which 229 were distinguished as cholera and of 
these 139 died. The remaining crew were transferred to 
other ships, where only 22 further cases were reported, 
and her decks which were described as 'the laboratory of 
pest poisons', were washed down with chloride of zinc and 
the whole ship fumigated. Milnroy, a leading public 
health expert of the day, described the epidemic as 'the 
most memorable instance on record of the effects of 
defective ventilation' and while this diagnosis was 
incorrect, the fact that it was accepted at the time, 
would seem to make the choice of the Britannia as a 
training ship a surprising one. 
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It is also pertinent to note that HMS Trafalgar the 
second most seriously affected ship in the 1854 cholera 
outbreak, and second again to the Britannia in the 1862 
statistics for primary fever in the home fleet, was also 
chosen as a training ship in 1870 by which time she was 
almost 40 years old. Given that, by their own admission, 
medical staff knew little about the transmission of 
infectious diseases in warships, the choice of these 
particular vessels for training young officers seems 
remarkable. 
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Chapter Four 
The development of higher education and the establishment 
and early years of the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich 1869 - 1877 
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Abstract 
Chapter Four examlnes the progress of higher education from 
1869 to 1877 and accounts for the increased activity 
evident in the subject during these years. 
It identifies the factors behind the appointment of the 
Shadwell Committee to conduct the first major enquiry into 
the higher education of naval officers. In particular, it 
explains how the impetus for reform was established by an 
Admiralty administration acknowledged as one of the most 
financially retrenched of the century. 
The Shadwell recommendations are considered and their 
proposal to establish a new naval college at Portsmouth or 
Greenwich is examined. The process by which the more 
expensive, overwhelmingly less popular option was 
eventually chosen is followed in detail, and the early 
progress of the institution recounted. 
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The period 1869-1877 witnessed a quickening pace in 
the development of naval education. In these years the 
steady progress of the previous decade was transformed In 
an attempt to provide a system that would both select 
potential officers more efficiently and once entered, train 
them more effectively. For the more experienced staff 
higher education was completely overhauled in order to 
establish a system that could reflect and react to, the 
technological demands of the 'new' navy. 
Up to 1869 this task had been undertaken by the Royal 
Naval College Portsmouth which was involved in a number of 
activities ranging from mandatory courses for Lieutenants 
qualifying as gunnery officers, to offering facilities for 
voluntary study to officers on half-pay. It has been shown 
that despite modern assessments of the College as a 
'cramming' establishment, or that its work was largely 
technical training, innovative high quality work was being 
undertaken by a small but talented staff. It has also been 
noted that within College activities such as the 
examination of new entrants, training of Naval Instructors 
and examining serving officers on promotion, it was 
possible to observe an embryonic educational headquarters 
for the Service. 
By the mid l860s however, the shortcomings of this 
institution, designed in 1729 for the education of young 
boys, were becoming increasingly apparent. While it still 
saw only a fraction of the officer corps, it was over-
crowded to the extent that a proportion of students always 
had to be accommodated in the gunnery training ship 
Excellent moored in the harbour - an arrangement required 
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so frequently that it was formally recognised ln the 1862 
Queens Regulations. l The number of students also placed 
pressure on College facilities such as the Study, which was 
only available for general use after four pm each day, and 
the Library from which books were not to be removed. 2 
The fabric of the building which had been under funded for 
many years was also in a poor state and subject to frequent 
complaint - one correspondent informing the Broad Arrow in 
1871 that the rooms of the College were 'neither wind nor 
water tight' and that 'the owner of a dog of any value 
would hesitate to keep it in one of the cabins of this 
. . . ,3 lnstltutlon . 
While the material and organisational defects of the 
College in the late l860s became yearly more apparent, the 
technological development of the Service proceeded apace. 
Within five years of the launch of the first ironclad 
HMS Warrior in 1860, Britain had 30 such ships afloat, each 
succeeding class demonstrating new aspects of design 
development. By the end of 1868 the first 'mastless' 
battleship had been laid down, turret ships were under 
construction and, from the August of that year, no future 
4 
British battleship would displace less than 8000 tons. A 
comparable revolution was underway in equipment, with the 
advent of the breech-loading gun, elementary torpedoes, 
hydraulics and electric light. 
Executive officers of the Royal Navy were of course 
neither responsible for the construction of warships or the 
operation of much of the new equipment they contained. As 
'military' officers their principal responsibility was to 
'fight the ship', and in the early days of the Navy's 
technological revolution this distinction could be 
maintained - with the engineer allowed to practise his 
craft without interference or indeed curiosity by his 
executive superior. However, by the late 1860s the 
application of engineering to the central purposes of 
warships was increasing and starting to strike at the 
military function. The operation of the steam-driven gun 
turret for example, implied inter-dependence of engineer 
and executive officers and stressed the requirement for 
mutual understanding of skills. In 1869 the Admiralty 
directed that the Chief Engineer as well as the Gunnery 
Officer was to take part in the half yearly examination of 
gun mountings, and about the same period artificers were 
appointed to ships for specific gunnery engineering 
d . 5 utles. 
By 1869 the disparity between the technological status 
of the Fleet and the facilities for the higher education of 
its executive officers was considerable and increasingly 
subject to comment and criticism. In that year Blackwoods 
Magazine noted that the College was 'lamentably deficient 
in instruments, apparatus and all appliances for study' and 
argued that 'the system of instruction for senior officers 
therefore requires a careful revision,.6 In March 1871 a 
letter to The Times 7 outlined the shortcomings of the 
College and in May a correspondent to the Broad Arrow wrote 
drawing attention to 'an abode of learning which, if 
properly built and arranged might contain the means of 
instruction in every branch of our most important 
Service,.8 
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The Background to Reform. 
The process by which the consensus for reform was 
translated into action has not been subject to previous 
detailed examination. The few commmentators on higher 
education have generally been content to note the formation 
of a committee to examine the subject and its subsequent 
recommendations, that eventually led to the establishment 
of the Royal Naval College Greenwich. The lack of 
curiosity about this process is surprising on several 
counts. First, because the 1870 Committee on the Higher 
Education of Naval Officers constituted the first major 
official enquiry into naval education, ie. it was the first 
report to have 'Command Paper' status and thus be presented 
to Parliament. As such it offered an excellent summary of 
existing educational provision ln the Service and, because 
the overwhelming preponderance of its witnesses were naval 
officers, it also provided an invaluable insight into 
contemporary thinking on the subject. Secondly the 
Shadwell Report was significant because of its place in the 
overall evolution of naval education. In particular, an 
analysis of its background and recommendations helps to 
explain why the decision to examine higher education and 
inaugurate a new college, with the extensive costs 
involved, was taken by an Admiralty administration 
acknowledged as one of the most financially retrenched of 
the century. 
To explore this paradox and accurately identify the 
roots of reform, it is essential to examine the political 
background to the decisions taken in the Admiralty at the 
time. In December 1868 the Disraeli government fell and 
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the Liberals were returned to power with Gladstone as Prime 
Minister. His was a ministry committed to reform and its 
record in this field was so extensive that it has been 
suggested that during these years the foundations of the 
modern State were established. 9 Much of this reforming 
activity was concerned with the overhaul of institutions. 
Access to the Civil Service was improved with the abolition 
of patronage and the introduction of compulsory competitive 
examination. The judiciary was remodelled and simplified 
in an attempt to make it more relevant to its contemporary 
• 
duties. A third maJor area of reorganisation was the 
military, which was subject to vast and sweeping change. 
The brunt of this reform was taken by the Army whose 
organisation, heavily based on patronage and influence, 
retained a discredited reputation derived from its 
performance in the Crimean War. Against bitter opposition 
~ 
and deeply entrenched interest, a series of measures 
transformed the Army into an organisation which, while 
still unsatisfactory in some aspects, was at least capable 
of adapting and expanding to face the challenges of the 
next century. Reforming measures included the abolition of 
'commission by purchase' in the officer corps and the 
transformation of conditions of service for soldiers. 
Flogging was effectively abolished, and some regimental 
groups reorganised. Perhaps most significant was the 
establishment of a clear command structure which made the 
Commander-in-Chief subordinate to the Secretary of State, 
but in turn gave him direct supervision of all land forces, 
thus limiting the powers of Lords Lieutenant over local 
Militia. 
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Reform in the Royal Navy was less drastic and 
principally designed to reap financial savings. In this 
sense the Service had always been less politically 
contentious than the Army, and throughout the l860s both 
parties had regarded it as a major source of potential 
public saving. At the fall of the Conservatives in 1868, 
Corry, the First Lord, had been planning sizeable 
reductions in naval spending - a process that the new 
government was pleased to continue. For Gladstone the Navy 
had long been a target for economising zeal and now, at the 
head of a government whose election campaign had placed 
reduction ln public spending second only to the Irish 
question, he determined to accelerate the pace established 
by his predecessors. 
Gladstone's demeanour towards the Navy appeared in 
marked contrast to his commitment to Army reform, which he 
had always seen as part of a general reconstruction of the 
10 
mores of a 'vast, leisured and wealthy class'. His 
interest and knowledge of the Navy was limited, and he 
seldom spoke on naval affairs, other than when reviewing 
, f d't 11 questlons 0 expen 1 ure. Thus while he was keen to make 
savings and played a full part in the appropriate Cabinet 
discussions, he did not personally dominate this particular 
aspect of government activity and was usually happy to 
devolve responsibility to the individual minister 
concerned. His choice for the post of First Lord of the 
Admiralty, charged with carrying out a major reduction in 
naval expenditure, was H C E Childers. 
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Hugh Culling Eardley Childers was born in 1827 and 
educated at Cheam School and Trinity College Cambridge 
where he graduated in 1850. He married the same year and 
travelled to Australia to take up a post as Inspector of 
Schools for New South Wales. Two years later he became 
Auditor General (Chancellor of the Exchequer) of the newly 
founded state of Victoria. It was this position that 
enabled him to advance his proposal to establish the 
University of Melbourne, whose bill of foundation received 
Royal assent in February 1853, and whose first Vice 
Chancellor, Childers became. His career in administration 
prospered and he served successively as Secretary to the 
Education Department, Collector of Customs and Member for 
Portland in the State parliament. Childers' work in 
Australia provided abundant evidence of an interest in 
education. Apart from his contributions to the 
inspectorate, administration and at Melbourne University, 
it has been noted that the Melbourne Public Library and the 
State aided system of primary education owed their origins 
h ' , 12 to 1S suggest10ns. 
In 1857 he returned to England to become the Agent-
General for Victoria and entered Parliament as Liberal 
member for Pontefract in January 1860. In the House he was 
active on a number of committees and built a reputation for 
independence, regardless of the issue. Apparently 
forsaking his previous interest in education, Childers 
established a reputation for financial acumen and retained 
extensive connections in the City of London as chairman of 
the London and County Bank, deputy chairman of the Bank of 
Australasia and a board member of Credit Foncier Italian. 
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In April 1864 he was appointed Civil Lord of the Admiralty 
ln the Somerset administration - a post he held until 
August of the following year. 
This short period as a Board member enabled him to galn 
some insight into the workings of Admiralty administration. 
He accompanied the Duke of Somerset at the various 
'visitations' of dockyards at home and abroad,13 and on the 
basis of his financial expertise, took a special interest 
in the system of dockyard accounts. His principal 
contribution to Admiralty affairs during this period was 
via the Greenwich Hospital Bill - which overhauled the 
finances of the foundation by limiting admission to 
wounded, helpless and infirm seamen and paying out-pensions 
to inmates who wished to live elsewhere. This had the 
effect of extending the benefits of Hospital funds to a 
greatly increased number of men. Throughout the period as 
a Junior Lord and subsequently in his position as Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, Childers was a resolute 
supporter 'of Gladstone's policy of retrenchment, and it has 
been suggested that upon this the foundation of their 
l ' , 1" b d 14 po ltlca lntlmacy was ase. 
Thus, when the Liberals were returned to power in 
December 1868, Childers appeared to have many of the 
qualities required of a First Lord who would be directed to 
reduce Naval spending below £10 million for the first time 
in a decade. He was an established administrator with 
Admiralty and Treasury experience, and was determined to 
apply the business methods derived from his career ln 
banking. His initial Circular of 7 January 1869 gave the 
Service a fair warning of what it might expect. 
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The First Lord and the Board of Admiralty in 
accepting the charge of this Great Department, have 
undertaken that its expenditure shall be carefully 
examined and anxiously watched and controlled, with 
a view to a wise and well ordered reduction. lS 
In accordance with this, Childers set to work with 
diligence, application and what has been described as 'the 
unconcealed belief that all power over the Navy was vested 
, h' 1 ,16 ln 1m a one . A favourable international situation 
enabled him to reduce the overseas squadrons which absorbed 
a large proportion of the naval budget. His earlier 
efforts to reform the accounts of Greenwich Hospital were 
further extended with the closure of the buildings in 1869. 
Deptford and Woolwich dockyard which had been under threat 
for some years were finally shut, at what his biographer 
termed 'the cost of immense unpopularity and of the most 
violent and bitter abuse,.17 Equally unpopular was his 
reform of the system of officer promotion and retirement,18 
which made him enemies amongst a large proportion of senior 
and long serving staff. 
The most fundamental of the Childers reforms was a 
change in the constitution of the Admiralty Board itself, 
the details of which were announced within weeks of his 
appointment. The composition of members was altered, with 
the civilians now outnumbering the sea lords by four to 
three. This might have been tolerable if it had not been 
accompanied by the decision to dispense with regular Board 
meetings and insist that Naval Staff advise the First Lord 
individually. This particular philosophy was explained in 
an Order in Council of 14 January 1869 which stated that 
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The First Lord being responsible to Your Majesty 
and to Parliament for all the business of the 
Admiralty, the other members of the Board should 
act as his assistants in the transactions of the 
d t · 19 u leSe 
From this date forward any collective decision making was 
marginalised with the First Lord now deciding on all 
important matters. The result was an increase in the 
political control of the Service and the achievement of a 
level of power for the First Lord, unmatched by his 
predecessors. 
By the end of his first year in office the 
structural changes introduced by Childers had enabled him 
to fulfill his remit to drive naval spending to below £10 
million and reduce manpower by around 2000. However, the 
dockyard closures, the prospect of compulsory retirement 
and the shift in power on the Board - whose meetings 
Ch 'ld d . . d' 11 . f . ,20 h d 1 ers lsmlsse as an appa lng waste 0 tlme, a 
made him enemies at every level. Nor was there any 
evidence that, despite the attempt to apply a more 
business-like approach to the organisation, the day to 
day working of the Admiralty was made more efficient. 
Coordination between departments became more difficult 
and the capacity of individual Board members to cope with 
increasingly technical business slowly reduced. What was 
undeniable was that for better or worse, Childers had 
established an organisational structure within which all 
lines of responsibility led ultimately to himself. The 
particular relevance to this study was that it was now 
possible for a First Lord to steer through measures 
without collective decision or opposition from other 
Board members. 
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His energies were soon applied to the field of naval 
education. In August 1869 in a confidential memo to the 
First Naval Lord, he noted that the standard of 
educational provision indicated 'a most unsatisfactory 
state of things,.21 Nor was he happy that the revision 
of regulations should be a matter for discussion at Board 
level and complained that 'it is lamentable to think that 
the training of midshipmen requires all this central 
, ,22 'h' actlon. Wlt ln three months, acting only on the 
advice of Joseph Woolley and a small personally appointed 
committee, which included the headmaster of his son's 
school, the regulations for Cadets and Midshipmen issued 
in August were withdrawn and replaced. 
A matter of days after issuing revised regulations 
for young officer training, Childers appointed a 
Committee to conduct the first major review of higher 
education. Once again this appeared to have been largely 
the result of personal initiative, for there is no record 
of discussion or correspondence between Board members on 
the matter - their minutes merely noted that, in a 
meeting of 28 January 1870, it was approved that 'a 
Committee on a course of education at the Naval College 
be appointed',23 with Childers acting as sponsor for the 
item. The letters of appointment had the hallmark of his 
brusque and impatient approach, observing that 'the time 
has corne when a more thorough examination might with 
advantage be made,24 and directing the Committee to 
'enquire and report what facilities for study should be 
allowed to, and what examinations should be passed by, 
officers of different ranks,.25 
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The Shadwell Committee 
The Committee on the Higher Education of Naval 
Officers was appointed on 28 January 1870, with the remit 
to examine four particular questions: 
1st. Are sufficient facilities for study glven to 
officers of these branches of the service, and are 
they afforded at such a period in an officer's 
service when such study is most beneficial? 
2nd. By what examinations should the result of 
such study be tested, and what advantages should 
be obtained by officers who succeed in these 
examinations? 
3rd. Is it desirable to limit the place of study 
to the College at Portsmouth? In what cases 
should officers be allowed or required to reside 
ln a College? Should the public buildings be used 
only as places for examination, lectures, library? 
On this head the Committee will take into their 
consideration whether the vacant buildings at 
Greenwich could be utilised for the purposes of 
education. 
4th. Is it desirable that facilities should be 
glven to young officers to study at Cambridge, 
if the University would admit them for a limited 
26 
number of terms? 
Appointed at the head of this Cornmrnittee was Rear 
Admiral Charles F A Shadwell, an officer with an 
extensive record of active service, particularly ln the 
Far East where he had been wounded leading a landing 
party in the attack on the Taku Forts in 1859. In 
addition to this distinguished record Shadwell was also a 
recognised scholar. He had joined the Service at the 
Royal Naval College Portsmouth in 1827 and had 
volunteered to study on half pay in 1848. It was during 
this time that he developed an interest in nautical 
astronomy on which he published a number of pamphlets. 
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His distinguished contemporary, Professor J K Laughton, 
noted that 'despite his long, and in some instances, 
brilliant service, Shadwell had the temperament of a 
student rather than a warrior. ,27 By the time he was 
appointed to head the Committee he was a Fellow of the 
Royal Society of some ten years standing, and was engaged 
on a study of nautical astronomy described as 'gradually 
, 1 d' t" 28 assurnlng encyc opae lC propor lons . 
The two fellow naval officers appointed with 
Shadwell also represented the scientific dimension of the 
Service. Captain George Henry Richards was the Head of 
Hydrography Branch, and Captain A W A Hood, the Director 
of Naval Ordnance. The civilian members were led by 
Joseph Woolley, Director of Education, distinguished 
naval architect and mathematician. He was accompanied by 
Revd. Dr Alfred Barry mathematician, former public school 
headmaster and Principal of King's College London. The 
third member was Spencer P Butler, Barrister at Law, who 
had previously served as Secretary to the Royal 
Commission on Greenwich Hospital in 1860, and in a 
similar post on the Durham University Commission the 
following year. 
Their report was published in July 1870 and its 
opening paragraphs revealed that the Committee had taken 
a novel approach to establishing a starting point for 
their deliberations. Having explained various 
administrative details and summarised how evidence was 
gathered, they offered a resume of various systems of 
naval education adopted by the major maritime powers -
the United States, France and Russia. In each case the 
qualifications and method of entry into the Service were 
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outlined and the principal characteristics of the 
education of foreign naval officers, identified and 
discussed. This portrait was then juxtaposed against the 
background of British naval education and the existing 
regulations for the Royal Navy. 
It was readily apparent from this comparative study 
that the British system had a number of quite different 
and distinct features, revealing little in common with 
methods adopted by foreign powers. The United States, 
France and Russia all entered officers at a more advanced 
age - never less than 14 and often as late as 18 years 
old - compared to the British system with youngsters 
frequently joining at 12, and with an overall mean age of 
13 years. All the foreign powers trained their students 
for longer, with Russia devoting six years to the task, 
more than double the length of time employed in the Royal 
Navy. This combination of later entry and longer 
training, admitted the Committee, undoubtedly produced 
Cadets who 'were better grounded in all pertaining to 
book learning' and were 'better qualified to enter on 
more advanced studies and to improve their general and 
special education,.29 
While the committee readily acknowledged this 
superior academic training, their defence of the British 
system remained resolute. The practice in the Royal Navy 
they argued: 
ensures the obtaining a supply of young officers 
at a time when, their minds being docile and 
plastic and their habits and modes of thought yet 
unformed, they can be more easily inured to the 
peculiar habits of a sea life, be more accustomed 
to its unavoidable privations and occasional 
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hardships, be trained up in attachment to their 
profession and be induced to adopt it heartily, 
th . .. 1 . f 30 as elr vocatlon ln 1 e. 
This defence was indeed in accordance with long 
established tradition. The practice of thrusting very 
young boys into the harsh conditions of a warship, which 
would then provide a proving ground for hardiness and the 
instilling of gentlemanly qualities had always 
predominated over the more formal college entry system. 
Nt::i L11cr were the Committee interested in recommending 
change, for new entry training was outside their terms of 
reference 3l and anyway they felt the British system to be 
'in accordance with its historical recollections and ln 
unison with the general tone of professional feeling on 
h b . ,32 t e su ]ect . Thus, while the superiority of academic 
training in other navies was readily acknowledged, the 
requirement in the Royal Navy to concentrate on forging 
qualities of character and leadership in the early years 
remained, ln the Committee's view, of paramount 
importance. 
At first glance these comments appear to be a 
simple reassertion of the traditional British approach. 
However where the Shadwell Committee broke new ground was 
to place the nature of education and training in the 
context of a complete naval career. In this sense, it 
suggesteg that while the British naval experience was 
entirely appropriate to the young Cadet, it could not be 
regarded as adequate or sufficient to meet the challenges 
of the later stages of an officer's service. While the 
acknowledged superiority of foreign systems might 
preclude the need for later study, within the British 
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pattern it was of the utmost importance 
to make provision for subsequent adult education 
or professional improvement in after years, which 
under our system of early entry and limited 
training becomes very essential, and of paramount 
. 33 lmportance. 
This was an ingenious argument for a system of higher 
education. It recognised the value, and made no attempt 
to change, the traditional nature of Royal Navy initial 
training yet, by direct comparison, it suggested that 
foreign powers were producing accomplished officers 
better able to face the technological challenges of the 
future. The implication was that a two tier system would 
both preserve traditional strengths and allow standards 
to be raised. 
Thus, for the first time, an attempt was made to 
justify the necessity of higher education in an officer's 
career pattern. To some extent the provision of study 
facilities for half-pay officers at the Royal Naval 
College Portsmouth had always attempted to satisfy this 
requirement, although numbers were limited and 
arrangements frequently 'ad hoc'. Similarly the role of 
the gunnery school had been recognised as not only 
providing specialist professional training but also 
posing an academic challenge to mid-seniority officers. 
The Shadwell Report of 1870, however, marked the formal 
recognition that such higher training was not just 
desirable, but essential to meet the technical challenges 
of the future. The choice of a comparative study to 
illustrate the point also implied the necessity of higher 
training, if the Royal Navy's prominence in the 
international naval order was to be maintained. 
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The Report, having established a datum, then turned 
to examine the existing provision of 'further training' 
ie. educational activity in the Service, beyond that 
conducted in HMS Britannia. They looked initially at the 
arrangements for the instruction of Midshipmen at sea - a 
system they found to be seriously defective. The 
difficulty of attempting to educate in the demanding 
surroundings of an operational warship had long been 
recognised, and evidence offered to Shadwell suggested 
that little change had taken place in recent years. 
Under the most favourable circumstances not more than SlX 
to eight hours could be spared for instruction, and even 
that was subject to 'the numerous interruptions which are 
incidental to a young officer's life on board ship,.34 
All the evidence suggested that the present system was 
'very imperfect' and was producing a situation where 'the 
knowledge of young officers in everything but navigation 
is in inverse proportion to the time elapsed since 
I . h . ., 35 eavlng t e Brltannla . 
Regulations governing future admission to the Royal 
Naval College and an outline of likely courses of 
instruction were then given. Perhaps the most surprising 
aspect of this section was the recommendation that 'after 
officers have passed their examinations as Sub 
Lieutenants all further study for which a College might 
36 
afford them opportunities should be wholly voluntary'. 
Given the strong case made in Section Seven for the 
necessity of higher education, some form of mandatory 
element might have been expected. The Committee however 
favoured a more subtle approach, and while emphasising 
the voluntary nature of college courses recommended that, 
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for the first time, Sub-Lieutenants and Lieutenants 
should attend on full pay, with time counting for 
seniority. In this manner they hoped 
to attain the important object of inducing 
officers to go to the College when young, and at 
a period of their service when study would be 
most beneficial to themselves, and to the 
service; at the same time they have recommended 
a qualifying period of previous sea service, so as 
not to interfere more than necessary with the 
acquirement of professional experience as officers 
and seamen, during the early period of their 
37 
career. 
This was clearly an attempt to strike a balance between 
the practical and theoretical knowledge necessary to a 
naval officer and one that acknowledged the traditional 
emphasis placed on sea service in the early years of a 
career. 
A number of the existing features of the College 
were to be retained in a slightly modified form. 
Engineers, Marine and Marine Artillery officers, for 
example, were still to be admitted under the existing 
regulations. The facility for Captains and Commanders to 
study on half pay was to be retained, although in future 
they would have to demonstrate aptitude for further study 
via a preliminary examination at which 'Officers failing 
38 to pass should leave to make room for others'. It was 
envisaged that no officer of Captain's rank who had not 
previously attended the College would be admitted, and 
half-pay officers should not form more than one fifth of 
the total College complement. 
The trend in these deliberations was quite apparent. 
Some traditional features were to be retained -
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particularly the link between academic facilities and 
professional training in gunnery, and the half pay 
arrangements which allowed senior officers to compensate 
for shortcomings in their previous Service education. 
However, the Committee envisaged a shift of emphasis to a 
College that would consist largely of younger officers, 
studying full time. The proposed combination of 
voluntary attendance with the benefits of full pay and 
seniority was a deft attempt to attract talented well 
motivated students, while ensuring they were not 
penalised for their endeavour. Finally, the imposition 
of an initial examination for officers of all ranks, both 
full and half pay, ensured a minimum standard of entry, 
upon which courses of study could be based. 
The principal areas of study recommended were Steam, 
Mathematics, Higher Mathematics, Nautical Astronomy, 
Languages, Physical and Experimental Sciences, 
Fortification and Naval Architecture. Additional 
lectures were to be offered on International and Maritime 
Law, and Naval Tactics. The mandatory element was 
restricted to the practical element of the 'Steam' course 
which was to be studied by all naval students regardless 
of rank. Otherwise no more than two courses were to be 
followed at anyone time. Up to one year might be spent 
at the College in each rank although this could be 
extended a further six months by special recommendation. 
The Committee was particularly keen to emphasise that any 
officer wishing to advance his knowledge beyond the 
limits of the set course, should be encouraged to do so, 
if College facilities permitted. 
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It will be readily apparent that the proposed 
curriculum indicated a conception of higher education 
exclusively and narrowly technical, devised with the 
objective of achieving a practical improvement in 
professional knowledge. Where Chemistry was to be 
studied, for example, it was to explore sheathing and 
anti-fouling compositions for ships' hulls. Nautical 
Astronomy featured magnetism as it related to compass 
correction, the use of instruments for celestial 
navigation and the study of weather. Fortification was 
the obvious corollary of gunnery. Even the study of 
foreign languages, by which the Committee actually meant 
French for naval officers and the possibility of German 
for Marines, was seen as the acquisition of a practical 
skill. To this end they suggested that it would be 'very 
advantageous to the public service if under suitable 
regulations, officers should be permitted to visit 
foreign countries for the purposes of studying their 
39 languages'. 
Later sections of the Report dealt briefly with 
administrative arrangements and the provision of 
equipment and future academic staffing levels within the 
College. This area again emphasised the modest nature of 
the Committee's proposals which, while acknowledging that 
numbers would be determined by the Admiralty, suggested 
that 60-70 students should be the basis for future 
calculations. This they argued would imply a full-time 
teaching staff of nine, to comprise 1 Professor, 1 
Assistant Professor, 2 Mathematical Assistants, 1 
Permanent French Master, 2 Practical Instructors in 
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Steam, 1 Instructor in Fortification and 1 Instructor ln 
Naval Architecture. Additionally a naval officer 
competent in marine surveying was to be appointed to 
teach 'the use of instruments' and to run the College 
observatory. The general working of the College would be 
supervised by an educational board, consisting of the 
Professor and principal members of the academic staff but 
would work under a senior naval officer acting as 
Superintendent of the establishment. 
It will be noted that these proposals differed 
little from the existing arrangements at the Royal Naval 
College Portsmouth, which had been commanded by a Captain 
Superintendent since its reorganisation in 1839. The 
proposed staffing levels were much the same and the 
number of students envisaged did not represent a dramatic 
increase. In the three decades since its inception more 
than 2500 officers had studied at Portsmouth, giving a 
mean yearly attendance of more than 80 students. Even 
when the numbers attending the much maligned Mates course 
were discounted, the College saw an average 44 students 
annually, with the majority attending on half-pay. Thus 
the intention for the new institution to teach between 60 
and 70 students per year hardly represented a drastic 
expanslon. Neither could such capacity begin to cater 
for more than a fraction of an officer corps, whose 
active list in January 1870 consisted of nearly 300 
Captains, over 400 Commanders and in excess of one 
. t 40 thousand Lieutenants and Sub Lleutenan s. 
The final sections of the Report dealt with a 
possible future site for a College. Although at the 
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outset the Committee had been specifically directed to 
consider 'whether the vacant buildings at Greenwich could 
be utilised for the purposes of education',41 they were 
unable to reach a decision. While arguing that such a 
question should be 'decided almost exclusively by the 
abstract consideration of the best interests of the 
College and the service',42 they failed to agree on a 
designated site and instead offered a summary of the 
respective arguments for the Portsmouth and Greenwich 
locations. The issue, in fact, divided the Committee, 
with the naval staff 'unanimously and stro~gly in favour 
of retaining and improving the existing Naval College at 
Portsmouth,43 and the civilian element equally resolute 
in favour of the conversion of Greenwich Hospital into an 
educational institution. 
The respective arguments were to some extent 
indicative of a general difference in philosophy towards 
the purposes of higher education in the Service. The 
naval lobby saw the essential element as the practical 
application of improved knowledge, and to this end 
Portsmouth was, they felt, the ideal choice. It was only 
in the Dockyard, it was argued, that the relationship 
between higher study and its practical consequences might 
be observed. Only at Portsmouth could officers 
study all improvements and can witness all trials 
and experiments that take place from time to time. 
They have access to all the factories and 
workshops; they have the opportunity of visiting 
and inspectinif~foreign vessels of war calling at 
the port. They are in constant contact with the 
service afloat, and with the society of Naval 
officers of all ranks, which necessarily elicits 
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much professional discussion of a useful and 
. . I h 44 crltlca c aracter. 
It is implicit in this argument that higher education was 
principally a form of vocational training. The naval 
members of the Committee were content to argue that it 
was not the primary aim to make naval officers 'able 
mathematicians or scientific experts', but rather to 
assist them in 'acquiring varied knowledge, which they 
can afterwards utilise and employ for the benefit of the 
bl . ., 45 pu lC serVlce . 
Predictably, the case for Greenwich was argued from 
a different angle. The belief here was that the first 
and essential requirement for a new college was the high 
quality and superior character of the teaching staff. 
The vicinity of London, 'which 1S the real scientific 
university of the kingdom',46 offered significant 
advantages, for it would be possible to obtain 'lectures 
and practical instruction by gentlemen eminent in the 
scientific and literary world which would be quite 
unavailable at the distance of portsmouth,.47 The 
civilian members foresaw the establishment of an academic 
community at Greenwich, with the Hospital quarters being 
used as residences by distinguished staff, and thus a 
higher standard of teaching being provided at a similar 
or lower cost than the south coast alternative. Further, 
the ancient connections with the Royal Navy, which dated 
from the mid seventeenth century and were epitomised in 
the magnificent Painted Hall of the Hospital, were seen 
as entirely appropriate to a seat of naval learning. 
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The utilitarian argument was not completely 
dismissed from the Greenwich case but was interpreted ln 
a rather wider context. The Thames and Medway, it was 
claimed, actually offered superior facilities for the 
study of naval architecture, ship building and stearn, and 
further the proximity of the Royal Artillery and Royal 
Engineers at Woolwich, Chatham and Shoeburyness gave 
special facilities for the study of gunnery, torpedoes 
and field fortification. The London site thus offered a 
unique opportunity for inter-disciplinary study and the 
facility for naval officers to mix socially and 
professionaly with 'scientific civilians and the 
, t'f' f h 48 SClen 1 lC corps 0 t e army'. It was thus envisaged 
that students studying at the new College would derive 
positive benefits from associating with the wider 
scientific community offered by the capital city. 
No consensus was achieved and the matter was 
referred to the Admiralty Board for a decision. The 
relative advantages of the two sites were advanced in a 
constructive and considered manner and, depending upon 
the particular perspective applied to higher education ln 
the Service, both had their merits. What was quite 
clear, however, was that while the issue divided the 
Committee nicely along service/civilian lines, the case 
for Greenwich was not based on any substantial oplnlon 
expressed by witnesses. Of the 16 persons examined only 
two supported the Greenwich case and of the 56 written 
submissions only five were in favour and some positively 
hostile to relocation. Many considered Portsmouth 'self 
evidently superior' and 'better for obvious reasons', 
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with one senior officer 'greatly surprised that a proposal to 
move the Naval College should ever seriously have been 
49 
made'. In the light of subsequent events, it is important 
to stress that such views were common, and while the case for 
both sites was presented as a fine balance, Greenwich was 
overwhelmingly less popular with those giving evidence. 
It was also considerably more expensive - a point that 
supporters of the Greenwich case were always prepared to 
concede. No estimates are included in the Report, but a note 
of the disparity between the respective sets of running costs 
is included in personal papers of Rear Admiral Tarleton, 
appointed Second Naval Lord in May 1872. 50 Here it was 
recorded that the annual cost of the College at Portsmouth 
over the previous years had averaged some £6,785 per annum, 
while the expenditure for running a higher education 
establishment at Greenwich was estimated to be in excess of 
51 £31,000 per annum. Even when the costs of Portsmouth and 
the School of Naval Architecture at South Kensington were 
combined, the Greenwich option was more than three times more 
expensive. Thus a move to the old Hospital was not only less 
popular with the Shadwell witnesses, but would represent, at 
a time of stringent naval economy, a considerable increase in 
the scientific vote. 
The Shadwell Report was clearly an important land-
mark in the evolution and development of education in the 
Royal Navy_ It was the first systematic, detailed 
examination of the subject and it ingeniously established a 
place for higher study, while simultaneously 
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acknowledging the value of the existing training process. 
Its concept of all higher education being followed on a 
voluntary basis without penalty was equally adept, for it 
encouraged the talented and motivated, and neatly side-
stepped the problems inherent in a compulsory attendance 
system. For the first time the Committee acknowledged the 
impossibility of achieving adequate levels of training and 
education on board operational warships, and its proposal 
::l' • h . I 52 to G1SpenSe Wlt sea gOlng Nava Instructors was formal 
recognition of low standards of professionalism over many 
years. Credit should also be given to the Committee's 
views on language training, which while rather narrowly 
conceived, did make provision for foreign travel on full 
pay in furtherance of study. Similarly the view that for 
exceptional officers 'opportunities should be given to 
resort to Universities or other places of higher education 
53 at horne and abroad' represented a considerable advance 
ln educational philosophy. 
Despite these positive qualities the majority of 
the Shadwell proposals were essentially conservative 
and relatively limited in scope. It will be apparent, for 
example, that there was a considerable disparity between 
the rhetoric urging the necessity and importance of higher 
study, and the actual measures recommended for its imple-
mentation. While the Committee advanced their 'hope that 
the renovated Naval College may infuse new scientific vigour 
into the service',54 their proposal for an institution 
employing just ten staff and a population of between 60 
and 70 students, differed very little from existing 
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arrangements. Neither could such an institution be anything 
other than tangential to an officer corps whose executive 
branch numbered several thousand and whose civil element, 
particularly in the engineering specialisation, was bound to 
increase in the future. 
It is also clear that while the civilians on the 
Committee - Woolley, Butler and Barry - had some reservations 
about the courses becoming overly technical, the members 
generally had a very narrow concept of the work that a future 
College might undertake. Their proposed syllabus differed 
little from the existing curriculum and each main subject was 
established and justified on the strict vocational 
requirements of the officer corps. While the lectures on 
international law and naval tactics were a welcome addition, 
they did not imply the recognition of a need for broader or 
more liberal study. Indeed, in this area the Committee were 
particularly defensive - emphasising the requirement for an 
A~~iralty approved text book which would both guide officers 
and warn of matters upon which 'doubtful views and unaccepted 
decisions still prevail,.55 Of even wider study - war 
operations, strategy or the history of naval campaigns there 
was no mention, and the concept of a war college, where 
military problems might be discussed in an intellectual and 
open manner, did not form any part of the deliberations. For 
the Shadwell Comittee, the purposes of higher education in 
the Service remained exclusively and narrowly technical. 
That this should have been so was hardly surprising when 
the background and experience of the witnesses are 
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considered, for although the membership of the Committee 
was split equally between civilians and serving officers, 
the preponderance of evidence was provided by naval 
personnel. Of the 16 people giving oral testimony, all 
but two were in the Service and more than three quarters of 
these had connections, either as staff or student, with the 
Royal Naval College, Portsmouth. Only two civilians were 
called - E J Reed and Thomas Main, both of whom had close 
links with existing arrangements as Chief Constructor of the 
Navy and Principal of the College, respectively. Thus, while 
all witnesses were interviewed at length, with 21 seSSlons 
producing more than 70,000 words of evidence, it is important 
to recognise that the catchment was both restricted and 
always likely to support the status quo. 
Similar reservations must be made about the other 
method of enquiry adopted by the Committee which was Vla 
a Circular, inviting comment upon a number of specific 
questions relating to the subject of naval education. 
First the background of those responding was arguably 
even more exclusive than those giving oral evidence, for 
all were naval staff and no views were cited from 
officers below the rank of Commander. Of the 56 
respondents, 49 were Captains or above and this included 
the views of some 12 Admirals. While some did have an 
established previous interest in the subject, the 
principal characteristic of the group appeared to be 
little more than their seniority in the Service. In some 
cases this was considerable indeed, - Admiral Sir Henry 
Codrington had joined the Royal Navy in 1823 and his 
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colleague Sir Frederick Grey in 1819, - decades before the 
advent of the training ship or the advent of any higher 
education in the Service. Indeed, by a calculation based on 
seniority, none of the 49 senior staff could have been the 
product of the existing initial education system that 
provided the foundation to higher study. While obviously not 
disqualifying them from comment, it hardly seemed a 
satisfactory basis for shaping future provision, particularly 
when the views of early Britannia students - by this time 
mostly mid seniority Lieutenants, remained unheard. 
The second point to make about this method concerns the 
nature of the Circular, which was restricted to posing twelve 
questions relevant to higher education. While this obviously 
limited the scope of the response, most of the enquiries were 
reasonably open ended and did provide the opportunity for 
those interested to comment at length. However, few 
apparently chose to do so for the abstract reveals a number 
of questions unanswered and responses often limited to a 
simple yes or no. The final request to 'favour the Committee 
with any other observations you may wish to offer' also 
failed to produce extensive testimony, and was ignored 
56 
altogether by 16 of the 56 correspondents. 
There are thus important methodological reservations to 
be made about the work of Shadwell. The membership of the 
Committee, with its blend of officers responsible for new 
technology and civilians including an academic, a university 
administrator and the Director of Education was both 
appropriate and imaginatively conceived. 
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However, their information gathering process was much 
less so. The overwhelming preponderance of naval 
witnesses, many of whom were extremely senior, with no 
obvious competence in the field of higher education, 
inevitably presented a highly restricted, vocationally 
orientated view of further study. Similarly the method 
of interviewing ln depth a small number while eliciting 
testimony, via a modest questionnaire, from a larger yet 
even more exclusive group, did nothing to widen the 
perspective. In this sense once the method was adopted, 
the result was inevitable. Consequently, any broadening 
of the perspective, as in the case for the relocation of 
the College to Greenwich, tended to be argued in spite 
of, rather than because of, the evidence offered. 
Response to Shadwell 
The Shadwell Report was issued on 8th July 1870. It 
was presented to the House of Commons in June the 
following year and a motion for its adoption was proposed 
by the naval writer and Liberal member for Hastings, 
Thomas Brassey. He was to become a noted authority on 
naval affairs, serving subsequently as civil lord of the 
Admiralty, parliamentary secretary to the Admiralty Board 
1884-85, and holding the presidency of the Institution of 
Naval Architects. Brassey believed the Shadwell 
recommendations to be both wise and judicious and, with 
the exception of the early age of entry which meant that 
young officers were 'deprived of the opportunity of 
pursuing their studies in the public schools of 
England',57 urged their full adoption. He was a vigorous 
supporter of maintaining the existing College at 
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Portsmouth which he foresaw as a great naval university 
providing 'a real fusion between the Merchant Marine and 
th I ., 58 e nava serVlce. The institution, he thought, 
should be empowered to confer degrees and investigate all 
branches of science which 'were important to the naval 
. t f . ,59 pOln 0 Vlew. 
Replying for the government the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, George Goschen, acknowledged the subject to be 
one of great importance but claimed that his limited 
experience in the past precluded him from making detailed 
comment on the Shadwell recommendations. He assured the 
House that the Report would receive the careful attention 
of the Admiralty and urged members not to press the 
matter to a division. There were only two further 
speakers - Sir John Hay reiterating the view that a 
public school education should not be denied to 
prospective young officers, and Captain Egerton who 
outlined the traditional argument about the danger of 
naval education becoming 'too theoretical'. On the 
assurance that the Shadwell Committee's recommendations 
would receive full consideration the motion was withdrawn 
without a decision and the session concluded. 
The short debate was the sum total of parliamentary 
discussion for, with the exception of a short exchange in 
60 . f the House of Lords , there was no further discusslon 0 
Shadwell, and its findings were consigned to internal 
Admiralty administration. This proved to be no more 
forthcoming, for although the Report was submitted in 
July 1870, it was more than two years before the 
announcement that a new naval college would be funded, 
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and the Order in Council authorising its establishment 
was only finally issued in January 1873. 61 
The brief, and in some ways less-than-satisfactory, 
parliamentary debate and the subsequent silence from the 
Admiralty proved a source of frustration to the Service 
press, which throughout 1871 and 1872 found naval 
education and apparent Admiralty inaction on the subject, 
a matter for comment. The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution reported debates on preliminary and 
higher education of naval officers in March and June 1871 
. 1 62 respectlve y. The following month the Naval Chronicle, 
reviewing the current state of naval education declared 
'how a subject of such importance should not have been 
ttl d 1 . tt f ., 63 se e ong ago lS a rna er 0 surprlse In a 
similar veln in January 1872 the United Service Magazine 
noted of naval education that 'the time to deal with this 
question, as with the matter of naval administration, ln 
a firm and satisfactory manner, has arrived. 64 
Several factors are relevant to Admiralty conduct at 
this time, and go some way to explaining the dilatory 
nature of the administrative process. Perhaps the prime 
consideration is that by the time of the parliamentary 
debate the original architect of naval educational 
reform, H C E Childers, had left office - forced to 
resign following the loss of the experimental battle-ship 
HMS Captain, which capsized and sank with the loss of 481 
lives, including his son Midshipman Leonard Childers, ln 
September 1870. This catastrophe threw into sharp focus 
the lines of responsibility that had been the hallmark of 
the Childers' administration. He had been an avid 
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supporter of the experimental turret ship concept and 
despite reservations expressed by a number of experts 
about the stability of the Captain, Childers had taken 
the final decision to send her to sea. The formal 
responsibility for her loss was thus placed at his door 
and, in the midst of acrimony and dispute, he eventually 
resigned from office in March 1871. 
with Childers' personal advocacy of naval education 
and his capacity to take the initiative 
rather than indulge in collective discussion removed, the 
progress of reform lost some of its initial impetus. His 
successor George Goschen, who assumed the office of First 
Lord in March 1871 was a wise and skilful administrator 
but had no previous experience of naval affairs and was 
forced to depend on an almost totally new Board. 
Unfortunately his arrival coincided with a series of 
incidents that embroiled him in controversy and further 
shook public confidence in Admiralty administration. 
Within months of taking office the battleship Agincourt, 
then the largest British warship afloat, was negligently 
stranded in broad daylight and clear weather on Pearl 
Rock, Gibraltar. In June the troopship Magaera was run 
aground and found to be unseaworthy - an incident that 
provoked a storm of protest concerning the condition in 
which the Admiralty allowed ships to proceed to sea. 
During 1871 and 1872 Goschen was subjected to a series of 
difficulties including the dockyard closures at Woolwich 
and Deptford, which caused considerable hardship to an 
already impoverished area. Throughout this baptism of 
fire Goschen remained under persistent pressure from 
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Gladstone to make economies in a budget that could 
scarcely stand further reduction. 
The cursory nature of the Commons debate on the 
Shadwell proposals, and the First Lord's tentative and 
cautious approach to their implementation, are thus 
partly explained by a wider perspective of Admiralty 
affairs during the period. Childers' retirement 
inevitably removed some urgency from the reform process 
and his successor under a series of pressures, not least 
from his leader, was attempting to deal with a difficult 
and crowded agenda. Yet while these factors may help to 
explain some administrative delay, they cast no light on 
why, in the face of overwhelming naval opposition, the 
final decision was taken to found the new College at 
Greenwich, or indeed why, at a time of unparallelled 
naval economy, this more expensive option should receive 
government support. 
Contemporary evidence suggests a general concern for 
the fate of the empty Greenwich Hospital itself. The 
buildings, which included the Painted Hall where Nelson 
lay in state after Trafalgar, had been designed initially 
by Wren 'for the safe retreat and public maintenance of 
. f ,65 Th men who have kept watch over publ1c sa ety... ey 
had housed almost 3000 pensioners in the years after the 
Napoleonic Wars and this number had been maintained until 
the 1850s. The declining roll thereafter prompted a 
Royal Commission of 1860 to suggest a number of reforms 
which were incorporated into the Greenwich Hospital 
Act of 1865 which allowed inmates to opt for out-
pensions. Further inducements to leave were offered 
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in 1869, and in October of that year the last pensioners 
were transferred to an infirmary and the buildings were 
closed. 
The future of this magnificent site was widely 
discussed in the Service press. Within a month of closure 
the Naval Chronicle suggested that the site 'might be 
advantageously turned to the purposes of a sort of Naval 
Hampton Court',66 where veteran officers might be afforded 
grace and favour apartments. In April of the following 
year the United Service Magazine lamented the fact that 
this beautiful and well known range of buildings had been 
67 
rendered empty and desolate, and stressed that legal 
considerations attached to the charitable foundation would 
limit their future use. The Naval Chronicle took up the 
theme in 1871 stressing that the Hospital was the property 
'not of the Nation but of the Navy' and declared that 
whatever the essential fate, the institution must remain 
'h' h S ' 68 Wlt ln t e erVlce. 
While there were few detailed proposals, the most 
popular view in the press was that the empty establishment 
should be put to some academic use within the Service. 
This was understandable for the original institution and 
surrounding area had always had a naval educational 
dimension. As early as 1712 a small mathematical school 
had been established for the sons of pensioners. From 
1828 this occupied the buildings of the Queens House in 
Greenwich Park with the title the Royal Hospital School. 
In 1833 a similar establishment had been established at 
Camberwell and in 1840 moved to a new site within view of 
69 " the Hospital at New Cross. Proposals ln varl0US 
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newspapers between 1869 and 1872 included converting the 
site into a school for the sons of naval officers, 
founding a shore based alternative to HMS Britannia, 
establishing a naval staff college and making Greenwich 
the new home of higher education in the Service. 
An association of the site with education, at least 
1n the public mind, appears to have arisen partly from a 
combination of historical precedent and partly via a 
simple process of confluence - the longer the buildings 
remained unoccupied and the longer the question of a new 
college remained unresolved, the more the two issues 
became associated. A Broad Arrow editorial of November 
1871, urging conversion of the Hospital to a college 
epitomised the view thus 'it is a scandal not to use 1n 
some national manner such a national monument as Greenwich 
Hospital ... There is a house and someone must be got to 
I , , " 70 1ve 1n lt . There 1S no evidence, however, that such 
observations had any effect on the decision, for the 
existing administration had closed the buildings, 
specifically upon economic grounds, and with their pursuit 
of naval economy undiminished and a cheaper option 
available at Portsmouth, they were unlikely to be swayed 
by sentiment. 
A closer examination of the political background and 
in particular the relationship of the Prime Minister with 
his own constituency, reveals a rather different and 
darker logic. Gladstone had been elected for one of the 
two seats at Greenwich in 1868, although the fact that he 
had been placed second he described as 'more like a defeat 
than a victory, although it places me in parliament 
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. , 71 
agaln. This was the start of a difficult relationship 
with the town, not least because the effects of the naval 
retrenchment, so close to the Gladstonian cause, devolved 
to a significant degree on his own constituents. The 
closure not only of Greenwich Hospital, but also of 
Woolwich and Deptford dockyards in the same year, had 
produced considerable local unemployment and discontent, 
to which Gladstone remained oddly unsympathetic - it being 
noted that 'none of the interest in the unemployed which 
he had shown in Lancashire in the 1860s was bestowed on 
the dockyard workers who had lost their jobs,.72 
It was almost three years before Gladstone could be 
persuaded to address local voters and it was a prospect 
that he approached with some trepidation. His Cabinet 
notes reveal that on 27 October 1871 he invited 
'contributions and cautions,73 as to the forthcoming 
constitutency speech at Blackheath. What his notes do not 
reveal is that in response to this request, he received a 
letter from George Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
who shared his leader's concern about 'what I should say 
in your place as to the discharge of Government workmen ln 
Woolwich and Greenwich, if I had the unenviable task of 
addressing a Greenwich audience,.74 Goschen suggested 
that Gladstone should employ the 'usual' arguments about 
the national need for reduction in government 
establishments, but acknowledged that 'I am unable to see 
. h' t' 75 how you can satisfy local feellng on t e pOln . 
However, in his concluding paragraphs he offered 
Gladstone a potential lifeline: 
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There may be one local argument in suggesting 
that ... if certain establishments are closed 
others will be opening up and indeed already there 
is a considerable record of employment [?] at 
Greenwich. As to the Hospital (Greenwich Hospital) 
I think I cannot do better than repeat what you 
said to the deputation,76 going a little further 
and saying you hoped the Hospital would be utilised 
to become an object of great interest to the 
country ... 
You may, I think speak as to some decision on this, 
as I feel sure that if I can obtain your consent 
and that of the Cabinet a great scheme can be 
carried out in the way of naval education ... 
I am [lost ?] at having no better ideas to give 
you but I am fairly [floored ?].77 
Gladstone's speech, delivered the next day to an 
audience of several thousand, including a large and 
hostile element, fully incorporated Goschen's suggested 
mollification of his constituents: 
Of your local interests, gentlemen, strictly so 
called, I will now say but one word, because it 
refers to a point at which, as a matter of fact, 
they touch upon a national subject. I mean with 
respect to the noble hospital at Greenwich. I had 
the honour of stating to an important deputation 
of your townsmen, formed without any distinction 
of political opinions, the views with which Her 
Majesty's Government would approach the considera-
tion of the questions connected with that truly 
national building. Since that time the matter has 
had the careful attention of my right honourable 
friend the First Lord of the Admiralty; and I am 
sanguine in the belief that, when his plans are 
matured, you will find that it will be, as I 
hope, in our power to apply the hospital to a 
purpose which will be satisfactory to you and to 
the country. Nor do I despair even of this, that 
it may be a purpose - though it would be premature 
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to express a positive opinion - that it may also 
be a purpose, which will revive and renew the 
traditions of the glorious profession with which 
from the first it has been connected. 78 
Nothing more of local interest was included and having 
offered this sop to local feeling and effectively quashed 
initial heckling and interruption, Gladstone spoke on a 
series of national issues for a further two hours, ln what 
has been described as one of his greatest oratorical 
79 
efforts. 
The matter was subsequently discussed in Cabinet with 
Gladstone's diary entry for 30 January 1872 noting 
'Greenwich Hospital to be made centre of naval 
education',80 although he took no further interest ln the 
scheme and did not speak in the constituency again until 
the next election, some two years later. The expediency 
of the decision however was clearly of some concern to the 
political members of the Admiralty Board who, throughout 
1872, demonstrated an evasive and disingenuous approach to 
the subject when pressed in the House. For example, on 
13th March a small committee led by the Second Naval Lord 
was appointed specifically 'to consider and arrange the 
details of the Establishment of Greenwich Hospital for 
d ., 81 e ucatl0n . Yet in the House of Lords on 3rd May the 
Earl of Camperdown, who was a member of that committee, 
while acknowledging that there was a growing opinion that 
Greenwich was the more suitable site, emphatically denied 
that the choice of location had been settled. Under heavy 
pressure from the Portsmouth lobby he concluded the debate 
with the assurance that the matter was 'still under the 
consideration of the First Lord of the Admiralty,.82 
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More obfuscation followed in August in a late night 
sitting on the Naval Estimates, within which the costs of 
establishing the College were included. The fact that 
this discussion had been long delayed may itself have been 
a political ploy - certainly the Broad Arrow thought so, 
commenting that 'the postponement of the Naval Estimates 
until the fag end of the session is no doubt a very 
. t th d f . d' f 11 d' . 83 convenlen me 0 0 aVOl lng u lSCUSSlon' and that 
it was 'now a favourite course with the Admiralty,.84 
Whether this was so or not, Goschen's claim in the debate 
that he had been informed that 'after careful estimates 
£10,000 would cover the whole transformation of 
Greenwich',8S did not accord with the findings of his own 
[Tarleton] Committee which reported confidentially on 29th 
June, that more than three times this amount would be 
required. 86 'The whole matter' concluded the Broad Arrow, 
, . h . f . . ,87 teems Wlt Clrcumstances 0 grave SUsplclon 
Sir James Elphinstone, one of the members for 
Portsmouth and a rigorous supporter of retaining the 
College in the dockyard, forced a division, claiming that 
opting for Greenwich was 'a political ruse for the purpose 
of doing something for that constituencY',88 and that the 
Vote for 'New Works, Buildings, Machinery and Repairs', 
within which the new college was included, be reduced by 
£10,000. Government support held firm, however, and the 
amendment was rejected by 99 to 64. Thus the 
establishment of the educational institution in the 
splendid surroundings of Greenwich Hospital, which had 
been determined privately between the Prime Minister and 
his First Lord some ten months previously, was finally 
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assured. 
The fact that, as the United Service Magazine bluntly 
commented 'there are few naval officers who, if consulted, 
would not unhesitatingly give Portsmouth the preference,89 
and that the decision to do otherwise was 'unquestionably 
due to the fact that the Prime Minister is member for 
Greenwich,90 did not of course disqualify the many 
arguments in its favour. The location close to the 
capital meant that it could attract high quality staff and 
there were increased opportunities for contact with a 
wider scientific community. Perhaps most significantly 
the vast range of empty wards and offices ln the Hospital, 
which at its peak had accommodated more than 2000 men, 
offered considerable potential to expand the modest 
proposals of the Shadwell Committee - particularly ln 
terms of the numbers of staff and students. 
This was certainly the view of the Tarleton Committee 
when it reported on the preliminary arrangements for the 
new college in June 1872. Although the members - Admiral 
Tarleton, the Earl of Camperdown, Joseph Woolley and the 
Director of Works for the Admiralty, Colonel Clarke -
noted they had considered the Shadwell findings and had 
d ' 91 taken 'further evidence on the subjects referre to us , 
no details were given and the report was presented in the 
form of a list of recommen~ations. Nevertheless there 
were a number of significant differences from the modest 
proposals offered by the earlier committee - the principal 
one being the incorporation of the School of Naval 
Architecture at South Kensington into the new Royal Naval 
College. 
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This presumably helped to justify the proposed 
increase in the number of students from the 60-70 foreseen 
by Shadwell to at least 200. In addition to Royal Naval 
personnel the group also foresaw the possibility of 
extending the entry to private students and officers of 
the Mercantile Marine. 92 Almost every class of entry was 
to be expanded, with the number of officers studying on 
half pay increasing from 23 to 75 and Engineers, who were 
in the minority at Portsmouth, forming the next largest 
group. Teaching staff were also to be increased, with 
Tarleton predicting a requirement for 27 permanent members 
composed of civilian professors, lecturers and serving 
officers. Unlike the Portsmouth college, whose 
Superintendent was also commanding officer of the gunnery 
ship, the new establishment was to have 'an Officer of not 
lower rank than that of Rear Admiral,93 to be appointed 
President. 
With the prospect of increased numbers went a serles 
of recommendations to extend the various terms of study. 
Sub Lieutenants who had previously attended for between 
six weeks and three months were now to spend six months at 
the College, and Royal Marine Lieutenants had their study 
extended to 18 months. One of the most significant 
changes applied to Engineers, many of whom at this stage 
received an exclusively practical course of instruction in 
the dockyards, before proceeding directly to sea. While 
it was keen to avoid any implied criticism, the Committee 
felt that with 'the complicated structure of our modern 
iron ships, and the valuable machinery distributed over 
them, we are of opinion that a wider and more general 
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knowledge is required,.94 H f th f ence or , a ter SlX years In 
the dockyard all Engineers would proceed to Greenwich for 
a one year course prior to a final examination. 
The Report concluded with a review of ancilliary 
arrangements, noting that the 'Naval Models' from South 
Kensington would be removed to Greenwich, that the 
Observatory belonging to Greenwich Hospital School would 
be available for the use of students, and that further 
laboratories would be fitted in the brewhouse. 95 For 
practical instruction in steam it would be necessary to 
attach a small steam vessel to the new establishment. The 
Committee were keen that 'no pecuniary obstacles should be 
placed in the way of Officers availing themselves of the 
advantages of studying at Greenwich' ,96 and to this end 
they recommended the granting of 'furnished quarters, 
fire, lights, attendance and an allowance of 2s. 6d a 
d ,97 ay . Nevertheless, the careful social distinctions 
between the various classes of officer were upheld with 
the recommendation that Commissioned Officers and Acting 
Sub Lieutenants should dine in the upper portion of the 
Painted Hall, while Acting Assistant Engineers and 
Students of Naval Architecture should use the rooms 
98 
underneath. 
In the context of the overall history of naval 
education the first Tarleton Report was a modest 
contribution, amounting to less than 20 pages, and 
containing little explanation or illustration of its 
recommendations. It was, of course, classified 
'Confidential', for internal use within the Admiralty, and 
because its purpose, to investigate the detailed 
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establishment of the new college, had yet to become public 
knowledge, it was limited in the extent of evidence it 
could take. Nevertheless, while clearly a corollary to 
the Shadwell Report, it also represented a significant 
advance over the original 1870 proposals particularly ln 
terms of the numbers and background of students, and the 
nature of the curriculum. Safe in the knowledge that the 
political imperative to move to Greenwich had been 
established the Committee, which included two members of 
the Admiralty Board, could afford to take a broader, more 
expansive view of the future of higher education. 
Given that the work of Tarleton was essentially 
procedural and that its remit 'to consider and arrange the 
Establishment at Greenwich Hospital for the Education of 
99 Officers in the Royal Navy' was clearly stated on its 
openlng page, accounts of the Committee's work have been 
subject to a surprising degree of misinterpretation. The 
principal view has been that it was formed to provide 
further adjudication on the respective merits of the 
Portsmouth and Greenwich sites, upon which Shadwell had 
been unable to agree. Lloyd states 
Service opinion was divided upon the advisability 
of the move, the First Lord, Childers decided the 
matter by setting up another Committee this time 
under Admiral J W Tarleton 100 
Dawson supports this view, noting that 'as opinion was 
divided a second committee was appointed under Admiral 
Tarleton,.lOl Sullivan envisages a similar role, claiming 
that the purpose of the Committee was 'to survey the 
buildings at Greenwich and make recommendations as to how 
102 
they should be used'. 
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The Royal Naval College Greenwich ~a larger more liberal 
institution deliberately segregated from the practical 
environment that most officers considered essential ... ' IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
In fact not one of these statements is accurate, as 
recourse to the original document confirms. Having been 
commissioned on 13th March 1872, the responsible First 
Lord was not Childers, who had retired 12 months 
previously, but his successor George Goschen. Neither was 
its task to consider the relative merits of the two sites 
- for a decision had been taken on that in Cabinet the 
previous January. The key point to make about Tarleton 
was that it was not adjudicatory, nor was its task to 
investigate and recommend a future purpose for the 
buildings of the Hospital, but rather it was to consider 
the detail required to implement a decision already taken 
to establish the new college therein. 
The Royal Naval College, Greenwich 
Having submitted a first report ln June 1872 the 
Committee was immediately reappointed to consider detailed 
regulations for the admission of students. They reported 
in December and their findings were incorporated in a 
series of Orders in Council promulgated in January and 
February 1873. The earliest, which formally announced the 
establishment of the College on 16th January, noted 
the object of securing by bringing together in 
one establishment all the necessary means for 
affording to Officers and others connected with 
Your Majesty's Navy ... the highest possible 
scientific instruction in all branches of 
f . 103 study bearing upon their pro eSSlon. 
This was further expanded in an Admiralty Circular of 30th 
January which predicted that the college would become 'a 
nucleus of mathematical and mechanical science especially 
devoted to those branches of scientific investigation of 
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t ' 104 mos 1nterest to the Navy', although it offered the 
reassurance to the traditionalists that this was to be 
'without prejudicing the all important practical training 
in active duties,.lOS Further regulations for the 
admission of students were included and the College opened 
for study on 1st February 1873. 
In accordance with the Tarleton recommendations the 
new college population represented a considerable 
expansion over existing facilities at Portsmouth. By 
December 1873 the student element comprised some 13 
Captains and Commanders, 51 Lieutenants, 20 Acting Sub 
Lieutenants, 13 Royal Marine Young Officers and more than 
40 Engineers of various ranks. The initial Order in 
Council had envisaged Professors in five disciplines -
Mathematics, Physical Science, Chemistry, Applied 
Mechanics and Fortification, but the register of 
professional staff revealed that by the end of 1873, a 
further 14 teaching appointments at various grades had 
been made. l06 The academic staff were led by a 
distinguished mathematician recruited from the University 
of London, Dr T Archer Hirst FRS. 
The first Admiral-President was Sir Astley Cooper-Key 
FRS, a noted sailor-scholar and a future First Sea Lord. 
He was a former Superintendent of the old College where, 
as a student, he had served in every rank. Cooper-Key had 
progressed swiftly up the promotion ladder and had always 
associated himself with the new technology at a time when 
107 h' 
service 1n stearn ships was much disparaged. T 1S 
record, and his established personal interest in officer 
education, seemed to make him an ideal choice for the new 
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post as President especially, as his biographer noted, 
since his experience with the active portion of the 
Service would 'command its confidence and [to] prevent any 
sentiment of the theoretical branch being separated from 
the active and the practical,.108 
Yet the suitability of Cooper-Key was more apparent 
than real. His memoirs, for example, reveal that he did 
not want the appointment and would have preferred a sea-
going command. In a letter to the First Lord in April 
1872 he stressed that the post of Admiral President was 
'not a position that I should have sought for or that I 
consider myself fitted ... ' and he asked Goschen 'not to 
think me ungracious if I say that I accept your offer 
109 
reluctantly'. This was no token politeness, for 
Cooper-Key's evidence to the Shadwell Committee in 1870 
revealed him to be a vigorous opponent of Greenwich. Not 
only did he think the location unsuitable but his stated 
belief that 'it is unadvisable and would be of no use to 
1 b d f ff ' ,110 attempt to educate highly the who e 0 y 0 0 lcers , 
was at odds with the wider, more liberal approach that the 
move to Greenwich implied. For Cooper-Key it was 
sufficient that the profession should be 'nine tenths 
staffed by practical men, good seamen with very little 
knowledge of what might be called book learning' - the 
remaining one tenth 'must be this and more highly educated 
, III 
men • 
It is important to stress that the view of a more 
limited institution, adjacent to the naval dockyard which 
would accept a restricted entry of officers, was not 
untypical - as the preponderance of naval evidence to 
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Shadwell demonstrated. So general was naval feeling on 
the subject, that many senlor officers intimately involved 
with the establishment of the Royal Naval College 
Greenwich, were on record as favouring the Portsmouth 
alternative. Not only was the first President 'in this 
category but so was his successor Admiral E G Fanshawe. 
Among other opponents were Admiral Tarleton who had headed 
the Committee establishing the College at Greenwich, 
Admiral Shadwell who was to become its third President and 
two original members of the Greenwich professional staff, 
J K Laughton and J B Harboard. The fact that Goschen was 
forced to depend on a number of individuals so obviously 
out of sympathy with the location and philosopy of the new 
college, was a further indication of the dominant 
political element in the decision to move to Greenwich. 
The early years of the College saw an increase in 
numbers of both staff and students. In 1874 additional 
instructors in Mathematics (2), French and Navigation and 
Nautical Astronomy were appointed, and the following year 
an Assistant Professorship was established in the Physics 
112 department. Additionally in 1875, an instructor ln 
Mechanical Engineering was appointed, and practical 
facilities for the study of steam were established with 
the transfer from Portsmouth of the gunboat Arrow and the 
old instructional tender Bee. 113 Not only were numbers 
increased but the entry profile was widened to include 
private students, officers from overseas navies and, in 
accordance with the Tarleton recommendations, the first 
'Admiralty Pupils selected by Competitive Examination from 
among the Apprentices in Her Majesty's Dockyards' who were 
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admitted under regulations promulgated in December 
1873. 114 
Despite his original reservations, Cooper-Key appears 
to have approached his new task with energy and 
enthusiasm. Colomb notes that by persistent efforts he 
overcame economic objections to the building of 
recreational and sports facilities within the college,llS 
and requests to the Admiralty resulted in facilities at 
Greenwich Hospital School including the Observatory and 
the Gymnasium, being offered to naval students. 116 
Nevertheless correspondence with the Admiralty also 
recorded some disparity between the Board and the Admiral 
President as to the nature and purpose of the 
establishment. Cooper-Key's initial reservations about 
maintaining discipline at the College 'in consequence of 
the quasi-civil character of the appointments of its 
officers' were quickly dismisssed by the Board, who 'did 
, . 117 
not anticipate any difficulty will be experlenced'. 
Neither were they prepared to accede to Cooper-Key's 
request that all officers should wear uniform while 
118 
studying at the College, or his proposal that separate 
educational records for officers should be maintained 
within the establishment. 119 
A persistent difficulty ln the opening years was to 
persuade the Admiralty to countenance spending on the 
special course of additional lectures recommended by the 
Tarleton Committee in 1872. While the sum total increased 
rapidly from 18 in 1873/74, to 66 the following year and 
91 in 1876,120 these lectures were frequently given 
without payment, by existing members of staff. 
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Despite the Tarleton recommendation that a permanent 
lecturer ln Naval History and Tactics be appointed, and 
that the subject should be compulsory for all naval 
officers, no such position was created. It was not until 
the 1875/76 session, after continued pressure from Cooper 
Key, that J K Laughton, an existing member of the 
mathematics department, was authorised to give six history 
lectures per year. 
Contemporary assessments of the early years of the 
College are sparse. No official report of its activities 
was rendered until the autumn of 1876 121 and this 
submission was largely confined to factual detail of staff 
and students, with very little comment. Generally the 
Service press, having been bitterly critical of the 
original decision to go to Greenwich, were supportive 
towards the new institution. The Naval Chronicle for 
example noted that 'a really statesmanlike liberality 
marks the efforts of the government to render the College 
of real benefit to the service,122 and in October 1874 a 
Broad Arrow editorial admitted no words for the College 
'but that of congratulation derived equally from its past 
successes and its future prospects,.123 
Nevertheless it is possible to detect within the 
Press a concern about the progress of the institution and 
the need for a formal review. In 1876 a Naval History of 
Our Times article identified two principal sources of 
complaint - that the number of instructional staff was 
insufficient, and that the severity of the examinations 
was resulting in officers who had spent considerable 
periods at sea having little time to attune themselves to 
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study and hence 'failing to reach the required point they 
are dismissed the Service, however good they may be in 
seamanship and gunnery,.124 Th B d A e roa rrow supported 
this, claiming that 'during the past two years the 
constant complaints cropping up, either in the Press or 
Parliament, to the effect that officers had been expelled 
from the Service,.125 
The Ccrdon Report. 
The result was that, ln addition to instructing the 
College to submit its own First Annual Report in September 
1876, in the same month the Admiralty appointed an 
external Committee, under the Revd. Osborne Gordon, to 
examine the various courses of study, the complement and 
remuneration of teaching staff and the conduct of 
examinations at Greenwich. Gordon was a former Censor of 
Christ Church, Oxford with considerable experience as a 
Civil Service and Army examiner and as a Parliamentary 
Commissioner. He was assisted by fellow academic 
H A Morgan from Jesus College, Cambridge and two senior 
administrators - R R W Lingen, Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury and J F Donelly, Director of the Science and Art 
Department. The Broad Arrow noted these appointments 
approvingly, claiming that the names of the Committee 
members alone 'are a sufficient guarantee that the enquiry 
would be conducted in an independent spirit, and that it 
h 'ft ' 126 would be neither narrow nor SlY · 
The Gordon Committee was appointed on 29th September 
1876 and examined 17 witnesses, all of whom were 
intimately connected with the Royal Naval College, 
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Greenwich. In contrast to Shadwell, whose evidence was 
gathered from a limited catchment of senior officers, this 
Committee examined a broader cross section from the 
College. This ranged from the Admiral President and his 
Director of Studies, to seven young Lieutenants and Sub 
Lieutenants who were studying, or had recently qualified, 
at Greenwich. The report, issued on 24th March 1877, was 
presented in eight sections - four dealing with staff, 
students, lectures and 'additional subjects', three with 
the remuneration of staff, examiners, and administrative 
support, and the last chapter constituting a summary of 
recommendations. 
It opened with a consideration of the various 
classes of students, and asked whether the existing 
courses of study and the arrangement of staff were 
appropriate. It was felt that the student body fell into 
three distinct groups. Class A consisted of Lieutenants 
qualifying as gunnery officers, several classes of 
engineers and naval architects and probationary officers 
of the Royal Marine Artillery. Although this was a 
somewhat disparate grouping, the one common factor was 
that they were all studying to the most advanced levels 
offered, and were following 'fixed and compulsory courses 
of study, arranged with reference to the duration of the 
session,.127 The Committee were satisfied with this 
group, whose work was characterised by diligence and 
application, and they concluded there was 'very little 
deficient either in the quantity or quality of the higher 
instruction' and that they had not met a student who was 
not 'perfectly satisfied with the assistance he 
. d' 128 recelve • 
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Class B were officers of various branches who had 
chosen to attend the College voluntarily and thus were 
part of a long and thriving tradition established at 
Portsmouth in 1829. The importance of 'half pay study' 
had been recognised by both Shadwell and Tarleton, and 
when the new College was established, provision was made 
to increase the number of places in this category. The 
Gordon Committee made clear, however, that these 
expectations had not been fulfilled. Of the 25 vacancies 
for Captains and Commanders only SlX had been filled in 
1875, two the following year and nine in 1877. While the 
number of Lieutenants was more buoyant, it had never 
reached its theoretical capacity and the class of 1877 was 
the lowest for three years. Not only were numbers low, 
but attendance was poor - the half pay Lieutenants course 
examined by Gordon averaging some 30 hours absence per 100 
hours instruction. In these circumstances the Committee 
concluded 'it is quite clear that a good deal of the time 
of the instructors and the money of the country, must be 
129 
spent to no purpose'. 
By far the most unsatisfactory group, however, were 
the third category of students - acting Sub Lieutenants 
sent to the College to complete the education they had 
begun five or six years previously in the Britannia. The 
level of this course was not advanced, for the examination 
papers were virtually identical to the ones set in the 
training ship130 and the students were thus merely 
required, in the view of the Committee, to recapitulate at 
the age of 20 or 21 what they had learnt when they were 
15. Despite the fact they were studying full time at the 
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College on a six month course, significant numbers were 
unable to complete the course without resorting to private 
tutors, often at considerable expense, in order to pass. 
Several factors were evident in these low rates of 
attainment, but the principal one appeared to be the 
disparity in student ability on entry to the College. 
While they had all demonstrated their competence prior to 
passing out of the Britannia, the intervening five years 
had seen young officers posted to a number of different 
ships, where educational facilities varied considerably. 
A Cadet posted to a flagship for example would be 
virtually guaranteed the services of a naval instructor, 
while those going to smaller vessels might spend the whole 
of their sea time without access to further study. The 
result was that by the time, as Sub Lieutenants, these 
officers arrived at Greenwich, the less fortunate, who had 
been denied instruction, had often forgotten all they had 
learnt. The College practice of entering Sub Lieutenants 
in irregular numbers, at varlous stages throughout the 
session, and without any form of ability grouplng, did 
little to alleviate the short comings of the weaker 
candidates. 
This problem was, in the view of Gordon, outside the 
power of the Greenwich authorities to solve, for it 
depended upon making improvements in the training process 
earlier in an officer's career. This in fact had already 
happened and the Sub Lieutenants examined by Gordon, as 
they acknowledged, were the products of a system that had 
been superceded. These improvements constituted an 
overhaul of the Britannia course which reduced the number 
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of subjects studied, and the introduction of periodic 
examinations afloat, for young officers in sea going 
ships. The combination of these two measures, argued the 
President of the College Admiral Fanshawe, would 'do away 
to a great extent with the extreme ignorance of some who 
h ,131 carne ere . 
The Report then briefly examined the staffing 
situation at the College and, although the remit was 
simply to consider the remuneration of academic staff, 
they allowed themselves some brief but significant 
observations about the place of higher education in the 
Royal Navy. In particular, they called for an advancement 
of the status of the College within the Service, arguing 
that it was 
desirable to remove, as far as possible from the 
minds of executive officers of the Royal Navy, who 
are under instruction in it, the impression that 
I 
they are simply going through on shore the same 
sort of instruction as they might have been going 
through under a naval instructor in a ship of war. 
The youngest of them are men to whom the idea of 
going back to school again must be naturally 
repulsive. 
A new approach, argued the Committee, was needed 
so that the Naval College might stand to the Britannia, 
as the universities stood to the public schools. 
This was all the more important in a Service 
establishment which could not be 'governed by those 
who teach, or by those who are drawn from the teaching 
132 h' to occupy body' and must have teachers w 0 appear 
a secondary place in precedence, in salary, ln 
133 power'. Such difficult conditions required an 
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academic staff of 'strong men to hold their own', and the 
Committee affirmed that under T Archer Hirst's leadership, 
such a situation prevailed. 
It was not within the terms of reference of the 
Committee to examine the course of study for the various 
classes of officers, but they were asked to consider what 
might be taught under the category 'additional subjects' 
and what courses of study might be delivered beyond those 
given hy the permanent staff. In doing so, they did in 
fact comment generally on the overall nature of the College 
curriculum. While no issue was taken with the view that 
the central core of College teaching should be 
mathematical, the Committee argued that the task of the 
establishment should be seen as two-fold. The primary aim 
was 'to increase the technical knowledge and skill of naval 
officers', and the secondary aim to cultivate 'their 
general intelligence, to improve their aptitude for the 
various duties which a naval officer is called upon to 
perform,.134 To this end, while fully supporting 'an 
intelligent apprehension of the principles on which the 
technical rules of the profession are founded,l35 Gordon 
felt that, for more senior courses in particular, a wider 
field of study, possibly encompassing physics, applied 
mechanics, modern languages, history, political geography 
and international law, might be pursued. 
Very little of the broader philosophical discussion 
about the future purpose of the college, the nature of its 
curriculum and its place in the Service was distilled into 
firm recommendation. Although the Committee listed some 35 
measures which they felt would improve the conduct of the 
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establishment, these were almost totally administrative in 
• 
nature and dealt principally with pay and the appointment 
of teaching staff, modified arrangements for the conduct of 
examinations and measures to ensure regular student 
attendance. While in a sense this was disappointing, it is 
important to emphasise that it was fully in accordance with 
the Committee's original remit, which was not to examine 
the overall efficiency of the establishment, but to 
consioer specific aspects of teaching and administration. 
Thus it may be argued that the principal value of the 
Gordon Committee to an understanding of the overall 
development of naval education lay, not in its 
recommendations, but in the wider picture of the College 
that its deliberations provided. While Lloyd has argued 
that this merely amounted to 'an unflattering light on the 
educational standards of the daY',136 this seems too 
sweeping a dismissal. 
There can be no doubt that the standards of the 
largest group, the Sub Lieutenants, remained low, although 
lack of diligence and a heavy reliance on private tutors 
was a traditional characteristic of such officers. 
T J Main, Professor at the Royal Naval College, Portsmouth, 
had complained to the 1870 Shadwell Committee that the 
institution was condemned to spending its time preparing 
backward Sub Lieutenants for their examinations noting that 
d ' 137 the students 'come to us to pass, not to be educate . 
The evidence offered to Gordon suggested that this problem 
remained unresolved, and an independent contemporary 
commentator observed that, despite official discouragement, 
about half the Sub Lieutenants entering the College in 
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1877 were employing private tutors. 138 The problem of 
course, lay not with Greenwich but with the inadequacy of 
the education process prior to the students' arrival - ln 
particular the five year period spent at sea after passing 
out of HMS Britannia. Here all the traditional problems of 
attempting education at sea - inadequate numbers and poor 
• 
standards of instruction, uneven provision and a general 
conflict between the study process and the demands of an 
operational warship remained in abundance. Until they were 
resolved, no modification of courses at the Greenwich 
career point could be effective. 
In most other areas the first four years of the new 
College saw considerable improvement. The overall number 
of students - some 200 studying at anyone time -
represented a three-fold increase over numbers at 
Portsmouth and the profile was widened considerably. By 
1877 the College was welcoming not only private civilian 
students but also the first officers sent from foreign 
navies, Japan, China and Denmark, to study at Greenwich. 
Perhaps the most significant addition to the student body 
was from within the Royal Navy itself, with the arrival of 
the Assistant and Acting Assistant Engineers who previously 
had been subject to largely practical training. They soon 
constituted the second largest group, after the Sub 
Lieutenants, undertaking compulsory courses and, unlike 
their military counterparts, they were noted for particular 
diligence. While the pertaining social niceties condemed 
them to separate messing facilities, their presence in 
significant numbers was indicative of a trend towards 
methodical, disciplined instruction essential to the 
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operation of the new technology. 
Similar improvements applied to the teaching staff and 
the prediction first advanced in the Shadwell Report, that 
higher quality teaching would result by establishing at 
Greenwich, appeared to be fulfilled. An American academic, 
Professor James Soley, directed by the United States 
government to report on the British system of naval 
education, noted that the Greenwich staff were 'chiefly 
Cambridge men of high university standing eminently fitted 
to carry out the purposes of the college,.139 Of T Archer 
Hirst, the Director of Studies, he noted that he was 'one 
of those rare instances of the harmonious union of a 
profound student and an efficient organiser' 140 By 1877 
the permanent complement comprised some 31 teaching staff, 
including six Professors, two Assistant Professors and a 
mixture of naval and civilian lecturers. A further six 
academic staff were appointed on a yearly basis, which with 
visiting lecturers and support staff brought the total 
involved in training in that year to 50 - more than five 
times the number involved at Portsmouth. 
To support this level of activity, annual expenditure 
on the higher education of officers was considerably 
increased, and the £31,000 per annum envisaged by the, 
Tarleton Committee was soon exceeded, with more than twice 
this amount allocated in the financial year 1873-74, and an 
average expenditure on the College of £45,000 for the 
following three years. 14l By 1877 this was supporting what 
Soley described as 'a well appointed professional college' 
on a site which 'seemed to fit it peculiary for a training 
place of naval officers,.142 In addition to the model 
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collection and the Observatory, now transferred from 
Greenwich Hospital School, the range of laboratories 
constructed since 1873 were 'especially well appointed, 
having been furnished with everything required for the 
advanced study of physics and chemistry, with the greatest 
care and at very considerable expense,.143 
Conclusion 
A general comparison of the Portsmouth institution ln 
1869 and the Royal Naval College Greenwich eight years 
later, provides a dramatic contrast, and helps to 
illustrate the extent of the development of higher 
education over the period. An examination of the process 
that produced this change however reveals that it was far 
from a simple or straight forward one. In particular it 
dispels the notion that the technological advances in ship 
design and weapons development that characterised the Royal 
Navy's industrial revolution from 1860 were followed 
swiftly and inevitably by changes in the higher education 
of its officers. It is apparent rather that for more than 
ten years after the launching of the first iron clad 
battleship, the advanced training of executive officers was 
characterised by a small, under-funded establishment 
attempting to train a token number of officers via a 
dedicated, talented but ultimately inadequate staff. 
While it is possible to detect an increasing inter 
dependence between executive and technical officers during 
the l860s, and a general consensus in the Service press 
that higher education should be overhauled, it is clear 
that the key element in initiating change was the 
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appointment of the Shadwell Committee, undertaken by 
H C E Childers. Modern assessments of his short 
administration have been almost totally hostile, with much 
emphasis placed on Childers' disinclination to accept 
advice, and his blunt and offensive manner. His taste for 
interfering in strictly naval matters and the triumph of 
the political over the professional dimension in Admiralty 
affairs that his reorganisation of the Board structure 
precipitated, have produced similar adverse comment. Yet, 
while these activities won him few friends amongst naval or 
civilian staff, there can be little doubt that a number of 
his reforms, including the reorganisation of the dockyards, 
the scheme of compulsory retirement and the enquiry into 
the higher education of naval officers were both perceptive 
and long overdue. 
Indeed it may be argued that Childers' single 
mindedness and indifference to personal unpopularity were 
important ingredients in the method of reform. The fact 
that he established an autocratic structure with all lines 
of responsibility leading to his office, undoubtedly 
allowed the subject of naval education to be moved up the 
agenda. While previous First Lords, notably Somerset and 
Corry, had occasionally expressed interest in the subject -
the former particularly keen to establish a shores ide 
college for Cadets in the early 1860s, they had never seen 
it as a matter for personal initiative. The Childers' 
approach, which dispensed with collective discussion and 
allowed the First Lord unparallelled freedom, meant that 
matters in which he was personally interested, including ln 
this case education, could be awarded a precedence unknown 
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under the old system. 
The Shadwell Report was clearly a significant document 
in a number of respects, not least because in recognising 
the values inherent in the British system of officer 
training - early age entry, and the rigorous environment 
designed to instill hardiness and ascetism, it also 
established that a return to full time academic study was a 
natural corollary. Henceforward, higher education was not 
an addendum to the training process, but an integral part 
of it. Although the Shadwell Committee felt initially that 
this might be undertaken without compulsion - a view which 
the performance of voluntary students at Greenwich later 
brought into question, they did establish that pay and 
seniority should not be penalised for academic endeavour. 
From 1870 onwards, higher education was seen not merely as 
desirable, but as a routine component in an officers' 
career. 
It has been noted that a gap exsisted between the 
rhetoric of the Shadwell Report and its recommendations. 
To some extent this was inevitable given the view of those 
examined, who were predominantly senior serving officers 
with a narrow technically orientated view of the purposes 
that advanced study might serve. On the basis of the 
evidence offered it was hardly surprising that, while 
acknowledging the importance of higher education, the 
Committee's concept should amount to little more than an 
extension of the existing College, with similar numbers of 
students and staff, and no wider purpose to training. 
Nevertheless, it was clear that some form of College 
training now commanded the support of even the most 
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conservative of officers. While most were content to see 
the institution as an adjunct to the dockyard - indeed few 
could understand its value in any other location, it was 
apparent that the antipathy to formal academic training 
evident in the l830s and 40s, had now gone. 
That the future of naval higher education should by 
1873 be invested in a very different, larger more liberal 
institution, deliberately segregated from the practical 
environment that most officers considered essential, has 
not previously been satisfactorily explained. Callender's 
view that if the Portsmouth site had been chosen 'it 
would have been necessary to spend hundreds of thousands of 
pounds on the erection of buildings',144 1S not supported 
by the evidence. Indeed, it was a cardinal point of the 
Portsmouth case that no such new work was required and that 
the existing defects of the building 'could be remedied by 
145 
refitting and remodelling the interior of the College' 
at minimal expense. Nor is there any substance in 
Sullivan's view that 'Greenwich Hospital was available for 
occupation at little cost,146 - for even the Greenwich 
lobby within the Shadwell Committee acknowledged that this 
was a much more expensive option. 147 This was confirmed by 
Sir John Tarleton's investigation,148 and retrospective 
costings cited in the Gordon Report show the annual cost of 
the new establishment to be more than ten times the 
149 Portsmouth yearly budget. 
Interpretation of the two and a half year interval 
between the issue of the Shadwell Report and the opening of 
the new College has been similarly confused. Several 
commentators, including Lloyd, sullivan and Dawson, have 
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attributed the delay to a division within Shadwell as to 
the more suitable site, and the need to appoint a second 
working party, the Tarleton Committee, to arbitrate on the 
matter. It has been shown, however, that this was not the 
Committee's task and that the decision had been taken, and 
the new Admiral President briefed, by the time this group 
was established. The purpose of Tarleton was thus not to 
adjudicate, but to carry out a confidential, detailed 
investigation of how the new College should be founded on 
the Greenwich site. 
It is, in fact, impossible to explain either the 
delay, or the eventual Admiralty decision, without further 
reference to the wider political background of the period. 
Within this, Childers' personal advocacy of educational 
reform has been shown as paramount and his resignation in 
March 1871 undoubtedly removed much of the impetus behind 
the implementation of Shadwell. His successor's early 
months in office were some of the most difficult of any 
First Lord in the second half of the nineteenth century and 
were unlikely to bring forward an issue which had 
previously held such a low priority. All the available 
evidence suggests that the Shadwell Report was in fact, 
shelved, and that it attracted no consideration by the 
Admiralty from its issue in July 1870 until Greenwich 
Hospital was offered as a political gambit by Goschen to 
his leader in October the following year. Similarly, 
while within the Report the case for Greenwich was 
cogently argued on sound educational grounds with an 
emphasis on a more liberal establishment with high 
quality teaching, deliberately segregated from the 
naval environment, there is no evidence that a 
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consideration of these factors formed any part of the 
decision. 
Subsequent government behaviour confirmed the 
expedient nature of the decision and was characterised by a 
pattern of obfuscation and deceit - illustrated in 
particular by the persistent public assurance that the 
matter was still unresolved, many months after a final 
Cabinet decision had been taken, and a Committee appointed 
to implement the details. The postponement of discussion 
on the matter until the very end of the Parliamentary 
session and the allocation of obscure sums of money in late 
night discussions also contributed to the view, widely held 
in the Service press, that the move to Greenwich was 
nothing more than a 'job'. 
The irony was that, in the light of subsequent naval 
developments, the decision to move was undoubtedly the 
correct one on a number of counts. Only at Greenwich, for 
example, was the institution capable of expanding to accept 
increased numbers of staff and students, and only on this 
site was space available to incorporate the School of Naval 
Architecture, whose amalgamation allowed shipwrights, 
engineers and executive officers to study alongside each 
other. Although it was not fully recognised at this stage, 
the buildings of the old Hospital afforded the potential to 
found an establishment of a size and stature that would 
suitably reflect the expanding Royal Navy of the last two 
decades of the century. 
It was quite clear that, even at its inauguration in 
February 1873, the College represented a larger and more 
. 
complex organisation, with greater numbers of staff, 
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students and courses than had been envisaged in the 
Shadwell Report. Much credit for this must be given to the 
Tarleton Committee who, although their remit was to 
consider the fine detail of the arrangements for the new 
College, produced a much expanded view of what the new 
institution might achieve. It should also be noted that ln 
some respects this exceeded the plans that eventually came 
to fruition. It was recommended by Tarleton, for example, 
that a permanent lecturer should be appointed to teach 
Naval History and Tactics and that this should be a 
compulsory subject for naval students. Other 
recommendations included the appointment of a Natural 
History and Botany lecturer, and a teacher of Hygiene -
although neither of these posts was filled by 1878. 
Had the Tarleton recommendations been fully 
implemented they would have undoubtedly helped to deflect 
much of the criticism that in conception the new College 
, 1 . 1 d 1 h' 1,150 d th t was exc USlve y an narrow y tec nlca an a 'no 
education was given which tended to broaden the mind or 
develop the powers of informed judgement' .151 At face 
value both these criticisms have some substance, yet in 
terms of the educational progress of the Service they take 
no account of the substantial relative improvement that the 
decision to move to Greenwich had achieved. For most naval 
officers who favoured a smaller institution within the 
naval arsenal, teaching practically based courses to a 
fraction of the officer corps, the new College was already 
more liberal than they expected or believed necessary. 
In this respect the relatively slow progress of the 
new institution, and in particular the tardy approach of 
the management towards a wider curriculum via paid external 
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lecturers in the numerous 'additional subjects' recommended 
by Shadwell, may be placed in context. Quite simply while 
the leadership and management of the institution lay in the 
hands of men like Cooper-Key, Fanshawe and Shadwell, all of 
whom had supported an even narrower concept of higher 
education, progress would inevitably be slow. Indeed, it 
was not until the arrival of Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton in 
1891, that an officer who had previously declared himself 
in favour of Greenwich, became Admiral President. While 
the undoubtedly talented civilian academic staff could have 
played a part in widening the curriculum they were 
destined, as the Gordon Report made clear, 'to occupy a 
d 1 · d . 1 . I 152 secon ary pace ln prece ence, ln sa ary, ln power. 
Within a military heirarchy the College could only develop 
at a pace dictated by the Navy and, as the Shadwell survey 
of serving officers made clear, this was inevtiably 
conservative and pedestrian in nature. 
By 1877 the initial transformation of the Royal Navy's 
higher education system was complete. This change was the 
product of a complex series of events in which bureaucratic 
overhaul, personal initiative and political expediency were 
intricately woven into the proper requirement for change. 
Despite justifiable criticisms of a technical and 
vocational bias, higher training was undoubtedly of a scale 
and nature that could not have been foreseen a decade 
previously, and while initial progress was slow and the 
distinction between the determination and the application 
of policy was rigidly upheld by the Admiralty, by 1877 the 
College had established the conditions that would enable it 
to react to the naval revolution of the last decade of the 
century. 
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Chapter Five 
The fortunes of HMS Britannia 1869 - 1877 
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Abstract 
This Chapter considers the fortunes of HMS Britannia 
from January 1869 until December 1877. It examines the 
contribution of the Childers' administration with respect 
to Cadets' training, and outlines the work of the 
previously unconsidered Woolley Committee responsible for 
devising a new curriculum for the ship. 
The deliberations of the first maJor Committee to 
examine standards in the Britannia - the Rice Committee -
are examined in detail and the validity of their findings 
1S contested. The subsequent fate of their recommendation 
to establish a naval college ashore is pursued and existing 
assessments of government conduct in the matter are 
challenged. 
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The Work of H C E Childers and Joseph Woolley 
The advent of a Liberal government in December 1868 
and in particular the appointment of H C E Childers as 
First Lord, saw the introduction of a series of measures to 
reform not only officers' higher education but also the 
training and education conducted in HMS Britannia. 
Considerable progress had been made since the ship's 
arrival at Dartmouth in the autumn of 1863. Sick quarters 
had been built ashore, sports fields constructed and a 
beach established where ships' boats might be recovered and 
launched. Despite these improvements it has been shown 
that aspects of life in the Britannia ln the 1860s 
continued to attract criticism. The nature and extent of 
corporal punishment for example had been the subject of a 
parliamentary question in 1867 and had led to the early 
reappointment of the commanding officer. Statistical 
returns from the Medical Director General continued to cite 
long sick lists from the ship, which were characterised by 
persistent outbreaks of scarlet fever and smallpox. There 
had also been adverse comment in the Service press 
concerning the lack of external moderation for the 
education and examinations carried out on board. 
To his credit the previous First Lord H T L Corry had 
attempted to deal assiduously with these problems. The 
practice of corporal punishment, which has been shown was 
never prevalent in the early years of the ship, was 
abolished altogether in July 1867. In the same year it was 
decided that the existing Britannia, which had been laid 
down in 1813 and launched ln 1829, should be paid off and a 
later, more commodious, ship found to replace her. Corry 
320 
was also sensitive to criticism of the educational routine 
and his Director of Education, Joseph Woolley, was 
dispatched to Dartmouth to enquire into the syllabus and 
assessment procedure, with the result that in 1868, the 
conduct of all examinations in the ship became his 
reponsibility. 
Yet despite Corry's undoubted diligence the arrival of 
the Childers' administration initiated a quickening in the 
pace of change. The new ship, for example, which had been 
promised as early as June 1867 became a reality within SlX 
months of Childers' arrival at the Admiralty. The 131 gun 
Prince of Wales had been laid down as a first rate wooden 
battleship in 1848 and was launched in 1860 by which time, 
despite the addition of an 800 HP engine, she was obsolete. 
At 3186 tons she was larger than her predecessor and had 
been originally designed for a complement of 1100 men. The 
ship was renamed Britannia and with the Hindostan served as 
the horne of officer training until the advent of a College 
ashore in 1905. 
The arrival of the new ship was closely followed by 
the framing of new regulations for the entry and examina-
tion of Cadets published on 3rd August 1869. 1 These 
applied to candidates who would sit the entrance examina-
tion In the following November and, if successful would 
join the Service on 15th January 1870. Apart from the 
2 
mlnor modifications of February 1865 the rules governing 
entry had remained unchanged for almost a decade and, in 
the spirit of the new reforming administration, the 1869 
regulations represented not only a modification to training 
and education, but also an attempt to grapple with more 
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fundamental manpower problems within the Service 
These changes included the narrowing of the age limits 
for entrance which from June 1870 were to be 'not less than 
12 or above 13 years of age,.3 The Britannia course was to 
be extended to a full two years, followed by a further 12 
months in a sea going training ship. In addition to the 
usual birth and health certificates candidates were now 
required to produce evidence of good conduct 'from the 
masters of any schools at which they may have been educated 
. h' h' , 4 Wlt ln t e prevlous two years. The entrance examination 
was still to be conducted at the Royal Naval College, 
Portsmouth but as with the Britannia examinations, the test 
was now under the direct supervision of the Admiralty 
Director of Education. 5 
The most radical change, however, applied to the 
number of candidates who on completion of the initial 
examination would be permitted to enter the Service. Until 
the advent of the nineteenth century, with the exception of 
those who attended the Naval Academy, the selection of 
recruits lay not with the Admiralty but with individual 
commanding officers, prepared to take young gentlemen and 
train them for the Lieutenant's exam. By 1857 the 
development of an Admiralty bureaucracy which sought to 
control quality and numbers had made deep inroads into this 
vested interest via entrance examinations, medical 
screening and the pattern of education and training 
implicit in the training ship. Yet despite these advances, 
even by 1869, candidates permitted to sit the entrance exam 
were still the 'nominations' of senior officers and, 
assuming they were successful, the Admiralty were bound to 
take them. 
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The question of nomination was a vexatious one, for it 
compounded Admiralty calculations already only vaguely 
based on the current strength of the Lieutenant's list, by 
introducing a further variable into the numbers. Neither 
could the administrators necessarily put their own house In 
order, for there was an important political dimension in 
the process. Explaining why almost 100 more Cadets had 
joined in the year 1859 than 12 months previously, the 
Naval Chronicle noted without comment that in that year a 
change of government had taken place and 'the claims of two 
different parties for a share in the patronage of the 
Admiralty had to be satisfied,.6 The situation did not 
pass unnoticed and an attempt was made to appoint a Select 
Committee to examine the subject in 1860. 7 This did not 
find favour with the Liberal administration of the day 
whose spokesman noted that any change would be detrimental 
to the interest of senior officers and 'an act of great 
injustice towards those officers and a great act of 
unpolicy,.8 
Discontent with the system persisted nevertheless and 
by 1868 the Naval Chronicle was suggesting that the 
distribution of nominations to Naval Cadetship was both 
corrupt and 'extensively used as a means of strengthening 
the government of the day,.9 In support of this it noted 
that when the present Admiralty carne into office it was 
found that the list of nominations for Naval Cadetship had 
· 10 been filled by the previous Board for the next 18 months. 
Not only was the system corrupt, argued the paper, but it 
was an important element in the chaotic manpower situation 
in which the Service had twice the number of subordinate 
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officers it needed, a shortage of Lieutenants and no 
means of retiring inefficient senior officers. 
A fundamental review of the Navy's manpower policy 
was an early priority for the Childers' administration 
and the First Lord set to the task with diligence, energy 
and his noted disregard for the sensitivities of senior 
officers. His first target was the system of promotion 
d t · 11 an re lrement. In every rank an upper age limit was 
introduced beyond which compulsory retirement, with new 
improved rates of pension, was enforced. While this 
measure caused outrage amongst many senior officers and 
earned Childers widespread antipathy, it was an essential 
reform and one which has been seen as an indispensable 
preliminary to real change in the Service, particularly 
in the 1890s, when early promotion helped identify 
capable and intelligent officers. 12 
What is less seldom appreciated is that Childers' 
reforming zeal applied not only to retirement but also to 
the entry regulations. That this should be so was 
entirely logical, for there was clearly little point in 
introducing a series of measures to establish the orderly 
exit of officers from the Service, if the numbers and 
quality of those entering were still determined on a 
relatively 'ad hoc' basis. Circular 46 in fact contained 
a clause as radical as anything in Childers' retirement 
policy. In paragraph four it was announced that 
The number of naval cadets to be entered at each 
examination will be determined by the Admiralty, 
and twice the number to be entered will be 
d f d h · 13 nominate to compete or ca ets lpS. 
This signalled the advance of 'limited competition' which 
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simultaneously regulated numbers entering, and ensured 
that only the top 50 per cent of all nominations could be 
successful. It marked an important advance in the 
Admiralty's long running battle with the vested interest 
of its senior officers for, while Admirals, Commodores 
and Captains could still put nominations forward, the 
total could only be twice as great as the number of 
vacancies and no place could be guaranteed. 
In accordance with the new meritocratic approach 
Circular 46 outlined in detail a more demanding entrance 
examination. This comprised a preliminary test In 
English, French, Arithmetic and Scripture History which, 
only when successfully completed, would allow the 
candidate to proceed to a further paper which consisted 
of: 
(f) Arithmetic; miscellaneous examples 100 
(g) Algebra; the first four rules and 
fractions. (Miscellaneous questions) 100 
(h) Euclid. Book 1 to Prop. XXII 100 
(i) French. Translation of English into 100 
French. 
(k) Latin. To read, translate, and parse 100 
a passage from the first two books of 
Caesar's De Bello Gallico, or Virgil's 
AEneid, and to translate easy passages 
from English into Latin 
(1) English History. From the commencement 100 
of the relgn of James I to the present 
day 
(m) The outlines of modern geography 
( n ) Anyone 
French. 
parse a 
English 
living foreign language except 
To read, translate, and 
passage, and to render an 
passage into it 
(0) Elementary drawing 
325 
100 
100 
The successful candidates would be appointed to HMS 
Britannia where their parents would be charged fees of 
£70 per annum for their son's education and a slightly 
smaller sum for the year spent in the sea training ship. 
Most commentators cite Circular 46 in their accounts 
of the period although none appears to realise that the 
regulations were almost immediately revised to appear as 
Circular 3c of January the following year. The reason 
for this unusual step was that in October 1869, three 
months before the first Cadet would enter under the new 
scheme, the Board decided to appoint a small Committee to 
exam1ne the new regulations and suggest a course of 
education to be followed in both the Britannia and the 
, t " h' 15 sea gOlng ra1n1ng s 1p. Such a decision was logical 
enough, for as the entry regulations had changed and as 
Cadets were to be accepted at a younger age V1a 
competition, there were clear implications for the 
curriculum. 
Yet there 1S also evidence that Childers was 
personally unhappy about the arrangements for Cadets' 
education even in the wake of the August 1869 revision. 16 
His Director of Education, Joseph Woolley was similarly 
concerned that the Admiralty should not fall into the 
trap of revising the entry regulations while doing 
nothing about the actual training in the ship. In 
October 1869 he wrote to Sir Sydney Dacres, First Naval 
Lord, 
Considerable pains being taken in the new order 
to secure a fair amount of attainment in the 
Candidates for Naval Cadetships, it seems to me 
most important that before they join Britannnia, 
3L6 
a scheme for their instruction during the two 
years they are to remain there should be carefully 
considered and laid down. 17 
Central to Woolley's concern was that 'the course should 
not be drawn up by anyone person' and especially that 
'counsel should be taken with someone not directly in the 
Admiralty Service,.18 He envisaged heading a small 
committee to examine the curriculum, which he suggested 
should consist of Alfred Barry, formerly headmaster of 
Cheltenham School, Captain R A Powell a past commanding 
officer of the Britannia and T J Main, Principal of the 
Royal Naval College, Portsmouth. 
Reaction to the Woolley minute was indicative of 
both Childers' personal interest in naval education and 
'of his singular autocratic approach to the management of 
change in Admiralty affairs. Within three days of the 
proposal to Dacres, the First Lord had personally 
intervened and had written, not to the nominees, but to 
his own son's headmaster, H M Butler of Harrow School, 
inviting him to join the Committee to review the 
curriculum in the Britannia. Childers apparently saw 
Butler's presence as essential for he noted that he would 
'take no further steps in the matter, until I hear from 
19 you'. Having received a favourable reply the First 
Lord, again writing personally, approached Woolley's 
nominees and, with the addition of R M Inskip, Naval 
Instructor HMS Britannia, by the 29th October 1869 less 
than two weeks after Woolley's original suggestion, the 
Committee was formed. 
Unlike the Shadwell Committee who interviewed 
numerous witnesses personally, took evidence by Circular, 
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and whose findings were presented to Parliament in 
Command Paper form, the Woolley Committee was an internal 
working party whose deliberations were classified 
'Confidential' and were for the sole use of the Admiralty 
Board. No detailed guidance was offered to the 
Committee, although letters of appointment noted that the 
extension of training time in Britannia 'will offer 
facilities for devoting the first two years more to 
mathematics and navigation and less to seamanship,20. 
The only other stipulation was that as the new term was 
to commence in the following January 'it will be well to 
21 have the course settled soon'. This was complied with, 
and the report presented in sections dealing with the 
entrance examination, the curriculum in Britannia and the 
course to be followed in the sea training ship, was 
submitted in the late autumn of 1869. 
Although it was not strictly within their remit the 
Committee commenced with some general observations 
concerning the entrance examination, outlined in the 
regulations published the previous August. Generally 
they were supportive but ln order 'to prevent superficial 
and discursive study and to encourage concentration of 
the mental efforts,22 it was proposed to limit the number 
of subjects in which candidates were tested. The 
preliminary examination was to remain but in the second 
paper the candidate would now be required to chose three 
topics from a list of seven. While subjects included 
History, Geography, Drawing, French and Modern Languages, 
all of which carried 100 marks each, they were heavily 
outweighed by Elementary Mathematics (300) and 
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Latin (200). The objective of this loading, noted the 
Committee was to bring the entrance examination 'as much 
as possible in accord with the teaching in public schools 
and of other good schools preparatory to them,.23 
Discussing the course of study to be followed In the 
ship, the Committee commenced with existing arrangements 
for religious instruction. This they proposed to 
increase from Sunday only teaching to a pattern that 
would allow half of all Cadets to follow religious 
instruction every day. This was to take the form of 
Scripture study although 'the systematic study and 
explanation of the Apostles Creed, the Lords Prayer and 
the Ten Commandments' was also recommended. Awards were 
to be made for 'careful study and thorough knowledge' and 
it was observed that 'such prlzes are found to be of 
considerable use in public schools,.24 
They then reviewed the place of Seamanship In the 
syllabus. It has been shown that, despite modern 
assessments that this subject dominated the Britannia 
syllabus, it never accounted for more than one third of 
the total marks required to pass out. The Committee's 
view was that this should be further reduced and that in 
future all Seamanship should be 'limited to such manual 
operations and such information only as may be readily 
acquired on board without having recourse to printed 
manuals,.25 Assessment was to be based on purely 
practical skill and to be examined orally. In future the 
subject was to occupy only four out of a total 28 hours 
instructional time per week. While it was still 
recognised as important, with the Committee noting that 
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any Cadet who failed to obtain at least half marks ln the 
subject be discharged from the Service,26 they saw its 
value largely as an antidote to vigorous academic study, 
observing that it formed 'a valuable addition to the 
studies not only in a professional point of view, but as 
affording that wholesome relief from purely mental 
work' . 27 
The Woolley Report reaffirmed the trend throughout 
the 1860s towards a syllabus that was essentially 
academic in nature, with a very heavy bias towards 
mathematics. Their recommended distribution and 
weighting of subjects was 
1. Mathematics (including, ln the 10 hours per week 
second year, navigation etc) 
2 . French 4 hours per week 
3 . English 3 hours per week 
4. Geography 2 hours per week 
5. History 2 hours per week 
6. Drawing 3 hours per week 28 
While the scheme of study for ancillary work was left to 
the instructors concerned, the Mathematics course, which 
included Arithmetic, Algebra, Euclid, Plane and Sperical 
Trigonomety and Navigation was very closely detailed. In 
addition to the prescribed course, a serles of lectures 
in elementary chemistry and a classificatory science 
'such as botany, a branch of zoology or entomology' was 
recommended and it was noted that for this purpose 'a 
very fitting lecture theatre might be extemporised ln the 
. ,29 gymnaslum 
The final section of the Report dealt briefly with 
the twelve months to be spent in the sea training ship 
after leaving Britannia, which was envisaged principally 
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as a period of consolidation and practical application of 
lessons learnt at Dartmouth. No new mathematics was to 
be taught but the Committee urged that 'the practice and 
theory of navigation and nautical astronomy should be 
extended, so as to embrace all the problems required by 
h . , 30 t e navlgator . The sea going training ship was to 
carry a commissioned engineer specifically to teach the 
theory, construction and management of the marine steam 
englne, and also a French instructor, 'an important part 
of whose duties should be the encouragement of French 
t . ,31 conversa lon . With a recognition of the traditional 
problems of undertaking efficient study in a sea going 
ship, the Committee stressed that all young officers work 
should be placed before examiners, and a journal should 
be kept, which would also be marked. 
These recommendations were accepted by the Admiralty 
and subsequently published as Circular 3c of 6 January 
1870 32 which formed the basis of entrance to, and 
instruction on board, HMS Britannia and the sea going 
training ship until 1875. Thus within 12 months of 
Childers' first directive as political head of the 
Service, not only had a comprehensive examination of 
higher education been initiated, but the regulations for 
entry and training of Cadets had been fundamentally 
revised, via a system of limited competition, lower age 
entry and a longer course. 
The most radical of these changes was the 
introduction of limited competition. In retrospect the 
idea that a Navy attempting to grapple with the machine 
age could allow its future generation of officers to be 
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chosen by a system of patronage, unfettered by Admiralty 
control, appears absurd. Yet it is equally clear that 
many officers, while having difficulty articulating a 
defence, saw the patronage system as entirely natural, 
for it had become not simply a perk or unofficial duty, 
but also a means by which the very membership of naval 
society was defined. Statham's view of the new system 
was the authentic voice of prejudice. 
It is difficult to refrain from dwelling at some 
length on the anomaly of this method of obtaining 
suitable officers ... Suffice to say it has always 
been condemned by a number of officers whose 
opinion should carry weight as men who have 
devoted their lives to the study of the efficiency 
of the Service and how best to ensure it~ and if 
their opponents seek to convince them by pointing 
to results, it is certainly within their right to 
maintain that these might have been better without 
limited competition 33 
The obfuscation and lack of substance here is readily 
apparent, but equally there is the sense that while the 
original system may have been odd or eccentric, it 
nevertheless represented a continuing tradition and thus 
a part of the warp and weft of the social fabric of the 
Service. 
This, as Childers demonstrated frequently during his 
brief term of office, was a consideration that had to be 
subjugated to method and efficiency in naval affairs. 
Yet the concept of limited competition, demonstrably a 
fairer and more meritocratic device, continued to 
irritate a nerve ln the Navy of the 1870s. In March 1871 
the Royal United Services Institution were told by 
Captain J G Goodenough that the new regulations would 
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produce boys 'sharper and better taught as midshipmen' 
but 'inferior Lieutenants, Commanders and Captains,34. 
Three months later Rear Admiral A P Ryder, a noted 
campaigner for improvements in Service education, urged 
the same forum to support the establishment of naval 
streams in public schools, where the 'moral and mental 
discipline which a boy is brought ... answers the purpose 
of bringing to the surface exactly the description of raw 
material we want,.35 Only in this manner argued Ryder 
could the Service hope to avoid 'indiscriminate admission 
by competition among boys of only 13 years old chosen 
from all sections of the community ... a step which would 
b t ' h' , 36 e mos mlSC levous . 
Yet it is hard to see ln Circular 3c the 
justification for such concerns. Nowhere was it 
suggested that the privilege of nomination should be 
withdrawn from senior officers, or that boys from all 
sections of the community should be allowed to compete. 
Indeed, far from encouraging indiscriminate admission, it 
may be argued that the revisions of the Woolley Committee 
represented a consolidation rather than a dismantling of 
the class barrier. One of their stated objectives, for 
example, was to align the entrance examination as far as 
possible with subjects taught in public schools and the 
reintroduction of Latin, which had been dropped as a 
qualification in 1865,37 clearly sought to achieve this. 
The degree to which it constituted a pure selection 
device may be shown by noting that while Latin was 
weighted second only to mathematics and carried double 
the marks of any other subject in the entrance test, 
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it formed no part of the actual Britannia syllabus. 
In fact the general thrust of the Woolley Committee was 
not only to align the naval entrance examination with public 
school practice, but also to make the Britannia syllabus 
increasingly akin to these establishments. There were 
clearly limits to the extent of this process, for the 
vocational demands on the young officer would always imply 
for example a strong mathematical bias to his education. 
Similarly, once proficiency in Latin had been demonstrated 
1n the entrance examination, there was no further recourse 
to serious classical education. Nevertheless, by lowering 
the entry age and extending the course to 24 months, the 
Admiralty itself had implied an increased emphasis on 
academic study and this was consolidated by the Committee. 
The increased emphasis on systematic religious instruction 
and, perhaps most of all, the relegation of seamanship 
teaching to the exercise of practical evolutions, confirmed 
a trend towards the concept of Britannia as an educational 
establishment afloat, rather than a commissioned warship 
which undertook training. 
The Woolley recommendations and the resultant Circular 
3c became the basis for the Britannia curriculum from 15 
January 1870. While the responsibility for examinations, 
prizes and seniority awarded lay with the Director of 
Education, all other aspects of training and education 
continued to be the business of the ship's commanding 
officer. This was a standard appointment usually held for 
about three years, and one that in the past had been filled 
by an officer with current command experience in a sea-going 
ship. In August 1871 however, it was announced that the new 
appointee would be Captain the Hon F A C Foley who, despite 
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a long and active career, had spent the previous four years 
in charge of the harbour gunnery training ship at Devonport. 
This break with tradition failed to impress the Naval 
Chronicle which felt that the current Captain of the sea 
training ship would be a better nominee and suggested that 
'some explanation is surely due to the Service,38 for 
Foley's appointment. 
Whatever Foley's qualifications and aptitude for the 
post he did not appear to have any particular interest in 
ensuring that the new curriculum was rigorously enforced. 
While the recommendations regarding seamanship were 
certainly applied, and mathematics and navigation courses 
were diligently pursued, the three years after 1871 saw 
virtually all other subjects taught in some reduced form. 
The principal casualty was English grammar for which, in the 
absence of any classics teaching, an extensive course had 
been proposed. This never came to fruition, with Woolley 
noting in 1874 that 'When I attempted to carry out that 
system ... the objections were so great that we confined 
activities to the simpler grammar which is in use in 
national schools,.39 History and geography followed a 
similar fate and it was noted that 'In religious knowledge 
the departure from the course laid down was very 
considerable,.40 
While the Woolley Committee had readily acknowledged 
that the 1870 recommendations were provisional and would be 
. . . , 1 t" 41 't 
'llable to reduct10n 1f found on tr1a too ex ens1ve, 1 
is equally clear that Foley and his naval staff were largely 
unsympathetic towards the new system. The demise of 
seamanship and increased emphasis on academic work appears 
to have undermined the professional reward of serving on the 
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naval staff. Foley's First Lieutenant noted that, apart 
from alternate days duties and attending to minor 
disciplinary offences, 'there did not seem much for the 
three lieutenants to do,.42 This Vlew was supported by 
Tupper, a Cadet in 1873, whose principal memory of his 
training was that the officers took 'little or no interest 
in the cadets and could not have been selected for their 
43 qualifications ln that respect' Foley apparently 
petitioned the Admiralty unsuccessfully on a number of 
occasions between 1871 and 1874 to have seamanship 
reinstated 44 and his evidence to the Rice Committee, 
which he proposed dispensing with the teaching of English 
grammar and History, revealed him as an opponent of the 
wider academic syllabus. 
Unfortunately the arrival of a Captain unsympathetic to 
the new curriculum coincided with a decline ln the influence 
of the Admiralty's Director of Education. The supervlslon 
and moderation of the Britannia examinations had been part 
of Woolley's task since 1868 although this only represented 
a fraction of a steadily increasing workload. By 1871, 
apart from his duties in connection with officer education, 
he was responsible for: 
(a) the examination of all engineers, shipwright 
apprentices and naval architects in Royal 
dockyards at horne and abroad. 
(b) the examination and inspection of boys in 
seamans training ships (5) and in the Greenwich 
Hospital Schools 
(c) the examination of Pupil Teachers and supervision 
of their progress during their course at the 
Training College 
(d) inspection and examination of all Infant, 
Industrial and Adult Schools within the Marine 
division 
(e) Supervision of Recreation Rooms and Libraries 
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(f) Correspondence and Reports concerning: 
(i) Grants to Schools containing children of 
parents employed in the Navy 
(ii) Grants to building schools in naval districts 
(iii) Gratuities to Schoolmasters 
(iv) Prizes in Dockyard Schools 45 
Additionally he was retained by the Controller of the Navy 
to advise on various scientific questions including the 
oversight of Admiralty laboratories at Torquay and as a 
member of the 1870 Committee on Ship Design. 
These tasks, which were undertaken solely by Woolley 
and his deputy Revd J A Harboard, apparently without 
clerical assistance, must have imposed a considerable burden 
for most of the examinations cited were held half yearly and 
the ships and establishments were very widely dispersed. In 
the winter of 1872 Woolley's health broke down and after a 
prolonged illness he was forced to write to the Earl of 
Camperdown, a member of the Admiralty Board, offering to 
return to the Admiralty, but warning that 
I am satisfied that I shall be unable to do so 
unless the duties are considerably modified - as my 
health would certainly again break down under such 
d 1 t . t 46 pressure as I was un er as Wln er 
He noted that 'the office I now hold has grown vastly in 
importance' and he suggested its scope might be further 
increased by employing additional staff and placing it 'in 
every respect on an equality with other Principal Officers 
eg. Medical Director General,.47 
It was clear that some form of modification to the 
Navy's educational administration would have to take place, 
for the whole spectrum of inspection and examination had 
widened in the eight years since Woolley's appointment. By 
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June 1872, while it was obvious that the new naval college 
at Greenwich would be much larger than originally envisaged 
and would be led by an Admiral, it was still unclear what 
its administrative structure would be and how it would stand 
in relation to the responsibilities of the Director of 
Education. This matter might be resolved, suggested 
Woolley, by his resignation and the establishment of a new 
post. 
I am however ready to go if my doing so will be 
advantageous to the service by enabling Mr Goschen 
to consolidate in the hands of a Naval Officer all 
the different departments more effectively than 
those of a Civilian. 48 
Either way, observed Woolley, some form of reorganisation 
would be necessary and he concluded by placing himself 'in 
the hands of Mr Goschen and your Lordship and shall be happy 
to go or remain as may be wished,.49 
Despite the provision of some temporary clerical 
support and the appointment of a second assistant with 
responsibility for the Marine division, Admiralty records 
show that Woolley's service ceased in December 1873. 50 
Initially the reason appears to have been recurrent ill 
health but by the time his pension arrangements were 
discussed the following month, the papers indicate that the 
Admiralty had subsequently decided to abolish the post. On 
the basis of this, the Board urged the Treasury to pay 
Woolley an allowance additional to his pension, ln 
recognition of 
the great energy and mental attainments which led 
to his undertaking, much to the advantage of the 
country, many extra and special services, not comlng 
strictly within the Office which he held. 51 
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The decision to dispense with the post of Admiralty Director 
of Education was formally announced by a circular of 21 
March 1874. 52 In future educational responsibilities were 
to be divided with 'the officers of the Royal Naval College 
at Greenwich' responsible for the general supervision of the 
dockyard schools and officers' education, and all functions 
relating to the lower deck, to be the responsibility of a 
new post holder, the Inspector of Naval Schools. 
This was in some ways a logical progression, for it has 
been shown that by 1871 the inspectoral and examining duties 
connected with sailors' and boys' training ships and 
establishments, had multiplied and were worthy of a 
dedicated post holder. Similarly the Royal Naval College at 
Greenwich was considerably larger and more prestigious than 
its predecessor and its first Admiral President, Astley 
Cooper-Key, was keen that the College should assume a wider 
bureaucratic responsibility for the conduct of officer 
education. As Officer candidates were now examined at 
Greenwich prior to Britannia and returned there after 
initial sea service on Sub Lieutenants courses, it appeared 
logical that educational policy should be determined at the 
College. 
Yet while the logic of transferring the general 
supervision of Cadets' education to the Royal Naval College 
was sound enough, little attention appears to have been paid 
to the practicalities of the process. Despite the fact that 
Woolley's service ceased in December 1873, it was not until 
21 March the following year that the new supervisory 
authority was announced, and the generalised description of 
this as simply 'the officers of Royal Naval College' seemed 
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disappointingly vague. Certainly the Circular seemed to 
prompt little action from the College, for as late as 22 May 
it was necessary for the Board to acquaint the Admiral 
President that 
my Lords have decided that the examination of Cadets 
ln HMS Britannia shall in future be conducted by the 
staff of the College and direct him to place himself 
ln communication with the Captain of Britannia and 
to submit proposals for carrying out the same. 53 
It would seem that for at least five months no action had 
been taken under the new arrangements. 54 
The Rice Committee 
It is apparent from contemporary accounts of life in 
the Britannia and from the evidence offered to the Rice 
Committee, that although the new syllabus outlined ln the 
regulations of 1870 gained Admiralty approval, it was only 
partially implemented up to 1874. While instruction 
remained essentially academic in nature with prowess ln 
mathematics the key to success, the intention of the Woolley 
Committee that it should be broadened to incorporate 
substantial portions of English, History, Geography and 
French remained~ partially at least, unfulfilled. This 
situation was exacerbated after 1871 by a decline in the 
influence, due to overwork and ill health, of the Director 
of Education. His resignation in late 1873, while 
precipitating an arguably more logical system of 
supervision, does not appear to have been grasped by either 
the Admiralty or the new Greenwich authorities with any 
degree of resolve, and a subsequent loss of momentum was 
evident. 
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While Foley may have been less than enthusiastic about 
the new educational curriculum, he nevertheless approached 
his task with energy and enthusiasm largely channelled into 
a programme to improve the habitability of the Britannia. 
Despite the fact that she had only been ln commission as a 
training ship since 1869 she was an obsolete design and it 
was more than 30 years since she had been laid down. 
Although larger and more commodious than her predecessor, 
the fifth Britannia showed the same problems of poor 
ventilation, dampness and rot. This was particularly 
evident in the instructional spaces above the orlop deck and 
in the sleeping accommodation. Lieutenant A W Warry joining 
her on the staff in 1870 noted that 'the air on the sleeping 
decks when the boys were turned in was, I thought, far from 
being as pure as was needful,.55 William Dalby, Staff 
Surgeon in the ship in the same year, confirmed that the 
lower decks suffered from poor air and that despite the 
persistent flushing of the bilges with a force pump, noted 
that this area was pervaded by an offensive smell. 56 
On his arrival in August 1871, Captain Foley, who had 
spent the previous three years running a harbour training 
ship, considered the Britannia to be in an unsatisfactory 
state, and set in motion a series of modifications. He 
noted that the major problem with the ship was that the keel 
had been decked over the ballast and thus it was 'impossible 
to clean out alongside the keel and there was foul air and a 
57 h" very bilgy smell'. The holds of the s lp were ln a 
particularly poor state with some timbers so rotten they had 
to be encased in concrete. 58 Under the supervision of Staff 
Commander William Browne vessels containing slaked lime 
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were placed in the bilges and 14 carpenters were employed 
for four months, to lay the keel open from stem to stern and 
thus allow the area beneath the sleeping accommodation to be 
satisfactorily cleaned. 
One reason for their diligence may be derived from 
examining the Health of the Navy reports for 1870 and 1871 
which revealed persistent outbreaks of illness among the 
Cadets. It has been shown that throughout the 1860s the 
prev10us Britannia had returned overlong sick lists and that 
this had been a matter of persistent concern to the 
d · 1 59 A m1ra ty. It is clear that the commissioning of the new 
ship did little to redress the problem and within twelve 
months of her arrival 13 cases of small pox and a maJor 
outbreak of scarlet fever had swept the ship. The latter 
epidemic, which required the removal of 61 Cadets to 
shores ide sick quarters, completely overwhelmed the medical 
facilities of both the ship and the town. The following 
year a further ten cases were reported, with the result that 
during the Christmas vacation, the Medical Director General 
directed the ship to be disinfected 'by means of sulphurous 
acid gas' and that 'all the various compartments of the 
ship, studies, messrooms, decks, latrines, holds etc were to 
be cleaned, painted and limewashed,.60 
While the Health of the Navy reports readily 
·acknowledged that scarlet fever 'was then prevailing more or 
less in every part of England' and that it was almost 
certainly imported from ashore, it 1S possible to observe a 
growing disenchantment on the part of the Admiralty medical 
department with the conditions in Britannia and Hindostan. 
While the causes of illness could seldom be accurately 
342 
identified there was little doubt, suggested the 1870 
report, that the rapid spread of disease was 'easily 
accounted for by the free inter-mingling and close 
association that unavoidably take place where so many young 
people are collected together in a ship,.61 The following 
year, after an outbreak of fever, the report went further 
suggesting that 'a nadus of the contagion, notwithstanding 
the various disinfecting measures adopted had still remained 
1 k · . h h' h 62 ur lng ln t e s lpS t emselves'. 
In early 1871 the First Lord, Hugh Childers, expressed 
a concern that the habitability and conditions of the 
training ship were so poor that the physical development of 
the Cadets was becoming impaired and that they were 
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suffering from 'stunted growth'. It is unclear upon what 
evidence this was based, but the Medical Director General 
Sir Alexander Armstrong, was charged with investigating the 
matter and submitted a minute to the Admiralty Board the 
following year, which concluded that 'boys can only be 
educated in a stationary training ship at a considerable 
sacrifice of and interference with, their due physical 
64 development'. The basis for this Vlew appears tenuous, 
for Armstrong later admitted to the Rice Committee that he 
had visited Britannia only three times in the previous five 
years, that no visit had lasted more than an hour, and that 
on none of these occasions were any Cadets on board. 65 By 
the time of the submission Childers had retired and his 
successor Geeorge Goschen took no action on the matter. 
However with the return of the Conservatives in March 1874, 
Armstrong re-submitted a report in which he expressed 'a 
strong opinion against the existing nature and course of 
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education on board the Britannia as being physically 
66 detrimental to growth'. 
This arrived on the desk of the new First Lord of the 
Admiralty, George Ward Hunt. He had no particular expertise 
or knowledge of naval matters, having served in the Derby 
administration from 1866-68 as financial secretary to the 
Treasury and earned a reputation for aptitude as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer under Disraeli until December 1869. On 
taking office at the Admiralty in March 1874, however, the 
new First Lord sought to acquaint himself with the state of 
the Service by instituting what the Reader to the Board 
described as 'an immediate and most impartial enquiry into 
67 the existing state of the several naval departments'. In 
the midst of this exerClse in May 1874, the Medical Director 
General's adverse comments were submitted and were thus 
included in the review. 
The following month a memorandum from the Secretary to 
the Board announced that Cadets' training would be 
scrutinised and in particular that: 
A question has arisen as to whether the conditions 
under which naval cadets are trained on board HMS 
Britannia are favourable to their health and 
physical development. Their Lordships are desirous 
that this matter should be investigated by a 
Committee. 
The attention of the Committee should be specially 
directed to the following points: 
I. (a) The effect of confinement on board a 
stationary ship. 
(b) Ventilation. 
(c) Sleeping arrangements. 
(d) Diet. 
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, 
II. (a) The course of study as regards the subjects, 
the number of hours, and the routine. 
(b) The nature of the examinations, including 
that on entry. 
Should the Committee be of opinion that the brains of 
the cadets are overtaxed, they should consider 
whether the course of study might be made less 
severe, and the standard of examination lowered, 
without detriment to their qualifications as naval 
ff ' 68 o lcers. 
The membership of the Committee appeared to be 
deliberately designed to represent a blend of talents and 
background relevant to Cadets' health, education and 
training. The professional dimension was represented by 
senior naval officers, Captain W C Carpenter, late of the 
sea training ship Ariadne and Captain William Graham 
incoming commanding officer of HMS Britannia. Medical 
expertise was provided by George Busk FRS, FRCS and Naval 
Surgeon James Vaughan and the team was completed by 
academics Revd H A Morgan and Revd Osborne Gordon69 from 
Jesus College, Cambridge and Christ Church, Oxford 
respectively. The Committee was under the leadership of 
Rear Admiral Edward BRice. 
The group commenced hearing evidence on 29th June 1874 
at Dartmouth and over the next three weeks some 38 witnesses 
were called before the Committee. These constituted a 
remarkably large and diverse group and it is significant to 
note that in contrast to the Shadwell evidence, which was 
predominantly drawn from senior officers, the largest single 
representation was from Naval Cadets - ten of whom testified 
before the Rice Committee. Medical expertise was provided 
by the Medical Director General and four Staff Surgeons 
with previous experience in either the Britannia or her sick 
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quarters ashore. Other witnesses included the Headmaster of 
the City of London School and mathematics staff from 
Christ's Hospital and Harrow. For the first time ln a naval 
educational enquiry the views of ancillary staff, ln this 
case the ship's carpenter, cricket coach and gym instructor, 
were sought. 
In excess of 3000 paragraphs of evidence were taken 
over a two and a half week period and distilled into a 
relatively compact report issued on 6th October 1874. The 
Committee's findings were presented in three principal 
sections dealing with health and environmental conditions, 
academic matters with particular reference to the curriculum 
and routine, and finally a review of the existing 
arrangements for entering boys into the Service. Additional 
memoranda by Morgan and Gordon on aspects of the academic 
course were included in the main report, and the appendices 
included extensive tables of Cadets' height and weight both 
at various stages of their career, and in comparison to boys 
at other schools. 
In accordance with the remit, the early sections of the 
report dealt specifically with questions of Cadets' health 
and physical development. Evidence here was derived from 
both verbal testimony and personal inspection. In the 
former category while most, regardless of their status, 
offered a Vlew on the Cadets well-being, the first six 
witnesses were questioned specifically and solely on the 
matter and thus constituted a sort of 'expert cadre'. 
They included the four Staff Surgeons, the Sergeant of 
Marines responsible for gymastics and physical training and 
the professional cricket coach to HMS Britannnia. Also 
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called as an expert witness later in the enquiry was the 
Medical Director General to the Admiralty. 
In addition to hearing this testimony the Committee, 
which included two medical practitioners, travelled to 
Dartmouth where they personally inspected Cadets 
at muster, at meals, in their classrooms, ln their 
hammocks at night, in the cricket field, in the 
gymnasium, in the boats, when bathing, and in every 
way which appeared likely to thoroughly test their 
h . 1 d' t' 70 p YSlca con 1 lone 
The ship was rigorously examined, including an inspection of 
Cadets' sleeping quarters carried out between the hours of 
llpm and lam. On this basis the statistical returns were 
derived and for the purposes of control and comparison the 
Committee visited other schools, including Eton College, 
where the physical condition of junior boys was observed and 
noted. 
As a result of both verbal testimony and their own 
investigation the Committee gave a complete endorsement to 
the environmental standards in the ship. While previous 
habitability problems were acknowledged and the improving 
work of Foley and his team was applauded, the Committee were 
of the view that by 1874 there was 'nothing in the fact of 
residence on board Britannia which is unfavourable to the 
71 health and physical development of the cadets'. In this 
respect the Committee noted a considerable improvement in 
the sickness returns in recent years. Ventilation, diet and 
the sleeping arrangements were all judged satisfactory and, 
with the exception of lengthening the lunch break, no 
recommendations for i~proving the physical surroundings or 
professional routine of HMS Britannia were made. 
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Given that the primary impetus behind the formation of 
the Committee was a long standing concern for the health of 
Cadets and the possible detrimental effects of confinement 
in a stationary training ship, the relevant section of the 
Report is remarkably brief. Despite the fact that in excess 
of 650 paragraphs of evidence was offered by expert 
witnesses and numerous pertinent observations were made by 
others, this was summarised in just 17 paragraphs of 
findings - many of them quite short. 
While there was nothing to suggest a deliberate 
misrepresentation, it is impossible to avoid the impression 
that the Committee was overly keen to award the ship a clean 
bill of health. Thus they were happy to cite that the bulk 
of medical evidence was prepared to endorse the suitability 
of the Britannia for new entry training. This was 
undeniable, for important witnesses with first hand 
knowledge of the ship confirmed the case. Staff Surgeon 
William Connolly for example noted'that the ship was 'nearly 
72 
as perfect as could be expected', and that no shortcoming 
73 ln Cadets' health could be attributed to living aboard. 
Staff Surgeon William Dalby confirmed that the Britannia had 
been 'wonderfully improved' and that 'as far as a ship can 
. h . t' 74 be she is as complete as anythlng t at can eX1S · 
What was less apparent however was that some 
witnesses, notably the Medical Director General, were 
unwilling to support the Britannia's suitability at all, 
and that even the positive affirmations cited in support of 
the Committee's conclusion, were invariably heavily 
qualified. For example, even when applauding the 
improvements, the balance of medical opinion 
348 
consistently argued that a shore based college would be a 
healthier and more desirable alternative. Indeed no expert 
witness was prepared to testify to the contrary. Thus 
despite Connolly's supportive views, he also noted that 'in 
a medical point of view I think a shore establishment would 
75 be favourable', and Dalby was unequivocal that not only 
would Cadets be healthier ashore, but that an establishment 
could probably operate at one third the expense of a ship.76 
While the Committee were eventually led to this conclusion 
and subsequently recommended the decommissioning of the 
ship, they seemed particularly keen to ensure that the 
decision was not related to problems of ships' hygiene. 
Conversely, the limited evidence of lassitude ln 
trainees observed by the Committee, namely that 'a portion 
77 
of cadets had a somehwat pale and jaded appearance', they 
attributed to the course of study, the number of hours and 
the routine of the working day. It was ln this area, 
concluded the members, that 'the brains of cadets were 
overtaxed ... by the excessive number of subjects and the 
system of examining,78 and they claimed 'there is some 
evidence of this in the overworked appearance of a portion 
of the cadets. 79 It is instructive to note that no 
empirical connection for this was established, or any 
attempt made to demonstrate why academic study, rather than 
the physical environment, should be responsible. It seemed 
to be a general assumption that if the condition of the ship 
had been established as healthy and yet Cadets continued to 
appear languid, then academic study must be to blame. 
Whether this was so or not, the assertion that there 
349 
was a link between the poor 'tone' of some Cadets and the 
nature of the curriculum, did have the effect of 
concentrating the efforts of the Rice investigation firmly 
in the educational domain. The sections of the Report 
dealing with entry procedure and the Britannia syllabus thus 
constituted the bulk of their findings, and were more than 
twice the length of the preceding consideration of 
habitability. It is also significant that while the remit 
to the Committee was primarily a medical and professional 
one and the preponderance of naval officers and doctors ln 
its membership reflected this, the majority of its 
deliberations were focused towards educational matters. 
In their instructions the Committee had been invited 
to consider the 'conditions of entry' and to make any 
appropriate recommendations for change. The nomination and 
entrance procedure had been a continuing matter of debate, 
and some irritation, in the Service since the adoption of a 
more competitive element in the initial examination by the 
Childers administration in 1870. This was a relatively 
modest measure which continued to protect the rights of 
senior officers to nominate candidates, while introducing an 
element of merit and control to admission. It was, however, 
widely resented, and the Rice Committee, heavily dominated 
by naval staff, moved swiftly and without preamble 'to 
express entire disapproval of the present system of entry by 
" ,80 
competltlon . 
The grounds for this objection, argued the Committee, 
'f' 11 d t' 1 The degree of 'cramming' were specl lca y e uca lona . 
required to prepare for a competitive examination involved 
many months of arduous study which frequently resulted in 
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lack of both sufficient sleep and the exercise necessary to 
maintain boys in vigorous health. Neither should the young 
aspirant be introduced to mental exertion in such a manner, 
for the likelihood was that 'having thus fallen into 
superficial habits of study it will be difficult for him 
afterwards to escape from them,.81 These arguments, 
suggested the Committee, had been advanced emphatically by 
various witnesses, including an examiner for the University 
of London, and they were therefore unanimous in the view 
that the system in force prior to 1869 be reverted 
to, and that boys be simply nominated to cadetship, 
without competition, but subject to passing a well-
considered test examination in reading, writing, 
. th t . d . 82 arl me lC, an Latln. 
While the Committee might have believed that limited 
competition should be abandoned on educational grounds, a 
detailed examination of the evidence suggests this was not 
the advice they received. It was true that objections were 
voiced by both Doctor Leonard Schmitz of the International 
School at Isleworth and by the Chief Naval Instructor of the 
Britannia, but with these exceptions all witnesses called on 
account of some educational expertise were happy to endorse 
the competitive system. Thus T J Potter, Head Mathematical 
Master at Christ's Hospital, while noting that competition 
should not be carried to excess did not find the system was 
injurious to boys,83 a view supported by the Headmaster of 
the City of London School. 84 Joseph Woolley, former 
Admiralty Director of Education, believed that competitive 
examination had the advantage of giving the Service the best 
pick of the boys85 and Revd John Harboard, the Admiralty's 
current Inspector of Schools, was 'decidedly of opinion that 
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limited competition is very advantageous' and that the 
Service gained, by that means, 'the most intellectual of the 
candidates and secure socially the best boys for the 
, ,86 
serVlce . 
In fact evidence against competitive entry carne not 
primarily from educationalists, but from senior naval 
officers who objected, not on the grounds that the system 
was harmful to candidates, but that it implied a wider and 
less defined catchment of young recruits. Most naval 
witnesses felt the trend should be moving in the opposite 
direction. Captain the Lord Gilford, for example, suggested 
that the choice of candidate should simply be a matter of 
First Lord's patronage and that any examination should be 
limited 'to a test that any boy from a public school could 
87 pass'. Vice Admiral A P Ryder advocated an even more 
restricted system where nominations should be given, not to 
individuals, but to 'some seven or eight of the great 
88 
schools of England' who would be tasked to provide each 
89 year '70 of the best boys that England can produce'. He 
was unambigious about the Navy's requirement 
We want the sons of gentlemen. We want the sons of 
men, I say who are not pauper gentlemen. We want, 
and it is better for us to have, the sons of men of 
l ' 1 'd d 90 some ltt e ln epen ence. 
Captain Thomas Brandreth echoed these sentiments and 
proposed limiting nominations to the products of 'Eton, 
Harrow, Shrewsbury and so forth'. This, he felt, would go 
some way to satisfying the great want of the Britannia which 
, 't' 91 was 'that there is no public school tone ln 1 • 
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The Rice Committee were unable fully to reflect these 
. 
vlews, not on the grounds that they were divisive, but 
because of the specific requirements of a young officer's 
education. The necessity, for example, of commencing active 
sea service at the earliest possible age, was strongly 
reiterated, and this in turn meant that a young officer's 
formal education would initially be shorter than that of his 
public school counterpart. Similarly, despite 'the 
advantages that such schools might possess as regards tone 
and formation of character',92 the typical syllabus was 
seldom relevant to the future Cadet whose principal 
vocational requirement was a solid grounding in mathematics, 
rather than Latin or Greek. For these reasons it was 
essential, argued the Committee, that the education process 
should continue to be devised and run by the Service. 
Nevertheless, they were sympathetic to the arguments 
for greater exclusivity in recruitment and thus, in addition 
to scrapping limited competition and returning to the system 
of absolute nomination, they suggested that the Navy should 
operate its own additional sifting mechanism. 
As it is apparent that under the present system unfit 
boys do occasionally find their way into the Service, 
we think that a safeguard might be found in the 
institution of a Board by whom all candidates should 
be approved prior to being permitted to undergo the 
educational examination. The Board might be composed 
of executive and medical officers combined, and their 
examination should take the place of the present 
medical examination. They should have power to 
reject any candidate who might appear to them unlikely 
to make an efficient officer. Defects not discover-
able by an educational test might frequently be patent 
to such a committee, and the Service would be thus 
spared the introduction of youths unsuitable for it. 93 
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This recommendation clearly represented a reversal of the 
general trend towards objective merit in the selection 
procedure introduced by Childers, which despite the 
pressures it implied via 'cramming', at least ensured 
success based on diligence and application. Now, as far 
as the Rice Committee were concerned, it was possible for 
a boy as young as 11 years to be rejected, even before the 
examination, on the indefinable grounds that he would be 
'unlikely to make an efficient officer'. 
Having given the Britannia a clean bill of health and 
recommended a return to a more subjective method of 
choosing potential officers, the Committee examined the 
future curriculum. Their basic contention was that the 
syllabus established by the Woolley Committee four years 
previously contained too many subjects to allow a 
competence in any. They also argued, rather obscurely, 
that knowledge acquired in History, Scripture History, 
Geography, Grammar and Literature 'is of the kind which 
taxes memory rather than reason' and was therefore 'apt to 
be quickly forgotten'. Conversely, it was felt that the 
Mathematics course, although heavily outweighing the arts 
element was not thorough enough and that its profile in a 
naval officer's education, on account of the accurate 
reasoning and scientific attainment it imparted, should be 
raised. To achieve this, suggested the Report, the 
content of the course could be reduced, the length of 
study extended, or a combination of both. 
Despite their previous endorsement of the living 
conditions and hygiene standards in the Britannia, the 
members were unwilling to extend the period of instruction 
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on board. Quite what the disadvantages of further time In 
the training ship might have been remained unspecified, 
but the Committee were adamant that 'we have no 
alternative, if the Britannia be maintained, but to 
propose a large reduction in the number of subjects 
taught,.94 Hence they recommended that examinations In 
Grammar, Literature, History, Scripture History, Physical 
Geography, and Physics be discontinued and increased 
emphasis placed on mathematics - a subject which was 
'daily becoming more important to the naval officer,95 at 
a time when 'the difference in the value of the 
observations made by cultivated and uncultivated observers 
cannot be too highly estimated. ,96 
Perhaps the most surprising recommendation, In the 
midst of the reduction of so many basic subjects, was that 
the study of Latin should be reintroduced. The logic for 
this appeared particularly tortuous, with the Committee's 
contention that History, Geography and Grammar were apt to 
be quickly forgotten but that a boy studying Latin 'having 
once acquired this knowledge he would never forget it, and 
it would be a source of pleasure to him in after life,.97 
Similarly, while the advantage of studying a classical 
language as an aid to improving English composition was 
heavily stressed, the actual teaching and examination of 
English Grammar and Literature was to be reduced, despite 
the fact that the Committee had been told by witnesses 
that young officers were deficient in this area. 
The Rice proposals, which it will be noted 
constituted to a large extent the unravelling of the work 
of the 1870 Woolley Committee, continued with revised 
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regulations for the place of seamanship in the syllabus. 
Since 1870 this subject had been reduced to a purely 
practical evolution requiring no classroom study and 
carrying no weight in the overall class of pass obtained. 
While Rice were happy to satisfy the first two conditions 
they wished to return seamanship to 'an important part in 
determining the class of certificate to be granted to the 
98 
cadet' and duly recommended that the assessment which 
should be 'purely practical and entirely oral' must now 
count accordingly. 
The whole philosophy underlying the reduction of 
subjects within the existing training period was designed, 
argued Rice, to send the Cadet to sea thoroughly grounded 
ln mathematics and with his general education as advanced 
as possible. This was not only desirable, but also 
essential, given the established difficulty of attempting 
to pursue the education process later in an operational 
warship. Despite their glowing endorsement of standards 
in the Britannia and the fact that their recommendations 
were, thus far, based on its retention, they expressed 
doubts as to whether even these proposals would produce 
the desired effect, while calculated and based on a two 
year training cycle. 
The proposed solution to this problem appeared ln 
paragraph 38, where the Committee considered 
whether it might not be desirable to substitute for 
the Britannia a college on shore, where a moderate 
extension of the course of training would not in 
our opinion be attended by the same disadvantages 
as a lengthened residence on board a stationary 
.. h' 99 tralnlng s lp. 
If such a plan were adopted the reduced syllabus would 
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still be pursued but based this time on a three year 
course on shore, broken by two extended summer cruises In 
sea-going training ships. 
The advocacy of a shore side college was conducted 
with considerable deftness and deference towards the 
Britannia, and the Committee were at pains to avoid any 
specific criticism of the ship. Hence, her excellence as 
a place of residence was stressed and the discipline 
pertaining aboard, which produced 'force of character and 
th ' f th . ,100 h' en USlasm or e serVlce was emp aSlsed. The fact 
was, however, that regardless of her own particular 
standards, by 1874 the Britannia bore 'but slight 
resemblance to a sea going man 0' war,lOl and the nature 
of life aboard was so different that it was 'in no way a 
preparation for the discomforts of a sea life,.102 
Conversely, there was much to be said for a naval 
college which would be established at the outset with a 
distinct atmosphere and discipline of its own, derived not 
from a warship but approximating as far as possible to the 
conditions of the best public schools. While it would 
have a naval officer as its Lieutenant Governor 
the utmost pains should be taken to obtain a 
headmaster and assistant masters of a calibre 
not inferior to that which would make them 
acceptable for like posts at the best public 
schools. l03 
The college should have immediate access to the water and 
be as close as possible to a sheltered anchorage where a 
small training vessel could be based. While the special 
requirements of a naval education would need to be 
maintained, it should be possible, argued the Committee, 
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to expand the study of Latin, Geography, and History so 
that any boy rejected as unfit for the Service during his 
course should be capable of resuming his education in an 
established public school. 
Although Sullivan has portrayed the Rice 
recommendation to establish such a college as 'a radical 
1 ,104, 'II b ' proposa lt Wl e noted that thelr concept of 
shoreside training differed little from the 
recommendations of the 1863 Select Committee on Promotion 
and Retirement. Similarly, it has been shown that in the 
same year a First Lord's circular drew a favourable 
response to the feasibility of shore side training and 
that a survey of potential sites had been undertaken. 
Discussion had been evident in the Service press for some 
years and the subject had recently been thoroughly aired 
in debate concerning the new college at Greenwich. In 
essence there was little original thinking in either the 
detail or the concept of shore training. 
In fact, far from taking a radical stance on the 
suitability of the Britannia, the Report seemed infused 
with a deference towards the ship which cast doubt on 
whether the Committee really expected their recommendation 
for a longer course on shore, to be accepted. Their 
combination for example of a vigorous endorsement of 
standards of health and habitability and an absolute 
opposition, for reasons never fully explained, to any 
extension of the course, seemed to suggest they expected 
the status quo to be maintained. Similarly, although they 
argued that the College was their preferred option, the 
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bulk of the discussion on the syllabus was concerned not 
with a fuller course conducted over three years, but on a 
two year session with a reduced number of subjects - ln 
effect the existing arrangement in the ship. It is 
important to note that however desirable the Rice Committee 
felt a college might be, arguments in its favour were 
careful to avoid a derogation of the Britannia. 
The Rice Report was submitted on 6th October 1874 and 
its recommendations incorporated into new regulations for 
entry published the following February.IOS The abolition 
of limited competition was confirmed and a return to the 
old system of absolute nomination authorised. As the 
overall manpower requirement remained unchanged - the Navy 
still required about 80 young officers per year, a 
reversion to the old system effectively halved the number 
of candidates. Nevertheless the fact that this smaller 
number were almost assured of a place appeared to satisfy 
the demands of senior officers, and Statham's claim that 
the decision had the full support of the Service, appeared 
to be borne out by reaction in the press. 
The new regulations also confirmed the promlnence of 
Arithmetic and Latin in the entrance examination which 
meant that for the first time in recent years, it was no 
longer necessary to demonstrate a proficiency in French -
an understanding of the outlines of modern geography being 
deemed an acceptable substitute. Thus in successive entry 
regulations over a ten year period, French had declined 
from being an equal scoring alternative to Latin, to a 
subject carrying half marks, and finally holding only 
optional status. This demise was all the more remarkable 
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on account of the vocational relevance of the language, 
which arguably placed it second only to mathematics in the 
naval officer's skills. 
The New Naval College 
While most commentators acknowledge the government's 
general acceptance of the Rice proposals there is a view 
that the issue of shore side training constituted an 
exception. Sullivan notes that 'no immediate action 
followed upon the Committee's recommendation that a college 
106 be established on shore'. Statham says of the issue that 
'no notice was taken of it, apparently, at the time,107 and 
Bonnett supports this view. l08 The basis for these 
assertions is unclear for it is evident from a number of 
sources that the government was no less assiduous in this 
matter than in others. Thus in the Estimates for the year 
immediately following the submission of the Rice Report a 
total of £65,000, of which £8,000 was immediately required, 
was allocated 'Towards the erection of a College for naval 
( . 1 d' h f' t )' 109 cadets 1nc u 1ng purc ase 0 Sl e . It is also clear 
that Ward Hunt's intention was to found the institution at 
Dartmouth, for on 5th April 1875 he directed the Medical 
Director General to report on the suitability of a site 
above the town. 110 In June further advice was sought from 
past commanding officers of the Britannia on the 
suitability of the location,lll and the following month a 
statement was drawn up demonstrating savings which would 
h h · 112 eventually accrue from the decommissioning of t e s lp. 
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In fact, far from allowing the matter to rest, the 
Broad Arrow was concerned that Ward Hunt was pursuing the 
matter too energetically. In July 1874 it noted that if 
the establishment of a naval college was an example of 
Conservative reform, then the government would do better to 
'return to its proper policy and not compromise itself by 
adopting the restless fancies of fussy agitators,.113 
Although matters were well advanced, the paper reflected 
gloomily, 'we trust we are not too late to avert a change 
which may be for the worst,.114 
In fact moves to scrap Britannia and replace her with 
a college were halted briefly the following year, not by 
the strength of the opposition but conversely by the extent 
and the variety of the support. Within weeks of the 
publication of the Rice Report in 1875, letters offering to 
sell land to the Admiralty for the site of a college 
started to flood in. The situation soon became more 
complex with the offer of land at Poole as a gift to the 
nation, and the political sensitivity sharpened as various 
members for seaside constituencies felt duty bound, 
according to the United Services Magazine, 'to trumpet 
. 1 1 1 . ,115 forth the praises of his partlcu ar oca lty . As the 
clamour grew the First Lord had to warn his staff that they 
should on no account enter into correspondence with vendors 
. l' 116 regarding the relative merits of potentla sltes. 
Clearly sensing difficulty ahead, Ward Hunt abandoned the 
plan to move directly ashore at Dartmouth and in 1876 
appointed a Committee to advise on a suitable location for 
the new college. 
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This group was led by Admiral George G Wellesley and 
consisted of serving officers Captains C T Curme and W E 
Gordon and two doctors - John Sutherland from the War 
Office and James Donnet former Inspector General of 
Hospitals for the Navy. Their remit was simply 'to advise 
their Lordships as to the most desirable site for a College 
for Naval Cadets' with due regard to 
1. General salubrity 
2. Supply of water 
3. A close harbour, giving facilities for the 
accommodation of a small training vessel and for 
boating and bathing with safety. 
4. Easy access to the sea from such harbour. 
5. Proper space for recreation ground on shore and 
suitability of the neighbourhood for walking 
exercise. 
6. Absence of special temptations ln the morality ln 
the neighbourhood. 
7. General suitability, including means of access by 
railway. 
8. Caeteris paribus reasonable proximity to fl~reat 
naval port is to be taken into consideration. 
With Naval Paymaster George Grandidier as Secretary, the 
Committee commenced their work in July 1876. 
Most existing comment has suggested that the scope of 
the Wellesley inquiry was relatively limited. Hughes for 
. .. t d 118 
example notes that only nine sltes were lnvestlga e , 
while Statham cites Milford Haven, Hayling Island, 
Westward Ho, the Isle of Wight, Dartmouth, Southampton 
119 Water and Poole, with Sullivan repeating 
the same locations. In fact reference to the original 
document reveals that the Wellesley survey was a much 
wider one and that in response to the insertion 'of an 
advertisement inviting offers of eligible sites accessible 
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by sea or tidal waters',120 they actually examined 28 
sites at 12 different locations. 
While these inspectoral tasks were relatively 
straight forward and might have been handled competently 
within an internal departmental report, it was clear from 
constituency interest in the question that the final 
decision would have some political significance, and thus 
the Wellesley deliberations were presented in the form of 
a COIT@and Paper in early 1877. The Report revealed that a 
number of the 28 sites could be dismissed relatively 
quickly. These included all those adjacent to the 
dockyards at Portsmouth, Devonport and Milford Haven on 
the grounds of 'immoral temptations', Hayling Island, 
Westward Ho and Poole for lack of satisfactory facilities 
for bathing and boating, and Weymouth, which could only 
offer Portland Roads as an anchorage for a training 
vessel. In the Committee's opinion there were only three 
contenders for the position - Wootton Creek on the Isle of 
Wight, ground on the shores of Southampton Water between 
Hamble and Netley and the original choice at Mount Boone, 
Dartmouth. 
The investigation of these sites was conducted with 
remarkable stringency including examination, via companies 
of Royal Engineers, of the sub soil down to six feet ln 
each location. Annual rainfall was measured and its 
incidence noted, as was the quality of the drinking water 
available at each location. The death rate, cause of 
death and prevalence of disease in the local population 
was analysed and the nature of the surrounding countryside 
for recreational purposes examined. While both sites on 
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the Solent had much to recommend them, the Committee 
nevertheless supported the First Lord's original decision 
that the new college should be built on the hill 
overlooking the moorings of the Britannia and Hindostan at 
Dartmouth. 121 
Predictably there was a good deal of hostile reaction 
from the thwarted constituencies with charges from E J 
Reed, Member for Pembroke, that the Wellesley Report 
t · d . . . . 122 con alne serlOUS lnconslstencles. In May 1877 the 
Member for the Isle of Wight secured the assurance that no 
final settlement would be reached until the First Lord, 
who was ill, had returned to the House. 123 In July it was 
announced that the government had accepted that Dartmouth 
was the best site but that the final decision would remain 
in abeyance as George Ward Hunt was now seriously ill and 
1 ·· b d 124 lVlng a roa . The situation became increasingly 
complex when, in response to this announcement, the 
Admiralty were informed that in fact the potential site 
was not for sale and that the owners had no intention of 
125 parting with any portion of the estate. This had the 
effect of increasing the pressure from other parties and 
throughout July 1877 the constituency interest was 
maintained with questions from the members for 
Southampton, Weymouth and Christchurch, all demanding to 
know when the matter would be finally resolved. 
By late July 1877 the legal aspects concerning the 
land had become confused with doubts now expressed 
concerning both its sale an~ apparently its legal 
ownership.126 What was clear, however, not least from 
persistent government prevarication, was that the whole 
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subject of a future naval college at Dartmouth was closely 
connected with the personal position of George Ward Hunt. 
Since the Childers reorganisation of 1869 it was of course 
perfectly possible for the senior political appointee to 
sponsor individual projects in isolation from his 
colleagues, and it was clear that A F Egerton, the 
Admiralty Secretary, was not prepared to advance the 
matter while his political master was absent. On July 
27th the Chancellor of the Exchequer effectively closed 
discussion with the announcement that no Vote would be 
made during the present session but that, pending the 
First Lord's return to health, it might be introduced as a 
supplementary estimate the following year. 127 
In fact two days later George Ward Hunt died and with 
his death the issue of a naval college faded into 
obscurity. The United Services Magazine had predicted 
that the continuance of the project would 'depend very 
much on the view that the new First Lord may happen to 
128 
take of the advisability of the proposed change' and 
although a summary prepared for his successor noted that 
'the proposed college was a matter that Mr Ward Hunt took 
a personal interest in',129 no action followed. In 
preparing his spending plans for the following year 
the new First Lord, W H Smith, noted to his Chief Clerk 
without further elaboration that, 
no provision is made 1n the Estimates for a vote 
for the Cadets college, it is not proposed to 
reopen negotiations for its acquisition this 
130 year. 
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In June 1878 Smith again noted that he was 'not prepared 
t t ",131 h o en er negotlatl0ns on t e matter and the lssue was 
allowed to rest, with no further discussion ln Admiralty 
papers until the advent of the Luard Committee examining 
Cadets tral'nl'ng l'n 1886. 132 It is also instructive to 
note that the change of First Lord effectively ended any 
further parliamentary discussion, and the back bench 
concerns about the future of naval training expressed ln 
the summer of 1877, were revealed as nothing more than the 
advancement of various constituency interests. 
Thus although the plan for shore side training came 
to nought it can be shown that, despite previous claims of 
Admiralty inaction, the matter was carefully and 
immediately advanced under the Ward Hunt administration. 
Money for the project was earmarked in the draft estimates 
and there can be little doubt that, but for the competing 
claims of other constituencies and the need to appoint a 
committee of arbitration, that a college would have been 
established in Dartmouth possibly as early as the autumn 
of 1875. That it was not was undoubtedly due to the 
personal preference of the new First Lord who could, with 
some justification, cite the Rice Committee's conclusion 
that while a new college was desirable, the Britannia 
remained perfectly adequate to fulfil the needs of Cadets' 
training. 
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Conclusion 
Some indication of the nature of life in the ship at 
this time may be gained by examining the Britannia 
regulations for 1877. The custom of issuing separate 
regulations had begun four years earlier with a small 
locally produced pUblication printed in the town. By 1877 
this amounted to some 110 pages concerning every 
conceivable detail of ship's routine from the temperature 
of salt water baths in winter (never to exceed 60 0 p) to 
the inspectoral arrangements for young officers brushes 
and combs - (mustered twice a month by the ship's Writer). 
Por every activity on board there was a laid down routine 
and it was possible, in theory anyway, to account for 
virtually every minute of Cadets' daily activity from 
0525, when those under Number Two punishment were to 
muster, until 2130 when evening prayers were completed and 
young officers returned to their hammocks. 
Within the regulations was an outline of what was 
termed the 'Scheme of Education in Use', which provides a 
useful insight into the educational progress made by the 
end of the period. By 1877 there were 16 staff involved 
with the instruction of young officers, the largest number 
to date, with the bulk of the work being handled by eight 
Naval Instructors who taught solely mathematics and were 
responsible for one class of students throughout their 
time in the ship. Although this group were all serving 
officers and their leader had the title Principal Naval 
Instructor, by this time the post was held by a civilian, 
a young former public schoolmaster, Revd J C P Aldous. 
Despite the fact that he had no previous naval experlence 
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he had been appointed ln 1875 presumably as part of the 
transition process to a shores ide college, which the Rice 
Committee had indicated 'should approximate as far as 
possible to the conditions of the best public schools,.133 
In addition to the Naval Instructors a Staff Commander 
taught Chartwork and Instruments, the Ship's Chaplain was 
responsible for Geography, Science and Astronomy and 
completing the teaching staff were masters responsible for 
French, Latin and Drawing. 
Instructional time was divided into Winter and Summer 
routine - a system designed to make maXlmum use of 
daylight and ensure that several hours could be spent each 
day undertaking sport and practical boatwork. In either 
mode a central core of six hours academic instruction was 
supplemented by daily 'Early Morning Study' for 30 minutes 
before breakfast and 'Evening Study' for one hour every 
day except Sunday. It will be noted from the subject 
responsibilities of the staff that by 1877 almost no 
instructional time was available for English Grammar, 
Literature or History and that the original Woolley 
proposals for elementary chemistry, botany and simple 
zoology had not been implemented. Indeed by this date 
writing and compositional skills were restricted to one 
hour's dictation per week and to the production of one 
essay per term. 'All books for private reading' warned 
the 1877 regulations 'are submitted to the Principal Naval 
Instructor for 
read novels on 
approval' and on no account were Cadets to 
134 Sundays. 
The impression of rigid organisation and close 
supervision was further strengthened by examining the 
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directions to Naval Instructors and other Masters, who 
were required to submit daily reports of the 'attention' 
demonstrated by their students and monthly reports of 
their progress. Report books were apparently submitted to 
the Captain at the end of each working day and a weekly 
review of those making 'Most and Least Progress' was 
conducted. Any Cadet who demonstrated a degree of 
attention to study described as 'moderate' or less was 
liable to punishment. 
The correctional routine in 1877 was still 
characterised by the three classes of punishment 
established by Captain Powell135 - with the additional 
supplement that when these proved ineffective with the 
persistently troublesome, the caning of Cadets 'had been 
tried and found most beneficial,.136 This practice had 
been reintroduced after almost six years of suspension in 
December 1872, although it remained seldom used. A survey 
of the ship's punishment books from 1873 to 1877 for 
example suggests that under Captain Foley only 16 Cadets 
had been physically punished in three years, and under his 
successor Captain William Graham, the average was little 
more than seven per year. Beating was awarded for a 
variety of offences, with breaking bounds either by 
entering barns and farmhouses or going aboard vessels ln 
the harbour, frequently cited. Any form of bullying or 
'fagging' was inevitably dealt with by corporal 
punishment, although it is clear that in the Britannia the 
most serious breaches of discipline were considered to be 
theft or immorality, for which culprits were dismissed 
from the Service. 
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The 1877 Regulations present a picture of a highly 
structured training routine in which conduct and progress 
was both academically and professionally very closely 
monitored. The syllabus which, in the wake of the Rice 
Report, again included significant portions of Seamanship 
instruction, was probably narrower than at any time ln the 
previous decade with only French, Latin and Drawing to 
alleviate an academic diet of practical and theoretical 
mathematics. The working day was physically demanding and 
the supervision, whether from instructors, staff officers 
or the ships regulating ratings, was constant. It is also 
evident, for example, from the 37 separate proforma listed 
at the end of the publication, that a set procedure 
existed for every possible eventuality, ranging from the 
circumstances in which the Captain would, exceptionally, 
correspond with the Mother, rather than the Father of a 
Cadet (Form 4), to the monthly examination of the state 
and condition of a Cadet's Sea Chest (Form 18). 
Yet in many ways life ln the Britannia might be 
thought to compare favourably with that of a contemporary 
public school, for while undoubtedly hide-bound with rules 
and regulations it was at least constantly under the gaze 
of the Admiralty, Parliament and the Service press. 
Perhaps, for this reason, there is little evidence for 
example of staff eccentricity, and the regular reappoint-
ment of both the Captain and his officers guarded against 
inefficiency and complacency. While the disciplinary 
routine was frequently invoked it will be noted that 
corporal punishment was still at this stage comparatively 
rare and, being a matter of public scrutiny, was 
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meticulously recorded. Further, unlike a number of public 
schools, the Cadet Captains (Prefects) had no delegated 
powers of physical punishment and far from gaining tacit 
approval, the practice of 'fagging' incurred severe 
penalties. 
The development of Cadet education from 1869 to 1877 
saw concerted attempts both to improve the quality of the 
young officer entrant and the nature of his initial 
training and education. The commissioning of a 
replacement training ship, the drafting of new 
regulations, the advent of competitive entry and the 
appointment of both minor and major enquiries into the 
system were tangible evidence of interest and concern. 
Yet serious doubts must be expressed about the degree of 
progress actually achieved by the end of the period. 
Despite a reducing manpower requirement by 1877 the 
Admiralty had readopted the system of absolute nomination, 
the attempt to found a naval college had come to naught, 
and academic training of a particularly narrow variety 
continued to be conducted in the Britannia which by this 
time resembled neither a school, or the contemporary 
warship she had originally been intended to emulate. 
The opening two years of the period, and in 
particular the advent of the Childers' administration, are 
those most distinctly identified with change. While it 
should not be forgotten that his predecessor, Henry Corry, 
had identified shortcomings in the Britannia system, had 
been responsible for the appointment of Woolley as 
external examiner and had advised Childers personally of 
the need to tackle the problem of 'the number of dunces in 
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the lower branches of the service,137, it was undoubtedly 
the new Liberal First Lord who initiated the change of 
pace ln naval educational affairs. 
This may be observed primarily ln the new regulations 
of 1869 and 1870 which constituted the first significant 
change in a decade, and whose primary improving measure 
was the advent of limited competition. In retrospect this 
appears a modest and logical device, undoubtedly driven by 
Childers' overall concern for order and regularity ln 
naval manpower, particularly at a time when the 
requirement for young officers was declining drastically. 
The logic of introducing an element of competition both to 
reduce numbers and raise standards appeared impeccable, 
particularly when it is borne in mind that at no time was 
it ever suggested that senior officers' privileges in the 
matter should be modified or withdrawn. This being the 
case, the subsequent reaction of antagonism and dismay 
throughout the officer corps appears out of proportion, 
and must surely have been based on the notion that the 
measure constituted the first step towards truly 
meritocratic selection via open competition. 
It is clear that other aspects of the 1869/70 
Regulations, such as the lowering of the entry age and the 
reduction of seamanship teaching in favour of academic 
study implied a shift in general philosphy away from the 
notion of a warship dedicated to training, towards the 
concept of a school afloat. Once again this appeared 
logical, for if the Service was determined to take more 
capable youngsters at an earlier age, there was a need to 
establish sound educational foundations. Similarly as 
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each year passed, the Britannia resembled less and less a 
ship of the active fleet and all modern relevant 
professional skills, apart from basic seamanship, were now 
best taught in the operational vessels of the fleet. 
The most evincing argument in support of the trend 
towards professional and academic segregation was 
undoubtedly the decision to appoint the Woolley Committee 
to report on a future curriculum. The existence of this 
group appears to have gone completely unnoticed in any 
previous account, yet their wide ranging remit and the 
conscious decision to consult experts with no previous 
naval knowledge emphasised the shift 1n the Admiralty 
approach towards Cadet's education. As might be expected 
from a group containing two headmasters, the Woolley 
recommendations were unambiguous that the entrance 
examination and the syllabus taught in the ship should be 
formulated to comply as far as possible, subject to naval 
requirements, with the practice adopted by British public 
schools. 
The personal contribution of Joseph Woolley to this 
process was particularly important. His place in naval 
education prior to 1869 has been discussed previously and 
it has been shown that Sullivan's view that Woolley 'was 
not able to initiate policy ... but would merely give his 
138 . 1 d t' t h' opinion when asked for it' ser10US y un eres 1ma es 1S 
contribution. with the arrival of a Liberal 
administration and a First Lord prepared to bypass the 
established pattern of decision making and rely on 
individual advice, the Director of'Education's influence 
was further extended. This has already been noted in his 
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work for the Shadwell Committee, where he was an early and 
v1gorous supporter of the Greenwich option, at a time when 
its unpopularity and expense appeared to preclude it. His 
contribution to Cadet education was no less significant, 
for it has been shown that the move to align the Britannia 
with public school practice was initiated by Woolley, that 
the committee responsible were largely his nominees, and 
that its recommendations were wholly accepted by the 
Admiralty Board. 
The fact that the Woolley recommendations were never 
fully implemented up to 1874 was probably due to a 
combination of factors - not least his own absence from 
the scene, first through illness and later by resignation. 
It is clear that some momentum was lost during the years 
1872-74, and Goschen's unwillingness to expand and uprate 
the post of Director of Education, as Woolley suggested on 
his departure, meant that a golden opportunity to provide 
some central direction to training was missed. The 
alternative chosen - to place the Britannia under the 
supervision of the newly founded Royal Naval College, 
might well have been a judicious one, if it had also been 
the intention to give Greenwich some autonomous 
educational authority. Despite the efforts of the first 
° °d 139 thO t task that the Adm1ral PreS1 ent 1S was no a 
Admiralty felt able to devolve, with the result that by 
early 1874 external supervision of the training ship had 
been emasculated and the sense of purpose injected by the 
Woolley Committee had been lost. 
374 
Despite dark mutterings In the contemporary Service 
press of a 'Britannia plot', by enemies of the ship, 'to 
break up an institution that has been of great value',140 
the decision to appoint a Committee of enquiry into the 
training ship appeared to be rooted In firmly empirical 
ground. Her poor health record was a matter of fact and 
the decision to appoint Captain Foley, directly from a 
harbour training ship, in order to institute an 
improvement programme was tacit admission of existing 
• 
problems. Thus, however wayward the evidence of the 
Medical Director General concerning the ship's 
suitability, it was clear that there was at least a case 
to answer and that it was raised at the critical moment 
when the new First Lord, George Ward Hunt, was under-
taking his initial review of priorities. 
Despite Statham's claim that it was not clear for 
what reason the Admiralty decided to appoint the Rice 
. 141. f h . f th t Commlttee, In act t e experlence 0 e years up 0 
1874 was fully reflected in the Committee's remit to 
examlne 'whether conditions under which naval cadets are 
trained on board HMS Britannia are favourable to their 
142 physical development'. It is important to remember, 
when reviewing the Rice findings, that any consideration 
of the nature of education conducted in the ship was 
always intended to relate to the issue of health and well 
being ie. the extent to which academic study for example 
overtaxed the young officer. This being the case the 
membership of the Committee - three naval officers, two 
naval doctors and two Oxbridge academics may initially 
have been thought appropriate. 
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It was evident, however, that despite the length and 
detail of its deliberations the Committee failed to 
address matters within its remit either expertly or 
independently. This was evident even in the relatively 
short examination of habitability which should, in theory 
have constituted the stuff of the report. While extensive 
medical testimony was certainly taken, it was significant 
that, with the exception of the Medical Director General, 
a resolute opponent of the ship, it was gleaned from staff 
with direct responsibilities for Britannia or her 
shores ide sick quarters. It was thus clearly of direct 
professional interest for the Staff Surgeons to insist 
that, while there had been problems in the past, things 
had now immeasurably improved. While this was probably 
true, the absence of any truly independent assessment must 
ralse doubts particularly when, for reasons not stated, 
the Committee remained implacably opposed to any extension 
of training time in the ship. 
The apparent contradiction between awarding the ship 
a clean bill of health, while refusing to countenance an 
extension of training time unless a college was built, 
remained unexplained. Yet it was education, and ln 
particular the mode of entry and future syllabus that 
absorbed the majority of the Rice deliberations. On the 
former matter, while they claimed to have recommended the 
abolition of competition specifically upon educational 
grounds, it is apparent from the evidence that it was the 
views of naval staff, rather than educators, that held 
sway. Perhaps the most pertinent observation to make 
about the decision was the extent that it swam against the 
376 
" 
tide, not only in other professions, but within the 
Service itself where the systematic reduction of manpower 
and the retention of absolute nomination were 
fundamentally incompatible. A little over five years 
later the Service re-introduced limited competition of 
even greater rigour143 , and in 1882 the examination, by 
this time described as of 'absolutely ferocious 
. ,144 
strlngency was transferred to the Civil Service 
Commissioners. 
It has been noted that the Rice deliberations 
represented an unravelling of the work of the Woolley 
Committee and recommendations such as the removal of 
compulsory French from the entrance examination, the 
raising of the profile of Latin in the syllabus and the 
return to absolute nomination ran exactly contrary to the 
Woolley proposals. That the work of this group consisting 
almost entirely of professional educators should be so 
systematically dismembered, while unfortunate, was at 
least only a temporary setback. The succeeding 
regulations of January 1881 reversed the judgement on both 
Latin and French and together with the readoption of 
limited competition helped return Cadets' education to the 
guidelines established by Woolley eleven years previously. 
A more permanent setback was the failure to bring to 
fruition the Rice measure with the best long term prospect 
of improving the quality of initial education in the 
Service - the proposal to found a naval college. This was 
hardly a new concept, for it had been under discussion 
periodically almost since the training ship commissioned, 
and had come close to adoption following a recommendation 
377 
of a Select Committee in 1863. Neither was it ever 
advocated with particular conviction, and in particular 
the essential corollary to the argument, namely that the 
Britannia was no longer an appropriate venue for naval 
training, was always missing from the college case. 
Nevertheless, despite previous comment to the contrary, it 
probably carne closer to fruition in the two years after 
1875 than at any other time previously, with Ward Hunt 
allocating money, negotiating for a site and appointing a 
Committee to investigate the question, before finally 
deciding to proceed with the project at Dartmouth. 
It has been shown that this impetus was achieved 
largely by Ward Hunt's personal identification with the 
project and that it did not survive a change of First 
Lord. By the time of his death the process had run into 
legal difficulties concerning the acquisition of land and 
the new incumbent W H Smith, a man 'intelligent enough to 
appreciate arguments for reform, but politically unable 
and temperamentally unwilling to crusade for them',145 had 
no previous Admiralty experience and was not prepared to 
award the matter any priority. In this he was undoubtedly 
assisted by both the Rice Committee's unwillingness to 
offer any real criticism of the Britannia and the fact 
that the so called parliamentary pressure for a naval 
college was little more than constituency self interest. 
With the vote of confidence implied by the decision of the 
Prince of Wales to enter his sons Prince George and Prince 
Edward into the Britannia in July 1877, Smith had a 
further and perhaps indisputable reason to take no further 
action in the matter. 
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The years from 1869 to 1877 thus saw mixed fortunes 
1n the development of initial education in the Royal Navy. 
The degree of political autonomy established by Childers' 
reform of the Admiralty Board certainly enabled progress 
to be made but equally, depending on the inclination of 
the First Lord, it also allowed development to falter. 
Clearly some matters had a logic and impetus that could 
not be long impeded - the advent of competitive entry for 
example, while suffering a temporary reversal in 1875, was 
inevitable. Similarly the practice of eliciting expert 
educational advice from external sources became standard 
after 1870. Yet a sense of missed opportunity rather than 
overall progress might be thought to characterise the 
period. The decision not to proceed with a naval college 
for example, meant that scope for expanding the quality 
and quantity of training would remain limited and that the 
Britannia - daily less like a warship, yet having none of 
the advantages of a school, would be seen as increasingly 
eccentric and isolated from the affairs of the nation and 
the Navy. The failure to establish any central direction 
and control to naval education in the wake of the 
abolition of the post of Director of Education also meant 
that for a further two decades progress would always 
remain tentative and spasmodic. 
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The years 1857 to 1877 have frequently been seen as 
constituting a general stasis 1n naval affairs, 
characterised by a principled reduction of expenditure, 
declining numbers of officers and men, public indifference 
and a lack of any significant party political dichotomy on 
Service matters. As a general overview or summary of the 
period it is difficult to take issue with any of these 
points, for a Navy which saw no significant increase 1n its 
budget over 25 years and whose manpower vote 1n 1860 would 
not be matched again until 1894, was clearly 1n the 
doldrums. When this was set against the need to fund 
nothing less -than an industrial revolution in ships and 
equipment, in an era when minor but persistent operational 
demands continued to pressure resources, it 1S easy to see 
how the Service frequently appeared to have lost positive 
direction and momentum. 
Yet beneath this slack water there was a strong 
counter current which was steadily, almost imperceptibly, 
moving the Navy to a position which would enable it to 
respond to future changes in political resolve. Many of 
the constituents of this movement were tentative and short 
lived, and even important measures with long term 
implications for the Service were considered unremarkable 
at the time. The introduction, for example, of sailors' 
uniform, modifications to discipline and punishment 
procedure, the establishment of career patterns and orderly 
routines for retirement were matters of little national 
importance or public concern, yet taken together it may be 
argued that they helped produce the social transformation 
which allowed the rapid expansion of the Royal Navy in the 
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last decade of the century. 
The development of naval education has some claim to 
be part of this positive undercurrent. While it was seldom 
prominent on an agenda pressurised by expenditure and 
manpower cuts, problems in ship design, and operational 
decisions concerning literally matters of life and death, 
it nevertheless made considerable if rather erratic 
progress in the two decades from 1857. This advance had 
two distinct characteristics. First, many improving 
educational measures were defined in and derived from, 
other areas of Admiralty concern. The Britannia, for 
example, was conceived primarily to counter the officer 
retention problem of the 1850s. Two decades later the 
advent of 'limited competition' was a measure to reduce 
numbers at a time of manpower stringency, and its subsequent 
suspenslon, while justified on educational grounds, was a 
transparent attempt to consolidate the structure of the 
officer corps by returning selection to its own senior 
staff. Thus not only did education occupy a relatively low 
place on the naval agenda, but it was commonly employed as 
a device or regulator of more general manpower problems. 
Secondly, it is clear that, despite considerable 
efforts applied to the improvement of initial and higher 
study, at no time between 1857 and 1877 were the total 
educational needs of the officer corps systematically 
examined or reviewed. While shortcomings in one area were 
occasionally cited as justification for improvement in 
another - as in the Shadwell defence of higher study - no 
comprehensive overview was ever attempted. The result was 
that while the principal characteristic of the period was 
388 
the pattern and order imposed upon naval training, this was 
seldom itself the product of an orderly or sequential 
process. Not only was this true in the relationship of 
education to other naval activity but it also applied to 
the relationship between initial and higher education where 
advances were frequently disparate and unrelated. 
Any satisfactory understanding of initial education 
must centre on the evolution and development of the officer 
training ship. Given that this institution trained and 
educated almost every senior naval figure to serve up to 
and beyond the First World War, it is surprising that no 
detailed analysis of the curriculum and routine has been 
previously undertaken. No detailed attempt for example has 
been made to explain the conditions of her commissioning, 
and accounts of the ship's history are essentially two 
dimensional. There has been a persistent tendency to 
portray Britannia as a harsh, even brutal, institution with 
a regime dedicated to the acquisition of inappropriate, 
outmoded practical skills and where all academic work was 
subordinate to athletic prowess. 
While this vision has undoubtedly been consolidated by 
senior officers' memoirs, original research suggests a 
different picture. It will be apparent, for example, that 
the Britannia system was a direct and logical reponse to 
the disastrous attempts undertaken since 1837 to enter and 
educate young officers solely in seagoing ships - a system 
responsible for a generation of young officers of such poor 
quality and low retention rate that the trained list was 
always under pressure. It has also been shown that the 
creation of this specialised training environment was 
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synonymous with a strong sense of pastoral care, and that 
far from an atmosphere of brutality, the first 20 years of 
the Britannia were infused with concern for the moral and 
physical welfare of young officers. While conditions were 
austere and discipline rigorous, it is clear that the lurid 
accounts of frequent physical punishment have no factual 
basis. In fact the regimes of successive commanding 
officers were models of temperance and restraint, and 
isolated examples of eccentric leadership were countered 
swiftly and firmly by an appropriately concerned Admiralty 
Board. 
A similar sense of perspective must be applied to the 
nature of the ship's curriculum which, despite assertions 
to the contrary, was always heavily academic, with a strong 
bias towards mathematics. While the syllabus was narrow ln 
concept and limited in scope, particularly with reference 
to history, geography and literary skills, it clearly 
formed the central core of the training, and while 
practical work was important, it was always subordinate and 
over two decades was gradually reduced, in favour of yet 
more study. Thus while recollections of Britannia 
inevitably emphasise the pursuit of practical boatwork or 
sail-based seamanship, and while the relevance of this 
type of training has subsequently been called into 
question, the evidence suggests that the bulk of a Cadet's 
training time was spent pursuing the mathematical skills 
essential to the seagoing profession. 
It will be evident that considerable official interest 
and attention was devoted to the Britannia and that the 20 
years from 1857 reveal a constant sense of ebb and flow ln 
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the philosophy applied to young officers' education. In part 
this was inevitable, for the mechanisms for revision and 
reVlew were inherent in the Britannia constitution. The 
ship's routine, for example, was always subject to a 
degree of re-alignment with the arrival of each new 
commanding office~ and successive Admiralty administrations 
inevitably adjusted priorities towards the training 
curriculum. Similarly, the contributions of a series of 
outsta~ding individuals such as H C E Childers, George Ward 
Hunt, Robert Harris and Joseph Woolley, ensured that the 
profile of the Britannia remained high and that her work was 
never far from the concern and care of the Service. 
It will thus be apparent that the portrayal of the ship 
as a stagnant institution adhering to a set of outdated 
concepts and values is quite inaccurate. Similarly, the 
ingenious view that the Britannia represented a conscious 
attempt to recreate the Navy of two generations past, or that 
her routine was an exercise in pseudo-realism, are not 
supported by the evidence. In fact the early years of formal 
officer training were characterised by lively and informed 
debate. There was, for example, a continuous review of the 
value of practical training in the new entry syllabus, which 
resulted in the logical and ordered segregation of 
professional and academic work. There was also a persistent 
and sometimes acrimonious discussion of the value of 
competition within the entrance procedure. Perhaps most 
significantly, there was always a debate about the relevance 
and value of the Britannia itself - in particular whether her 
work might be better conducted in a shore based institution. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that the 
Britannia system of officer training was both unusual and 
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significantly different to methods adopted by other important 
maritime powers, particularly Russia, the United States and 
France. Only in Britain, for example, were attempts made to 
undertake continuing education in operational warships, and 
only in the Royal Navy was a corps of Naval Instructors 
maintained. Unlike her competitors, who were prepared to 
accept entrants often as old as 18 and never less than 14, 
the British not only persisted with early age entry, but 
act~ally reduced the minimum to 12 during the period. 
Similarly the other major powers all practised some form of 
shoreside education - at St Petersburg (1752), Annapolis 
(1845) and Brest (1848) - while the Royal Navy persisted with 
the training ship system into the early years of the 
twentieth century. 
Not only was the British system highly esoteric but it 
also commanded considerable support from its own officer 
corps. While there was an extensive debate about whether 
training should be conducted on ship or ashore, there was 
little dispute about the nature of the work to be undertaken 
or the priorities involved. At the heart of the British 
system was a basic requirement for young officer candidates 
to be selected exclusively, via the nomination system, by 
members of the existing officer corps. They were to be 
imbued with the qualities of physical toughness, honour and 
courage required by a military officer, and these 
characteristics were to be instilled at the earliest possible 
age. The process did not preclude academic study - indeed 
the pursuit of superior mathematical skills lay at the heart 
of Cadet training - but it did imply that such work should 
remain narrowly interpreted and vocationally orientated. 
Indeed so confident was the Service about the priorities 
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in an officer's early years, that it was prepared to 
acknowledge that in certain areas other systems were 
superior. The Rice Committee, for example, noted the 
advantages reaped by major naval competitors who entered 
candidates later and trained them longer. l Shadwell was 
more forthright, concluding that foreign students were 
even 
'better grounded in all appertaining to book learning' and 
that 'having received a greater amount of mental training 
must be better qualified to enter on more advanced studies,.2 
Yet recognition of these advantages played little part In 
modifying the British approach, where it was felt that deeper 
and more fundamental aspects of a young officer's character 
were to be moulded and produced. 
It was also implicit within the British system that 
only the Royal Navy could undertake this task. This was a 
private world, where the selection of the next generation of 
young officers was considered to be a matter solely for the 
Service, and even the suggestion that the examination of 
candidates for example, might be placed on a broader, more 
meritocratic basis was enough to provoke hostility and 
resentment. Similarly, it was felt that all education must 
be undertaken within an exclusively naval environment, and 
while there was considerable admiration within the officer 
corps for the work of the English public schools, the 
requirement for very young Cadets always precluded a post-
school entry. Thus there was never a naval equivalent to the 
'military stream' within the public school system, and the 
increasing tendency of the British army to attract university 
graduates in these years3 had no parallel in the Royal Navy. 
It will be clear from this thesis that previous accounts 
of the development of initial education in the Service have 
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been based upon misinterpretation and insufficient evidence, 
and that far from inactivity or anachronistic self 
indulgence, the years 1857 to 1877 were characterised by a 
sense of tentative, but clearly identifiable progress. While 
advances in the field were frequently experimental or 
makeshift, rather than the components in the evolution of a 
coherent system, and while to the external observer they may 
have appeared quirky or eccentric, there is little doubt that 
in the exclusive world of the Royal Navy, progress seemed 
logical enough. Detailed research suggests that although 
mistakes were made and opportunities missed, for the most 
part the provision of Cadets' education was pursued in a 
diligent and constructive manner. 
The development of higher education during these years 
stood in marked contrast to the fortunes of HMS Britannia, 
and is inextricably linked with the activities of the Liberal 
government 1868-1874, and in particular with the naval 
administration of H C E Childers. Prior to his arrival at 
the Admiralty the academic needs of trained officers had been 
inadequately met by an underfunded, scarcely resourced 
establishment that saw only a fraction of the officer corps. 
While the Royal Naval College, Portsmouth was not without 
significance and could certainly not be dismissed as a 
'cramming' establishment or an institution dedicated solely 
to technical training, it was clear by 1869 that the valuable 
work it undertook was insufficient for a Service in the midst 
of a scientific revolution. Childers' unique contribution 
was both to recognise this and, via his characteristic 
dispensation with established procedure, to initiate 
personally the process of change. 
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It is important to stress that although previous First 
Lords had demonstrated sporadic interest and concern with 
higher training, Childers was the first to arrive In office 
with the express intention of introducing reform. His 
previous Board experience and an established record of 
achievement in educational administration, made him uniquely 
suited to the task and his contribution may be seen as two 
fold. In the general sense, his overhaul of Board membership 
and procedure, and In particular the dominance of the 
political over the professional view that this produced, 
meant that from 1869 traditional obstacles to reform were 
removed. While this overhaul was undoubtedly insensitively 
introduced and operated, it was nevertheless the essential 
pre-requisite for future change in a number of areas 
including officer training. It was this structural change 
that prompted the advance in higher education from 1869 to 
1874 and, combined with Childers' personal interest, helped 
to explain how an Admiralty administration acknowledged as 
one of the most retrenched of the century, could also be the 
harbinger of educational advance. 
In addition to the general re-structuring of procedure 
Childers also made a series of specific contributions to the 
reform process. In Cadet education these included the 
provision of a replacement training ship, the introduction of 
competitive entry and the appointment of the Woolley 
Committee - the first to employ external advisers and 
probably the most 'expert' of the period. In higher 
education his sponsorship of the first systematic and 
detailed examination of the facilities for advanced study, 
via the Shadwell Committee, set in motion a process that laid 
the foundation of the Royal Navy's modern higher education 
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system. As such, Shadwell was of considerable significance, 
not least because it contained the vital acknowledgment that 
the existing nature of initial training and the inadequacy of 
education at sea, implied a mandatory return to higher study 
later in an officer's career. 
Yet it is clear that while the Shadwell Committee was a 
vital component in the reform process, their conception of 
higher education was essentially conservative and limited in 
scope. Indeed there can be little doubt that, had the views 
of its naval members prevailed or the financial question been 
paramount, the new college they recommended would merely have 
been an extension of the existing facility at Portsmouth. In 
fact by the time this establishment opened . ln 1873 it 
represented not only the less popular and more expensive 
option considered by Shadwell, but also a significantly 
different institution to the one envisaged even by the 
advocates of the Greenwich case. This thesis has shown that 
the period between the publication of the report and the 
opening of the new college was thus a crucial one ln the 
history of naval education. In particular it has 
demonstrated that the interregnum was not the product of 
indecision or the need for further adjudication, but rather 
the result of a process of political expediency in which the 
overwhelming feeling within the Service was overturned and 
large sums of money expended by one of the most frugal naval 
administrations of the century, in order to consolidate the 
Prime Minister's constituency power base. 
That the new college was larger and more comprehensive 
than the original model was undoubtedly due to the Tarleton 
Committee's deft exploration of the political dimension in 
this decision. The key point to make about this Committee, 
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and one that has not been previously understood, was that it 
was appointed after the Cabinet decision had been taken to 
move to Greenwich. The establishment of this political 
imperative thus gave Tarleton the latitude, even in a period 
of stringent naval economy, to expand in almost every respect 
the Shadwell vision of a higher education establishment. 
The overwhelming irony was that although the Royal Naval 
College was of a scale and magnitude that could hardly have 
been foreseen by the most ardent reformer, and although it 
represented a new liberality in the provision of higher 
education, all the evidence suggests that it was not what the 
Navy felt it required. For most naval officers of the 1870s 
the principal characteristic of advanced study was that it 
should be inextricably linked to practical application, and 
this in turn implied a colocation of college and working 
dockyard. This being the case, the early years at Greenwich 
were almost inevitably condemned to a faltering progress, for 
leadership was invariably invested in senior officers 
previously on record as favouring the antithesis of the 
College they led. 
Thus despite the provision of first class facilities and 
the injection of considerable finance, it is clear that the 
sense of confidence that underpinned the concept of initial 
training was lacking. This was evident not only ~n the 
general antipathy of the officer corps, but also ~n Admiralty 
conduct towards the new establishment. Despite the fact that 
Greenwich was clearly not what the Navy wanted, the Board 
approach remained ambivalent for some years after it was 
clear that its case had been lost. While they were prepared 
for example to invest the leadership of the College in an 
officer of Flag rank - a man who would normally command a 
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fleet of ships and thousands of men - there was a marked 
reluctance to award him any latitude or personal initiative 
in determining policy. The result was that a succession of 
Admirals' President, men described by one commentator as 
distinguished 'for breadth of view, maturity of judgement and 
t I · ,4 men a vlgour, far from shaping the progress and character 
of the institution, were required to petition the Board on 
even the smallest detail relating to college organisation. 
The foundation of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich 
undoubtedly represented a major advance in higher education 
provision. By almost any measurement - number of students, 
staff, administrative and technical support, range and 
content of courses - it constituted a step change over the 
facilities at Portsmouth. Yet it was also clear that the 
reorganisation was less than total, and that in particular 
there had been little devolvement of policy determination to 
the college authority. This remained the responsibility of 
the Board - an inexpert, frequently changing group whose 
views, no matter how well considered, were always vulnerable 
to political interference. The result was that educational 
policy continued to be devised on an 'ad hoc' basis, with an 
ill defined distinction maintained between the formulation of 
policy and its application. 
To some extent this shortcoming bedevilled the overall 
development of naval education throughout the period and it 
was thrown into stark relief with the retirement of Joseph 
Woolley, and the subsequent abolition of his post. This 
thesis has shown that Woolley was a major figure in the 
development of officer education whose influence was seldom 
absent from any important advance and who, contrary to 
previous assertion, was capable of both initiating and 
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executing policy. Yet the scale of his contribution and his 
formal title 'Director of Education' must not be confused 
with any notion of central control or authority. Indeed in 
his valedictory letter Woolley made it clear to the Board 
that it was this vital imperative that had been conspicuously 
absent during his time, and that the single most important 
reform in naval education would be to elevate his post to the 
equivalent of other heads of department. Only in this way 
could the future pattern of officer training be determined In 
a disciplined and logical manner. 
The failure of the Board to comply with Woolley's 
request, but merely to add his post to the existing duties of 
the Admiral President at Greenwich was both a missed 
opportunity and a retrograde step. While Woolley's formal 
power was never great he did at least possess a degree of 
independence and permanence in the post. Awarding the task 
to a senior serving officer militated against both of these 
qualities and meant that successive Admirals' President, 
denied by the Board any real autonomy, would be forced to 
treat the task largely as an administrative burden. Thus, 
far from improving the direction and control of naval 
education the reassignment of the position meant that impetus. 
was lost. In the short term this was evident in the 
Britannia, where the diligence and application that had 
characterised the inspectoral process faltered at a crucial 
point in the development of the syllabus. In the longer term 
it meant that the scope and nature of officer education would 
continue to be determined by makeshift and experiment, rather 
than the construction of a coherent, identifiable system. 
This disparate approach so puzzled American academic 
James Soley that in 1878 he concluded his detailed study of 
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the world's most powerful navy by observing that 'the high 
scientific and professional attainments of many English naval 
officers are not in consequence, but in spite of their early 
education,.5 While it is easy to understand Soley's sense of 
bemusement, his judgement seems harsh - particularly when it 
is remembered that at this stage the Britannia system was 
scarcely 20 years old and the Royal Naval College 
considerably less. Nor, unlike the United States or Japan, 
did the Royal Navy have the advantage of establishing a 
system untrammelled by historical associations and precedents 
that in part militated against systematic planning. Given 
these considerations, and that the first two decades of 
formal educational provision in the Service were almost 
exactly coincidental with an era of retrenchment in spending 
and public indifference to naval affairs, it is perhaps more 
pertinent to note the extent to which the education process 
did touch the officer corps. For regardless of its uneven 
pattern of development, by 1877 an identifiable system of 
education applying to all personnel had emerged. While it 
certainly lacked cohesion and refinement, and in some areas 
was demonstrably inefficient, it stood in marked contrast to 
the conditions at the start of the period. 
Yet within a matter of years the dark age of the 
Victorian navy that had fostered this pattern of officer 
training was itself drawing to a close. From 1877 the annual 
naval estimate was never to fall below £10 million again and 
by 1884 the work of the Imperial Federation League and the 
'Truth about the Navy' campaign waged by newspaper editor W T 
Stead, was effectively bringing to an end the era of public 
indifference to naval affairs. In the remaining years of the 
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century, popular pressure obliged successive governments to 
enlarge the Service, to the extent that by 1896 the Royal 
Navy was absorbing one fifth of all government expenditure 
and the Admiralty was employing, directly and indirectly, ln 
excess of two per cent of the working population. 6 
While there is much to support the concept of a new era 
in British naval history commencing in the early l880s, it is 
clear that the change constituted something less than a 
complete revolution. It has been extensively argued for 
example, that despite the rapid expansion of the Service and 
the novel range of artefacts - long range ordnance, 
torpedoes, submarines and mines - it was called to operate, 
there was little evidence of an accompanying shift in the 
values and mental attitudes of its leadership. Both Fisher 
and Beatty were fierce critics of the intellectual calibre of 
fellow senior officers,7 and Churchill himself complained of 
'a frightful dearth of first class men in the Vice Admiral 
and Rear Admiral lists,.8 It has since been popularly argued 
that, in the midst of considerable scientific progress, the 
officer corps of the late Victorian and Edwardian navy 
remained unreceptive to new ideas, and characterised by 
narrow-mindedness and chauvinism. By 1900, one commentator 
has claimed, 'even the ablest minds of the Navy lived in the 
9 day before yesterday'. 
If this view is accepted, it is clearly appropriate to 
ask how successfully the educational practices established in 
the period covered by this thesis equipped the officer corps 
to meet the challenges of the late nineteenth century and 
beyond. It has been popularly suggested that the paucity of 
intellect in the officer corps was related, in part at least, 
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to the fact that its members had received an education 
heavily imbued with the values of another age - that they 
were in a sense more fitted for the quarterdeck of HMS 
Victory, than a modern ironclad. IO Much has been made, for 
example, of the disparity between the physical surroundings 
of the old wooden walled training ship and the conditions in 
the new mechanised Navy, and in this respect the retention of 
sail based seamanship ln the syllabus is cited as an instance 
of myopia towards the training process. ll Marder, for 
example, envisages a direct connection between what he terms 
'the faulty, obsolete system of education with its stress on 
outmoded subjects' and the fact that by 1900 the Navy could 
boast 'few Admirals of conspicuous ability,.12 
Yet the evidence of this thesis is that if there was a 
fault in the Britannia syllabus it was not that it was 
irrelevant or outmoded, but quite the opposite - that it was 
far too objectively and vocationally orientated. The 
academic element, which was considerable and consisted of a 
solid diet of algebra, arithmetic and spherical trigonometry, 
was quite specifically designed to produce skilled ship 
handlers and accomplished navigators, and it appeared to do 
so. Similarly the element of sail training that remained was 
not justified on grounds of practical application, but rather 
because it was felt to enhance relevant character and 
leadership skills and foster qualities of courage and 
'I' 13 physical agility considered essential in a ml ltary career. 
Once again the experience of the late nineteenth century and 
beyond suggests that bravery, devotion to duty and high 
morale were seldom lacking in the officer corps. 
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Other characteristics of the system undoubtedly imposed 
long-term penalties. The persistent, deliberate policy of 
entering Cadets at as early an age as possible, meant that 
their general schooling and contact with those destined for 
other professions, was completed by the age of 12. All study 
effectively ceased two years later, and by the age of 15 the 
young officer was borne on the complement of an operational 
warship. By any contemporary comparison this was narrow, 
limited training, and while the academic course may have 
produced stolid watchkeeping officers, it probably did little 
for the development of informed judgement. Similarly, the 
almost total lack of history, geography or literary skills ln 
early training may have contributed to a basic antipathy 
towards theoretical and academic study of the naval 
profession, later in a career. 
Thus, while there were undoubtedly shortcomings in the 
training curriculum, detailed research suggests that they 
were not the ones commonly cited. Neither can they be said 
to be the product of decadence or haphazard thinking, indeed 
the evidence suggests that the content of young officer 
training was based on rigid empiricism and in particular, a 
narrow objective concept of the work an officer might be 
expected to perform. 
If there was a tangible link between educational 
practice and the poor calibre of the officer corps, it 
probably lay less in the Britannia and more in the general 
approach to recruitment and selection. At the heart of this 
lay the process of absolute nomination which, while 
effectively allowing senior officers to select the next 
generation of naval leadership, meant that recruits were 
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drawn solely from families with naval connections or 
influence. Despite the advances in training from 1857, the 
degree of intellectual ability required for entry remained 
minimal. Even with the advent of tougher examinations ln 
1881, the calibre remained low and the recruiting pool 
shallow - indeed it has been argued that this step merely 
increased reliance on the quasi-preparatory school or 
'crammer,.14 Th th "t" d 
us, e nomlna lon proce ure, which continued 
into the early years of the twentieth century,15 combined 
with an Admiralty requirement for at least three years fees 
for each Cadet, effectively limited catchment to a narrow 
section of society. The evidence of various enquiries in the 
two decades from 1857 suggests that the Navy did not attract 
the best of even this small group. 
The problems created by exclusive recruitment and an 
overly vocational approach were further compounded by 
prejudice within the officer corps towards technical matters, 
or more accurately towards those who dealt with them. 
Clearly by 1900 the Service faced a series of technological 
challenges that even the most refined member of the executive 
branch could not avoid. Yet despite this, and the 
requirement dictated by the mechanised Fleet for closer 
integration and interdependence amongst the officer corps, 
the Service insisted on training its young engineers and 
executives separately. Even later, when courses were co-
located at Greenwich, rigid social distinctions, including 
separate messes, were maintained. Not only did this produce 
results inimicable to esprit de corps, but the difference ln 
pay, status and conditions first established in the 
respective training ships,16 eventually led to a shortage of 
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technical staff - the very men upon whom the modern Navy with 
its mass of intricate machinery, would ultimately depend. By 
1901 social prejudice towards engineers had become so serious 
that a deputation of Headmasters, led by Gow of Westminster, 
petitioned the Admiralty 'to intimate the impossibility of 
recommending the engineering branch as a desirable career,.17 
Such instances demonstrated that while a narrowly 
conceived, elitist education system may have been 
appropriate, or at least passed unnoticed, during the 
quiescent years of the Service, it was no foundation for 
leadership in an organisation at the forefront of Britain's 
second industrial revolution. It is clear that while the 
requirement for specialisation and technical expertise 
created by material progress was acknowledged, it also lay 
most uneasily with many of the traditions entrenched within 
the officer corps. 
Yet despite this unhappy situation and Fisher's 
energetic efforts to dispense with fees, introduce cornmon 
training and extend recruitment - in effect an attempt to 
demolish the principal features of the education system 
created in the 20 years from 1857 - the Royal Navy showed a 
remarkable capacity to retain many of the hallmarks 
established during this time. Although a slight reduction of 
parental fees was achieved after 1905, for example, the 
principle of free education for all Naval Cadets was not 
finally achieved until 1947. Only in that year was the 
entry age raised to 16, and it was almost a further decade 
before it was raised again to coincide with the age at which 
most potential officers finished their education. In this 
manner both parental fees and early (or at least earlier than 
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most professions) entry, remained a feature of naval life for 
the first half of the twentieth century. 
Similarly, Fisher's ideal of common training and parity 
of promotion between the various specialisations of the 
officer corps also took decades to come to fruition. Despite 
the success of 'amalgamated training' established in the 
United States in 1899, the philosophy was deliberately 
reversed in the Royal Navy in 1925 when, far from striving 
towards commonality, the officer corps was re-divided into 
twelve separate categories. 18 The same measure also reserved 
both ship command and the exercise of military authority 
exclusively for the executive branch. This decision, 
subsequently known as 'the great betrayal', effectively 
limited engineers' advancement until the officer structure 
was fundamentally revised in 1957. Yet even until recently, 
certain appointments have remained the sole preserve of 
executive officers - as late as 1988, command of the Royal 
Naval College, Dartmouth was one such post, and at the time 
of writing, no engineer officer has ever become First or 
Second Sea Lord. 
In higher education some of the same limitations that 
beset earlier training may also be observed, albeit in 
slightly different form. Although the Royal Naval College 
was a much larger and more liberal institution than most 
officers thought necessary, its syllabus was heavily 
influenced by the aim of 'cultivating the general 
intelligence of officers to improve their aptitude for the 
various duties, which a naval officer is called upon to 
perform,.l9 The problem was that these 'various duties' were 
so narrowly conceived that the syllabus concentrated almost 
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exclusively on technical and material matters. Not only did 
the majority of young executive officers view such pre-
occupations with a degree of contempt, but the tendency of 
this side of the work to dominate naval thought meant that 
there was almost no place within the Navy's conception of 
higher study for the examination of broader matters, 
particularly tactics, strategy and naval history. 
Despite the fact that the general naval scene was 
changing more rapidly than at any time in the century, the 
value of ships as fighting instruments was still being 
studied almost solely from a technical standpoint. At 
Greenwich little time was devoted to thinking about wider 
matters such as who the enemy might be, or where and how a 
future battle might be fought. The value of history was 
widely derided, the study of international law largely 
ignored, and it was not until 1900 that a modest form of 
tactical training was introduced, via the Senior Officers 
War Course. Even this had a limited life span for, in an 
echo of the previous higher education debate, it was 
transferred in 1905 to Portsmouth, in order to become 'more 
practical,.20 Although the Royal Naval College undoubtedly 
taught to a very high standard, it never attempted to 
interpret its role in a wider context which promoted not 
only the acquisition of knowledge, but also the development 
of broader and more divergent thinking. 
One of the effects of this was that while the Royal 
Navy entered the First World War with the highest standards 
of seamanship and navigation, and while its officer corps 
had a morale which 'retained intact the traditions of 
21 
success that had buoyed them for the last century' the 
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organisation had serious shortcomings. The failure, for 
example, of its higher education establishment to develop 
any satisfactory staff system, or to examine naval affairs 
in a wider context, meant that senior officers were 
frequently cautious, unimaginative and unwilling to 
delegate. Conversely their subordinates, whose naval 
historical knowledge amounted only to tales of heroic action 
and daring deed, waited . expectation of ln a second 
Trafalgar, and wondered ln what manner the new Nelson might 
appear. 22 At the heart of an organisation with many 
admirable qualities, there was a lack of strategic and 
tactical awareness, and an incoherence in fighting doctrine 
that would both cost the country dear and, by 1918, 
effectively end the love affair between the Nation and its 
Navy. 
Yet it could be argued that the limitations of higher 
education detectable in the period of this study had an even 
more profound effect on the development of the Royal Navy in 
the twentieth century. For the lack of systematic naval 
history teaching and of serious strategic or tactical 
contemplation in the early years at Greenwich, did not 
simply leave a vacuum, but was rather replaced by the 
arguments of what Richmond has termed the 'School of 
. ,23 Experlence . Here it was maintained that the only place 
to learn about maritime strategy and tactics was actually at 
sea, where, as Till has caustically remarked, after a number 
of years on the bridge 'a mystical appreciation of what sea 
warfare was all about could be expected to descend on the 
head of the efficient naval officer, rather in the manner of 
24 , the Holy Ghost'. The 'primacy of practical experience 
argument commended itself to basic instincts of action and 
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courage within an officer corps which, despite its immersion 
in a puzzling array of new weaponry, apparently perceived 
the academic study of warfare as a process which would 
inevitably replace the fighting seaman with the bookworm. 25 
The overwhelming view within the officer corps, wrote Lord 
Esher, was that 'history is written for schoolmasters and 
armchair strategists. Statesmen and warriors pick their way 
through the dusk,.26 
Thus, even by 1900, there was a widespread antipathy 
towards the theoretical and academic study of the naval 
profession, and while seamanship, gunnery and devotion to 
duty were of the highest order, it was noted by a 
contemporary observer that 'officers who made any real study 
of war from the point of view of Staff work were regarded as 
cranks and lunatics, hunters of soft jobs L • 27 It was hardly 
surprlslng therefore that the first major scholarly study of 
seapower emanated, not from Dartmouth or Greenwich, but from 
Annapolis lecturer, Captain A T Mahan USN,28 and although 
his work was well received in Britain, it was in Germany and 
Japan that it became compulsory reading for all young 
officers. Despite being pre-eminent in the first four 
decades of the twentieth century the Royal Navy contributed 
remarkably little to the literature of maritime strategy or 
naval history, and the British sailor-scholar has been a 
notably rarer figure than his military counterpart. Even 
today, when the increasing complexity of maritime warfare 
would seem to imply a requirement for disciplined scrutiny, 
the academic component in British naval training is the 
shortest in NATO,29 and the arguments of the 'School of 
. 30 Experience' are still powerfully advanced. 
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It will be seen that many of the qualities associated 
with the late Victorian and Edwardian officer corps were 
derived, at least in part, from the system of education 
founded and developed in the period of this study. In 
addition, some of the distinguishing characteristics - high 
professional standards, exclusivity, the pursuit of 
gentlemanly ideals, the primacy of practical and operational 
experience, a distaste for academic or theoretical enquiry -
have demonstrated not only a capacity to survive, but to 
become synonymous with an approach regarded amongst the 
World's navies, as quintessentially British. 
These factors help to confirm the significance of the 
two decades from 1857 as the most important in the evolution 
of officer education in the Royal Navy. Not only was more 
progress made in the respective fields of initial and higher 
education that at any other time, but it was made, quite 
remarkably, against a background of public indifference, 
financial retrenchment and a general stasis in naval 
affairs. While it undoubtedly lacked cohesion and 
refinement, by 1877 educational provision not only stood in 
marked contrast to conditions at the start of the period, 
but also displayed hallmarks that were to remain imprinted 
on the officer corps of the Royal Navy to the present day. 
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